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 The surprise attacks of September 11, 2001, generated a need for more 
sophisticated models for the detection of potential threats. A prerequisite of such models 
is the ability to simulate reduced human performance realistically. Realistic human 
performance should include the very human traits of imperfect perception, imperfect 
cognitive processing, and imperfect behavior. Imperfect or lowered performance caused 
by lack of information, lack of perception, or lack of cognitive resources, is termed 
“reduced human performance” and takes a variety of forms, which simulated entities 
must portray, if they are to be realistic.  
An unexpected event is called a surprise, and surprises are more likely to occur 
when performance is reduced. Thus surprises may be seen as a by-product of reduced 
human performance. A sophisticated cognitive model should generate surprises and 
unexpected outcomes as part of its portrayal of complex problem domains. 
Current cognitive models not only lack flexibility and realism, they fail to model 
individual behavior and reduced performance. This research analyzes current cognitive 
theories (namely, symbolism, connectionism, and dynamicism). We then hypothesize that 
reduced human performance can be best modeled as a complex adaptive system. The 
resulting multi-agent model Reduced Human Performance Model (RHPM) implements 
reactive agents (following a notion of Dr. Chris Wicken’s Multiple Resource Model) 
competing for cognitive resources. Lack of resources is used to trigger the simulation of 
imperfect perception and imperfect cognition.  
The developed multi-agent system generates adaptive and emergent behavior. The 
simulation system is calibrated with human experimental data in scenarios involving 
vigilance decrement, wherein vigilance is decreased during the first 30 minutes of a 
screening task. RHPM is validated against previous unknown vigilance task scenarios.  
RHPM generates realistic reduced human performance with a new cognitive 
modeling hypothesis. Its use for computer generated forces (i.e. radar screen operator) 
improves the realism of simulation systems by adding human like reduced performance.  
vi 
This research’s main contribution is the development of a well suited tool to 
mediate between vigilance theories such as signal detection theory and experimental data. 
It generates insights creating likely hypotheses to improve the theories.  
vii 
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A. THESIS STATEMENT 
Reduced human performance resulting from a sustained attention task can be 
modeled as a complex adaptive system (CAS) and the resulting computational model can 
be shown to approximate empirical human performance data under similar conditions. 
B. MOTIVATION 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—
is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in 
which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and 
the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out 
of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This 
is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans 
all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no 
more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”  
(Osama Bin Laden, Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans. 
Published in Al-Quds al-'Arabi on February 23, 1998) 
The motivation for this work is steered by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our 
research focus is aimed to support the war against terrorism. We hope to simulate 
potential outcomes and identify blind spots, thereby helping to prevent terrorist acts. 
Previous simulation systems have not been able to predict unlikely, but very dangerous, 
terrorist actions. Because the September 11 attacks came as a surprise, we focus our 
research on the unexpected, with questions such as: 
· How can we model surprises?  
· How can we categorize surprises? 
· What factors and kinds of performance reductions lead to blind spots?  
We claim that by employing composite-agent technology with a new cognitive 
model based on complex adaptive systems theory, we can achieve greater, unbiased 
insights into problems of human performance. Another expected improvement is implicit 
in the reality that complex adaptive systems produce emergent behavior that is often 
synonymous with surprise. 
 
 2 
John Holland, a founder of CAS theory, said: 
I just love these things where the situation unfolds and I say,’ Gee whiz! 
Did that really come from these assumptions!?’ Because if I do it right, if 
the underlying rules of evolution of the themes are in control and not me, 
then I’ll be surprised. And if I’m not surprised, then I am not very happy, 
because I know I’ve built everything in from the start. (Waldrop 1992, 
p.152). 
 
The next section explains the background and shows a possible path towards 
developing a new cognitive model. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, 
diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility so poorly 
defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps 
in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too 
precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes 
the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone so often that it 
has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one 
who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority 
out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also 
those that everybody assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes 
straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal 
disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human 
beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion - which 
is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical 
background to tip us off to the climax). Finally at Pearl Harbor, surprise 
may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, 
and possibly some sheer bad luck. 
The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The 
failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. 
This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be 
described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at 
the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything in a government's (or in an 
alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively. 
(Schelling 1962, p. I) 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, showed not for the first time in Western 
history, a need for threat-analysis simulation models that, unlike current models, are 
capable of generating or revealing surprises, unintended consequences, and blind spots 
(Smith 2002).   
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Israel had suffered a surprise attack in 1973. Egypt and Syrian forces attacked a 
somewhat ill-prepared Israeli defense force. Intense retrospection led to the conclusion 
that there was no single cause for the victim’s surprise. Chorev concluded that  
Israel deceived itself: the adherence to the “conception”, the faith in its 
military deterrence power, the unwillingness to believe that the Arabs 
would take so great risks and the “wishful thinking” all of these, rather 
than deception, contributed to its crucial surprise. 
 
Chorev mentioned three safeguards to ward off surprise attacks: 
1. Increase awareness of limitations- to the nature of judgmental biases and 
the limitations of the intelligence process; 
2. Improving the formation of hypotheses – in order to increase the perceived 
likelihood of alternative interpretations and scenarios that may sensitize 
analysts and decision makers to discrepant information; 
3. Improving information processing – especially by using quantitative and 
empirical methods to facilitate the information process.(Chorev 1996, 
p.23) 
 
Different types of simulation models, taking these safeguards into account, are 
needed to support analysts evaluating potential threats to individuals, organizations and 
even societies. One common technique in intelligence analysis use is “backward 
thinking”, in which the analyst envisions an outcome and traces how this outcome might 
have become possible (Heuer 1999). A model that generates potential outcomes or 
hypotheses and provides an event trace would be an invaluable tool. To provide a benefit, 
this model has to generate outcomes that surprise the analyst and further his critical 
thinking. To find surprise in a specific context, two kinds of conditions must be modeled: 
· Logical conditions that determine whether the surprising action or 
outcome is physically possible, and therefore credible. 
· Subjective conditions: 
o The target must have a weakness he/she was ignorant of. 
o The opportunist must be motivated in such a way as to cause him 
to discover the weakness and exploit it. 
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Currently there are no cognitive models that accommodate subjective conditions. 
The National Research Council report on modeling human and organizational behavior 
states: 
Even the best of them [cognitive models] assume ideal human behavior 
according to doctrine that will be carried out literally, and rarely take 
account of the vagaries of human performance capacities (Pew and Mavor 
1998, p.34).  
 
Current cognitive models have several identified weaknesses. The council’s report 
and other sources describe those in detail (Pew and Mavor 1998; Ritter, Shadbolt et al. 
1999). A major criticism to rule-based approaches, for example, is that these systems are 
mechanistic, brittle, and unable to cope with unforeseen events.  
Another major weakness is stated in a psychological bulletin: 
Cognitive Psychology has developed as a domain in which basic rules of 
human information processing are investigated. This kind of approach 
often neglects the existence and importance of individual differences. At 
best, such differences are regarded as troublesome though not much 
interesting source of variation of results observed in various cognitive 
tasks. The psychology of individual differences, on the other hand, has 
developed as a domain in which differentiation of human traits as well as 
intercorrelation between them, are of basic interest. This approach usually 
neglects cognitive processes underlying human traits, although one can 
argue that traits are just behavioral expressions of elementary cognitive 
and physiological processes. It seems that combination of the processual 
approach, typical of experimental cognitive psychology, with the 
correlational approach, typical of the psychology of individual differences, 
is of utmost necessity. Only through such combination is it likely to obtain 
valid theoretical models, which would be able to link variables from the 
domain of temperament, personality, and cognition. (Nêcka and Szymura 
2001, p.159). 
From our perspective there are two main weaknesses to overcome to meet the 
requirements for threat-analysis simulation models: 
1) Current cognitive models generate neither adaptation1 nor emergent 
behavior2, which are essential features of individual human behavior 
modeling. 
                                                 
1 Adaptation is defined as a process whereby an organism fits itself to its environment( after : Holland, 
Holland, 1995). 
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2) Current cognitive models do not model individual human-performance 
reduction, which leads to homogenous, predictable, and unrealistic model 
behavior. 
We hypothesize that we can overcome these weaknesses by using complex 
adaptive systems theory as the foundation for a new cognitive architecture. The expected 
advantages are the simulation of autonomous, emergent, flexible, self-explaining, 
adaptive, dynamic and robust behaviors.  
Modeling surprises and blind spots requires an indirect approach3 that helps us 
explore a wider problem domain. Classical direct approaches4 often have a biased 
confined area (box) of analyst expectations. The boundaries of direct approaches are 
predetermined by the modeler and represent the degrees of freedom of the model. This 
type of approach has been used very successfully for linear problem domains. Non-linear 
problem domains often require heuristics in order to define the needed constraints. A 
basic property of CAS is its non-linearity (Holland 1995). Indirect modeling approaches, 
like multi agent system (MAS) modeling, search the entire domain, constrained by 
physical boundaries only. 
D. THE COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM HYPOTHESIS (CASH) 
Now we come to the core hypothesis of this research:  
Reduced human performance can be modeled as a complex adaptive system.  
Murray Gell-Mann claimed in 1994 that “Each of us humans functions in many 
different ways as a complex adaptive system” (Gell-Mann 1994). There have been a 
number of researchers (e.g., Melanie Mitchell of Santa Fe Institute, NM, and John 
Sokolowski of Old Dominion University, VA) working implicitly under this assumption. 
                                                 
2 Emergent behavior is a behavior on a higher level that is generated by interactions and behaviors on a 
lower level. Often it is referred to as micro decisions lead to macro behavior. (Schelling, T. C. 1978). 
3 An indirect approach is an approach where there is no pre-programmed path to a solution. 
Autonomous software agents determine their path within physical boundaries. 
4 A direct approach is an approach where the modeler conceives an algorithmic solution to a problem 
and implements that solution into software. 
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Manifestly the hypothesis is not a new insight, but the formulation of what has hitherto 
been implied. However, the hypothesis has not yet been established in cognitive sciences.  
Holland defined a CAS as a nonlinear dynamical system, composed of many 
interacting, hierarchically organized agents, continuously adapting to a changing 
environment. He described a variety of complex adaptive systems, all of which display 
the central enigma of coherence under change. Holland claims that CAS behavior is 
determined by general principles and that CAS typically have lever points.5 He describes 
key properties (aggregation, non-linearity, flows, diversity) and mechanisms (tags, 
internal models, building blocks) central to understanding CAS (Holland 1995; Holland 
1998). We will describe details on complex adaptive systems theory later on.  
The ultimate goal for a cognitive model is an “integrative architecture that 
subsumes all or most of the contributors to human performance capacities and 
limitations” (Pew and Mavor 1998). It appears to be widely accepted that human 
behavior can be modeled with a stage model of information processing. Broadbent 
generated the first ideas with his single resource theory. Kahnemann6 was a major 
proponent of the single-resource model and showed that the cognitive capacity varies 
depending on arousal level and other variables (Wickens 1992). However, research in 
multitasking showed convincing evidence against a single-source theory. Wickens 
expanded the model to include then-current insights of psychology and social sciences. 
He also suggested a widely acknowledged model for the human information process. 
                                                 
5 Lever points are points wherein a small change in the input amount can lead to a large directed 
change. The immune system is a good example of this type of behavior. Upon introduction of a small 
amount of vaccine, the immune system adapts rapidly to develop immunity. 
























Figure 1.   Stage Model of Human Information Processing (From :Wickens,1992) 
 
Figure 1 shows the different stages for the human information processing. A 
stimulus is stored in the short-term sensory store (STSS) for a few seconds (visual 
stimulus about 1 second, auditory stimulus about 5 sec; echoic memory). If it is not 
perceived within this timeframe, it is not a perception. Perceptions are sometimes 
matched with patterns, likely stored in long-term memory7. This is the encoding stage.  
Next, during the central processing stage, the perception is forwarded to the 
decision- and response-selection system, which uses the working memory to determine 
whether an action should be initiated. The last stage is the response-execution stage, 
which leads either to a vocal or manual response to the perceived stimuli (Wickens 
1992).  
(Pew and Mavor 1998) modified this model slightly to show the elements that 
should be included in an integrative architecture. They left out the STSS and connected 
the perception to long-term memory via working memory. However, a major alteration to 
                                                 
7 One example for a pattern is the recognition of the letter “a”. Long term memory provides different 
types of a’s (A, a,A…)  
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the original stage model is the fact that Pew did not show the attentive resources that are 
central to modeling reduced performance (Pew and Mavor 1998). 
Thus, we will use the original stage model in order to show that all the elements 
of the stage model can be modeled with CAS. The nonlinear interactions between the 
attentive resources have different effects on the information processing stages, which 
eventually result in interesting human-like emergent behavior. 
We define reduced human performance as performance degradation over time. 
The reduction is sometimes quantifiable in measures for speed and/or accuracy. Vigilance 
decrement is an excellent example of performance degradation; our inability to sustain 
attention for a long time is well known to all. Attention depends very much on available 
cognitive resources, and sustained attention is a high-workload task (Wickens 2002). 
Other factors besides time can degrade performance. Stress, heat, sleep 
deprivation, injury, and loss of motivation are among the many factors that may be 
involved. These factors may not have the same effect on a person at all times; some 
effects may even cancel each other out (e.g. fatigue vs. noise) (Davies and Tune 1970; 
Davies and Parasuraman 1982; Warm 1984; Parasuraman 1998). Obviously degradation 
is a dynamic and highly non-linear process, and as a feature of a CAS, well established. 
The next question to answer is whether the structure of the underlying process is to some 
degree hierarchical.   
Wickens’ multiple resource model assumes that cognitive resources can be 













Figure 2.   Multiple Resource Model (After: Wickens, 2002) 
 
Figure 2 is an adaptation of the better known cube that can be seen in many 
textbooks (Wickens 1992; Matthews, Davies et al. 2000; Wickens 2002). It assumes we 
have two main resource pools: one for the perceptual and central-processing phase, and 
one for the response-selection and execution phase. These resources can be divided into 
verbal and spatial, or, respectively, vocal and manual. The structure indicates a 
hierarchical system. The system is also adaptive since we can focus our attention 
(selective attention), thus filtering information to a certain extent. Thus, we adapt our 
cognitive resource consciously or subconsciously (or both) to a changing environment. 
This research claims that Wickens’ multiple resource theory fits into Holland’s definition 
of a complex adaptive system.  
E. APPROACH 
Our research is based on the hypothesis that reduced human performance can be 
modeled as a complex adaptive system. Our hypothesis synthesizes strengths of other 
cognitive theories like connectionism, symbolism, and dynamicism.  
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Instead of using connected neurons in a neural network, we will model agents that 
establish timely restricted connections. Thus we use a loosely coupled8 network of MAS, 
which are an ideal implementation tool for CAS (Axelrod 1997). We inherit the strength 
of the symbolic approach9 by using symbolic representation within our agents. Our 
connected agents will work in parallel, exploiting the main strength of the connectionism 
approach. Connections are established via communication routers, allowing us to cancel 
or add new connections during runtime. This addresses the time dimension utilizing the 
strength of the dynamic approach. 
1.  Reduced Human Performance Model (RHPM) 
Our reduced human performance model first try to capture the effects of vigilance 
decrement, such as that which plagues security screeners at airports. Many studies 
involving reduced visual and auditory vigilance provide real-world data as a reference 
(Matthews, Davies et al. 1990; Koelega 1992; Matthews and Holley 1993; Sawin and 
Scerbo 1995; See, Howe et al. 1995; Gill 1996; Bahri 1994; See, Warm et al. 1997; 
Balakrishnan 1998; Lane and Kasian 1998; Methot and Huitema 1998; Fenner, Leahy et 
al. 1999; Temple, Warm et al. 2000; Zoccolotti, Matano et al. 2000). We conduct our 
own experiment and utilize substantial research data to validate our model. Our approach 





                                                 
8 Loosely coupled is a software engineering term. It indicates that our architecture is composed of 
modules that can operate independently from each other. Interaction between modules is based on 
communication, thus modules can be exchanged and/or  replaced at any time Bradley, G., A. Buss, et al. 
(1998). "An Architecture for Dynamic Planning and Execution using Loosely Coupled Components." 
Naval Postgraduate School Research Newsletter 8: 1-7. Chapter 4 describes the concept more closely. 
9 Symbolic representations are understandable for the users, whereas the interpretation of weights on 
nodes and connection (as in neural networks) is not intuitive at all. 
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execution stage  
Figure 3.   Conceptual Framework for Reduced Human Performance Model 
 
Figure 3 shows the RHPM framework. Symbolic constructor agents (SCA) 
perceive information (impressions) and relay them to the cognitive module, which holds 
a symbolic interpretation of the outer environment. The symbolic representation depends 
on the inner state of the system. For example, a highly aroused person may perceive 
background noise as a threat, whereas somebody used to the noise might not even register 
this information. The cognitive module is a multi-agent system itself and contains several 
diverse composite agents. This module coordinates intentions with actions and creates 
behavior. The Capacity Manager is a multi-agent system, based on Wickens’ Multiple 
Resource Model, which determines the current arousal level and introduces noise into the 
system. It can also interrupt transitions and access the cognitive module to suppress 
processes. The impression stream is analyzed and, if appropriate, a capacity decrease is 
initiated. It also evaluates capacity demands of planned activities, determining whether 
these activities will be executed.  
The Individual States and Traits (IST) module represents the personality, 
emotions and goals. The GoalAgent deals with conflicting goals and actions. It uses a 
weighting scheme based on personality traits to determine how to act in the face of 
opposing goals. An example for a goal conflict might occur when an airport security 
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screener sees a long line of travelers waiting. He wants to decrease the queue, but also 
wants to find any potential weapons. At some point he detects an item he cannot identify 
but which does not look like a weapon. What will he do? The answer may lie in his 
personality.  
Personality plays a major role in human performance but does not account for 
much of the variance. To go back to our example, there is evidence that introverts 
outperform extraverts when it comes to screening (Methot and Huitema 1998; Gusev and 
Schapkin 2001; Schapkin and Gusev 2001). The Stress Agent will capture the sensitivity 
of human performance to increasing arousal. Evidence suggests that under conditions of 
high arousal, an extrovert will outperform an introvert (Matthews, Davies et al. 1990) and 
probably examine the unidentifiable item. A realistic cognitive model should capture this 
interplay between conditions and personality. 
We strive to create a cognitive model that can identify weaknesses in 
organizations by modeling the effects of reduced human performance. Decisions and 
policies of not-so-rational actors can be exploited to further some malevolent goal, so 
agents must be forced to operate and decide with imperfect knowledge and restricted 
cognitive resources. 
F. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research strives to suggest a new cognitive model that simulates individual 
reduced human performance. Our reduced human performance model is one of the 
milestones to build a new kind of threat analysis simulation system. 
1.  Contribution Goals  
Our research has four main goals: 
·  To inaugurate a paradigm shift in human behavior modeling that takes 
vagary into account based on convincing evidence from many sources. 
· To propose a framework for the next-generation cognitive architecture 
(reduced human performance model RHPM) and to explain the 
advantages of the proposed framework. 
· To implement parts of the framework to show its contribution by 
modeling the challenging problem of individual vigilance decrement. 
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· To validate the implemented RHPM with quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. 
2.  Scope 
It is beyond the scope of this research to design, implement and validate a new 
cognitive architecture. However, even a partial implementation should be embedded in a 
framework using proper design techniques so that the model can be enlarged at any time. 
The theoretical underpinnings of our hypothesis need to be established by comparing and 
contrasting new findings in different sciences. This research focuses on three main 
points: 
1. Reduced Human Performance can be modeled as a complex adaptive 
system. 
2. The developed model allows the provisional working criteria for a 
complex adaptive system to develop. 
3. The RHP Model is strongly connected to the observations of human 
experiments. 
Our implementation focuses on cognitive resource modeling with respect to 
vigilance tasks. This is meant as a proof-of-concept implementation and should add 
validity to our hypothesis. Considerable future work is required in order to implement the 
full framework. 
G. DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  
· Chapter II, Related Work, describes current research on complex 
adaptive systems in different fields. It uses a taxonomy to recognize CAS. 
We will show the motivation behind applying CAS theory to this 
particular field and also show the benefits. This chapter also describes 
current state-of-the-art cognitive modeling, pointing out strengths and 
weaknesses of cognitive models in terms of human-performance 
reduction.  
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· Chapter III, Reduced Human Performance, introduces basics of human 
performa nce and relevant studies in vigilance performance. It describes 
the connection between attention, arousal, and vigilance in depth. It then 
shows and explains the main findings of conducted personality type and 
vigilance experiments.  
· Chapter IV, Reduced Human Performance Model (RHPM), details 
how the reduced human performance model and our composite agent map 
onto each other. It states model assumptions and relates the design to 
psychological models. 
· Chapter V, Experiments and Results, describes the design of 
experiments and provides results. It also compares the achievements of 
RHPM’s implementation with current cognitive models.   
· Chapter VI, Conclusion and Follow-on Work, summarizes our 




II.  RELATED WORK 
 
Our research expands into two research areas: complex adaptive systems theory 
and cognitive modeling. In this chapter, we describe applications of CAS theory to 
different sciences and cognitive modeling and its current state of development. We 
include strengths and weaknesses of some cognitive theories and resulting architectures 
in terms of human-performance reduction.  
A.  COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
CAS theory has been successfully applied to various sciences like sociology and 
medicine. Historically, many sciences were founded based on Newton’s mechanistic 
explanation of physics. Newton hypothesized that the universe is mechanistic. He 
envisioned the universe as a gigantic mechanic clock, where simple rules govern the 
relationship of the single parts of this clock (Newton 1729). Since his rules were very 
well suited to explain many phenomena (e.g. movement of stars in relation to each other), 
his approach became the overwhelming approach for almost 250 years. Einstein’s 
relativity theory showed where Newtonian physics fell short. Thus physics was probably 
the first science that found complementary theories expanding the mechanistic worldview 
incorporating dynamics of space and time relationships. Dynamic systems constantly 
change into different equilibria and never maintain a particular equilibrium (Gell-Mann 
1994). Meanwhile many other sciences are beginning to use CAS theory looking at their 
domain from a different perspective. Economy is a prime example on how CAS theory 
has changed the perception of a former static theory, called the neoclassical approach. 
The initial research at the Santa Fe Institute (Arthur 1994; Cowan, Pines et al. 1994; 
Arthur 1999) specifically used economics as one application area. We will describe some 
of the applications later. 
1. Definitions for Complex Adaptive System (CAS) 
a. Santa Fe Institute’s Definitions 
In 1995 researchers at the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico formulated a 
new way of using computer programs for research. John Holland, often called the father 
of genetic systems, explained his ideas on complex adaptive systems during the Ulam 
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series at the institute. Michel Waldrop outlined the ten most important points of 
Holland’s lecture: 
1) First each of these systems is a network of many agents acting in 
parallel. 
2) Furthermore, the control of a complex adaptive system is highly 
dispersed. There is no master neurone in the brain, for example, 
nor is there any master cell within a developing embryo. If there is 
to be any coherent behaviour in the system it has to arise from 
competition and cooperation among the agents themselves. 
3) Second, a complex adaptive system has many levels of 
organisation, with agents at any one level serving as building 
blocks for agents at a higher level. A group of proteins, lipids, and 
nucleic acids will form a cell, a group of cells will form a tissue, a 
collection of tissues will form an organ, etcetera. 
4) Furthermore, said Holland - and this is something he considered 
very important - complex adaptive systems are constantly revising 
and rearranging their building blocks as they gain experience. 
Succeeding generations of organisms will modify and rearrange 
their tissues through the process of evolution. The brain will 
continually strengthen and weaken myriad connections between its 
neurons as an individual learns from his or her encounters with the 
world. 
5) At some deep, fundamental level, all these processes of learning, 
evolution and adaptation are the same. And one of the fundamental 
mechanisms of adaptation in any given system is this revision and 
recombination of the building blocks. 
6) Third, he said, all complex adaptive systems anticipate the future. 
7) More generally, every complex adaptive system is constantly 
making predictions based on its various internal models of the 
world - its implicit or explicit assumptions about the way things 
are out there. Furthermore, these models are much more than 
passive blueprints. They are active. Like subroutines in a computer 
program, they can come to life in a given situation and ‘execute,’ 
producing behaviour in the system. In fact, you can think of 
internal models as the building blocks of behaviour. And like any 
other building blocks, they can be tested, refined, and rearranged 
as the system gets experience. 
8) Finally, said Holland, complex adaptive systems typically have 
many niches, each one of which can be exploited by an agent 
adapted to fill that niche. 
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9) And that, in turn, means that it is essentially meaningless to talk 
about a complex adaptive system as in a state of equilibrium: the 
system can never get there. It is always unfolding, always in 
transition. In fact if the system ever does reach equilibrium, it isn’t 
just stable. It’s dead! 
10) And by the same token, there’s no point imagining the agents in 
the system can optimize their fitness, or their utility, or whatever. 
The space of possibilities is too vast; they have no practical way of 
finding the optimum. The most they can ever do is change to 
improve themselves relative to what the other agents are doing. In 
short, complex adaptive systems are characterized by continuous 
novelty (Waldrop 1992, p.42).  
Murray Gell-Mann10 explains CAS:  
A complex adaptive system acquires information about its environment 
and its own interaction with that environment, identifying regularities in 
that information, condensing those regularities into a kind of “schema” or 
model, and acting in the real world on the basis of that schema. In each 
case, there are various competing schemata, and the results of the action in 
the real world feed back to the influence the competition among those 
schemata (Gell-Mann 1994, p.165). 
These statements indicate that there is no standard definition for complex adaptive 
systems. Some researchers call the CAS approach the third way of doing science (Arthur 
1994; Axelrod 1997). CAS provide insights into a problem domain, but these insights do 
not necessarily forecast certain behaviors or behavioral ranges. Thus CAS do not function 
as “weather forecasting tools” rather, they show possible interaction producing emergent 
behavior that could potentially occur at some point. Next we will describe our own 
provisional definition and define working criterias to discern whether or not a system is a 
complex adaptive system. 
 b. Provisional Working Definition 
 A complex adaptive system consists of many autonomous agents that act 
in parallel with decentralized control. The non-linear interaction between these agents 
leads to adaptive and emergent behavior. The agents are organized in dynamically re-
arranging structures that change into different equilibria and never maintain a particular 
equilibrium. In many systems, the CAS builds an internal (implicit or explicit) model of 
the future. There is a strong sense of path dependency in CAS. This property is built upon 
                                                 
10 Murray Gell-Mann won the Nobel Price in 1969 for his contributions to the discovery of the quark. 
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the interaction of autonomous active entities and the non-linearity of their impact upon 
each other. As the system’s structure evolves it incorporates information that can serve as 
the foundation for new interaction and new behavior. 
 The following taxonomy can be derived from this definition: 
· Does the system consist of autonomous agents that act in parallel? 
· Is the control of the system highly dispersed? 
· Do the agents engage in non-linear interactions? 
· Does the system adapt and does it produce emergent behavior? 
· Is the system changing its structure dynamically?  
· Does the system permanently change into different equilibria? 
· Does the system anticipate the future? 
· Does the system have a strong sense of path dependency? 
Next we will describe some applications of CAS in more detail. We focus on the 
classical examples showing what additional insights they generated. 
2. Ecological Science 
Ecological science is the study of relationships between living things and their 
environments. Complex adaptive systems theory has been used to describe the 
interactions between elements in an ecological system. Examples for the applications 
include salmon habitats as CAS with the SWARM software (Minar, Burkhart et al. 
1996), and livestock breeding industries as CAS (Charteris, Golden et al. 2001).  The 
classic example in ecological science, however, is Sugarscape. 
a. Sugarscape  
Sugarscape models artificial societies in an environment that consists of 
resources (sugar and spices). Simple rules govern the behavior of autonomous agents and 
produce rich emergent behavior. Sugarscape starts with a very simple artificial world 
consisting of a landscape with sugar resources and agents gathering sugar.  
Epstein and Axtell describe their research goal: 
The broad aim of this research is to begin the development of a more 
unified social science, one that embeds evolutionary processes in a 
computational environment that simulates demographics, the transmission 
of culture, conflict, economics, disease, the emergence of groups, and 
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agent co adaptation with an environment, all from the bottom up. Artificial 
society–type models may change the way we think about explanation in 
the social sciences. What constitutes an explanation of an observed social 
phenomenon? Perhaps one day people will interpret the question, “Can 
you explain it?” as asking “Can you grow it?” Artificial society modeling 
allows us to “grow” social structures in silico demonstrating that certain 
sets of micro specifications are sufficient to generate the macro 
phenomena of interest. And that, after all, is a central aim. As social 
scientists, we are presented with “already emerged” collective phenomena, 
and we seek micro rules that can generate them. We can, of course, use 
statistics to test the match between the true, observed, structures and the 
ones we grow. But the ability to grow them—greatly facilitated by modern 
object-oriented programming—is what is new. Indeed, it holds out the 





Figure 4.   Sugarscape and Sugarscape with Agents ( From: Epstein and Axtell 1996, 
p.21) 
 
Figure 4 shows the basic setup of Sugarscape, with and without an agent 
population. Sugar-dense areas are yellow; white spaces contain no resources at all. 
Epstein and Axtell embellish this simple scenario by creating more and more behavioral 
rules for their agents. They show emergent phenomena like wealth distribution, social 
networks of neighbors, migration, combat, proto-history, economic networks, and 
disease-transmission networks.  
One example of generated emergent behavior is migration, which shows 
an aggregated behavior that single agents cannot achieve. Agents can move in only four 
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directions (north, south, west, and east). However, the population migrates diagonally in 
waves, from the lower-left corner to the upper right (north east) on their quest for sugar.  
The authors conclude: 
A wide range of important social, or collective, phenomena can be made 
to emerge from the spatio-temporal interaction of autonomous agents 
operating on landscapes under simple local rules (Epstein and Axtell 1996, 
p.172). 
 
The authors provide a CD containing movies of the dynamic changes in 
certain situations. The visual impact is impressively dynamic. This is certainly a gain in 
understanding how certain phenomena in societies arise. It is up to social scientists to 
compare how the model’s rules and assumptions relate to real-world cause and effect. 
Even if real-world factors are more complicated, CAS provides ways and means to 
simulate these phenomena in ecology.  
3. Organizational Science 
Mitleton-Kelly11 provided an overview on how complexity theory changes the 
perspective on organizational science. She criticizes the assumption that individuals 
exhibit average behaviors which becomes predictable. In her opinion, this assumption 
leads to a mechanistic linear model that is counterproductive in providing insights into 
the different emergent phenomena in an organization. The interaction between 
individuals with non-average behavior generates unpredictable, non-linear, and multiple 
outcomes. These traditional models also do not take the system’s sensitivity to initial 
conditions into consideration. Thus important factors for the system’s behavior are 
simply left out of the analysis. The behavior of a dynamic system might be unpredictable, 
but the range of possibilities is limited. She calls the limited range of behaviors “bounded 
instability” (Mitleton-Kelly 1997).  
In the state of bounded instability, strategy and planning acquires a new 
meaning and the emphasis changes from established methodologies to 
new ways of thinking. Some planning tools, such as scenario planning, 
may still be used, but they will need to be applied in a different way and 
seen from a fresh perspective. If uncertainty increases to the point of 
instability, with the associated high turbulence, then all conventional 
planning approaches become totally ineffective. The difference between 
                                                 
11 This paper was awarded Best Paper in Process Management by the British Academy of 
Management  in recognition of its ‘excellence and influence’ in 1997. 
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the states of bounded instability and instability, is that in the transition 
phase, analogous to the edge of chaos, the behaviour may be new but it 
does have pattern and structure. It will be the ability to recognize new 
patterns as they emerge which will provide organisations with a real 
competitive advantage in the future. Thinking in complexity terms helps in 
‘seeing’ the new patterns (Mitleton-Kelly 1997, p.15). 
 
 Marion and Bacon (Marion and Bacon 2000) describe how complexity theory can 
help to gain insights into the phenomenon of extinction. Thus they try to answer the 
question how robust, complex systems can become extinct. Classical reductionist theories 
assume single causes for extinction, like the failure of new organizations (liability of 
newness), improper organizational structure, and organizational inertia among other 
theories. The authors claim that these theories overly simplify the underlying processes 
and that the extinction of a complex systems results from multiple interactive events and 
involved multiple chains of interaction. A system builds meta-aggregates by integrating 
agents that provide raw material to an organization (i.e. suppliers). Other agents that 
potentially have long-range impact on environment, supplies, and  the like build the 
meta-meta-aggregate of an organization. Marion and Bacon hypothesize: 
Extinction or decline (defined as failure to achieve stated or assumed 
goals) can occur when meta- and meta-meta-aggregates are poorly 
developed, they can occur because complex systems are, by definition, 
poised on the brink of disaster, and they occur when networks deteriorate 
(Marion and Bacon, 2000, p.92). 
 
They concluded that poorly developed meta- and meta-meta-aggregates and 
deteriorating networks caused the failure of two businesses. The fit organization did show 
evidence that a robust complex adaptive system could resist extinction due to its ability to 
change, compromise, and adapt. The authors are convinced that a reductionist view on 
the problem of extinction does not provide a holistic view. Success and failure of an 
organization are a function of the dynamics of complex, interactive wholes. 
 The value of a new science certainly depends on its applicability to a specific 
field. Complexity theory already has provided many useful metaphors for organizational 
science. (Lissack 2000). However, its real value has not fully being realized. McKelvey 
challenged complexity theorists to incorporate a systematic agenda linking complexity 
theory development with mathematical or computational model development. 
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Furthermore there needs to be a systematic agenda linking model structures with real 
world structures in order to have an effective way to apply complexity science to 
organizational science (McKelvey 2000). 
4. Economy 
The Santa Fe Institute immediately challenged classical economic theory with 
complexity theory. John Holland and Brian Arthur spent many hours discussing how 
complexity theory could be facilitated in economy (Waldrop 1992). Brian Arthur used 
the El Farol bar problem to show a model of an expectational economy: 
One hundred people must decide independently each week whether to 
show up at their favorite bar (El Farol in Santa Fe). The rule is that if a 
person predicts that more that 60 (say) will attend, he will avoid the 
crowds and stay home; if he predicts fewer than 60 he will go. Of interest 
are how the bar-goers each week might predict the numbers showing up, 
and the resulting dynamics of the numbers attending. Notice two features 
of this problem. Our agents will quickly realize that predictions of how 
many will attend depend on others’ predictions of how many attend 
(because that determines their attendance). But others’ predictions in turn 
depend on their predictions of others’ predictions. Deductively there is an 
infinite regress. No “correct” expectational model can be assumed to be 
common knowledge, and from the agents’ viewpoint, the problem is ill-
defined. (This is true for most expectational problems, not just for this 
example.) Second, and diabolically, any commonalty of expectations gets 
broken up:  If all use an expectational model that predicts few will go, all 
will go, invalidating that model. Similarly, if all believe most will go, 
nobody will go, invalidating that belief. Expectations will be forced to 
differ.  In 1993 I modeled this situation by assuming that as the agents 
visit the bar, they act inductively—they act as statisticians, each starting 
with a variety of subjectively chosen expectational models or forecasting 
hypotheses.  Each week they act on their currently most accurate model 
(call this their active predictor). Thus agents’ beliefs or hypotheses 
compete for use in an ecology these beliefs create. Computer simulation 
showed that the mean attendance quickly converges to 60. In fact, the 
predictors self-organize into an equilibrium  “ecology” in which of the 
active predictors 40% on average are forecasting above 60, 60% below 60. 
This emergent ecology is organic in nature. For, while the population of 
active predictors splits into this 60/40 average ratio, it keeps changing in 
membership forever.  Why do the predictors self-organize so that 60 
emerges as average attendance and forecasts split into a 60/40 ratio? Well, 
suppose 70% of predictors forecasted above 60 for a longish time, then on 
average only 30 people would show up. But this would validate predictors 
that forecasted close to 30, restoring the “ecological” balance among 
predictions. The 40%–60% “natural” combination becomes an emergent 
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structure. The Bar Problem is a miniature expectational economy, with 
complex dynamics (Arthur 1994, p.3). 
 
Arthur claimed that the dynamics of an expectational economy could not have 
been predicted with the traditional forecasting models. These traditional forecasting 
models for the financial market work only well on first order, assuming rational 
expectations. However, second order events like bubbles and crashes cannot be 
accounted for by those theories. Classical expectational theories are useful if the rate of 
change (i.e. updating the forecasting hypotheses) is slow. However, once the rate of 
change is increased, complexity economics is better able to explain the dynamics of an 
economy (Arthur, 1999). 
5. Medical Science 
Medical science provides two good examples of how complexity theory 
provided more inside into the functioning of organ system. We will next describe 
research on the heart and the immune system as complex adaptive systems. 
The view that the heart is merely a muscular pump reactive to external stimuli is 
changing, as this mechanistic view couldn’t explain certain phenomena like myocardial 
ischemia12, a dynamic process associated with both destructive and protective cellular-
response mechanisms. The heart appears to be a complex organ able to self-regulate and 
adapt. Cardiac self-regulation is crucial in coping with myocardial ischemia. Doctors now 
see the heart as a highly interconnected network of cardiac neurons signaling intracellular 
reactions. This network adapts on the cellular level to certain input patterns and executes 
specific output patterns. Transplanted hearts provide an excellent example of the 
emergent property of heart-rate dynamics. Within a hundred days after transplantation, 
the donated organ dynamically reorganizes its rhythm-generating system back to full 
functionality, demonstrating that the transplanted heart is not passive in the assimilation 
process. Even the decentralized heart shows self-regulatory patterns. 
                                                 
12 Myocardial ischemia is a condition in which oxygen deprivation to the heart muscle is accompanied 
by inadequate removal of metabolites because of reduced blood flow or perfusion. 
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This phenomenon has been used as an impetus for reassessing the prevailing 
paradigm of cardiac regulation and adaptation (Kresh, Izrailtyan et al. 2002). Kresh 
concludes: 
The heart is goal-seeking and purposeful organ that can adapt/select a 
course of action out of many possible strategies so as to optimize its 
functional integrity in response to imposed "environmental" stresses. With 
respect to cardiac function this implies homodynamic selection process. 
Indeed, there may be a parallel between the brain acting as a self-
organizing system and the intrinsic cardiac nervous system of the heart 
(Kresh, Izrailtyan et al. 2002, p.5) 
 
The immune system is often used as a prime example for describing a complex 
adaptive system. Holland described the immune system: 
The human immune system is made up of large numbers of highly mobile 
units called antibodies that continually repel or destroy an ever-changing 
cast of invaders called antigens. The invaders – primarily biochemicals, 
bacteria, and viruses – come in endless varieties, as different from one 
another as snowflakes. Because of this variety, and because new invaders 
are always appearing, the immune system cannot simply list all possible 
invaders. It must change or adapt (Latin “ to fit”) its antibodies to new 
invaders that appear, never settling to a fixed configuration. Despite its 
protean nature, the immune system maintains an impressive coherence 
(Holland 1995.p.2). 
 
The theories on the immune system are mostly mechanistic and reductionist 
theories. The prevailing mainstream theory is the clonal selection theory. It states that 
during the prenatal development the self-recognizing capability of the immune system’s 
receptors is removed, and that therefore anything they identify is treated as hostile. This 
view has been challenged because there is evidence that the invading pathogens relate to 
humans on the molecular level (Hershberg and Efroni 2001). 
It is becoming clear that the field of immunology is approaching a 
paradigm shift. It is agreed by most researchers that the immune system is 
a complex system both in its composition and its behavior. However, the 
most popular ideas of immune function treat the immune system in a 
mechanistic and reductionist manner.(Hershberg and Efroni 2001) 
 
The immune system should be viewed as complex adaptive system that sees 
patterns and understands context in order to survive. Grilo implemented an artificial 
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immune system (AIS) based on complex adaptive systems theory. Since it wasn’t 
possible to model all the details of an immune system (e.g. an immune system can have 
more than 107 receptors expressed at any given time) he focused on interactions. He 
explained that a model like his cannot be used for precise quantitative outcomes but for 
studying patterns of behavior. Therefore the occurring interactions have to be realistically 
modeled. His simulation system shows strong resemblance between model and real 
immune system and has been used and validated in various experiments (Grilo, Caetano 
et al. 2000). 
Artificial immune system simulators aim the domain of hypothesis 
generation and experiment prototyping. This class of systems can help to 
design rational therapeutic intervention as well as understanding the 
process of disease. Moreover, the system’s large parameter set can be 
constructed upon what-if hypothesis, otherwise difficult to attain in 
laboratory. The resulting data, obtained from in silico simulations, can 
support clinical trials and diagnosis and further bound in vivo laboratory 
tests to a set of experiments which will probably lead to attractive 
outcomes (Grilo, Caetano et al. 2000,p.18). 
 
These examples show that the application of complexity theory in medical science 
challenges prevailing mechanistic paradigms. However, it better explains phenomena 
previously ignored by theories. More importantly it furthers the understanding and in the 
long run will improve treatments. 
6. Combat Modeling 
For the last century, conventional wisdom regarding the basic processes of war 
and most current models of land combat has been rooted in the idea of Lanchester 
Equations (LE). In 1914, F.W. Lanchester used differential equations to express attrition 
rates on the battlefield. These equations have been modified over the years, but the main 
assumption is that combat is always driven by a force-on-force attrition rate. This theory 
ignores spatial relationships and the human factor in combat. It certainly was not 
adequate to support analysis of the United States Marine Corps’ vision of small, highly 
trained, well-armed autonomous teams working in concert, continually adapting to 
changing conditions and environments. Thus, Prof. Ilachinski challenged the almost 
century-old theory by arguing that land combat can (and should) be modeled as a 
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complex adaptive system. He transferred complexity theory into the military domain and 
showed that land combat properties resemble the properties of CAS (Ilachinski 1997). 
His work has generated a lot of interest in combat modeling especially because tactical 
behaviors such as flank maneuvers, containment, encirclement and “Guerilla-like” 
assaults emerged out of his implementation, called ‘Irreducible Semi-Autonomous 
Adaptive Combat ‘(ISAAC). 
In ISAAC, the "final outcome" of a battle -- as defined, say, by measuring 
the surviving force strengths -- takes second stage to exploring how two 
forces might “co-evolve” during combat. A few examples of the 
profoundly non-equilibrium dynamics that characterizes much of real 
combat include: the sudden “flash of insight” of a clever commander that 
changes the course of a battle; the swift flanking maneuver that surprises 
the enemy; and the serendipitous confluence of several far-separated (and 
unorchestrated) events that lead to victory. These are the kinds of behavior 
that Lanchesterian-based models are in principle incapable of even 
addressing. ISAAC represents a first step toward being able to explore 
such questions (Ilachinski 1997,p.226). 
 
Ilachinski’s work has not died out. Many research projects continue to explore his 
ideas. Project Albert is an international military research effort with many participating 
countries (i.e., United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Germany) (Horne and Lauren 
2000). The MOVES Institute especially has produced many follow-on projects. Hiles, 
VanPutte et al. (2001) provide a good summary of this work. 
The paradigm for combat modeling has fundamentally changed and improved 
insights into the processes. These types of simulation systems will enhance the 
capabilities exploring policy and concept development as well as force structure 
development. 
7. Complexity Theory as Worldview Challenge 
So far we have defined complex adaptive system, explaining the main features of 
the underlying theory. We also showed that the predominant mechanistic wordview has 
successfully been challenged in several areas. Complexity theory has in fact improved the 
realism of simulation systems, like the artificial immune system (AIS) or Ilachinski’s 
ISAAC. It also has furthered the understanding of previously ignored (or taken for 
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granted) phenomenona (e.g. succesfull heart transplantations). In the social sciences, the 
average behavior assumption combined with the rationality assumption of human 
behavior has led to a linear mechanistic worldview (Tosey 2002). By refusing these 
assumptions, economics and organizational sciences have advanced to a better 
understanding of the relationships between individual elements (firms, groups, and 
individuals). A natural extension to this view is to research how individuals are modeled 
and whether complexity theory could improve the understanding of individual based 
behavior. Next we will describe current state of the art in cognitive modeling and show 
how much current models got stuck in a mechanistic rut.  
B. COGNITIVE MODELING 
The next paragraphs roughly describe the past and ongoing research in cognitive 
modeling. After a short history of cognitive modeling, we briefly describe the three main 
approaches (symbolism, connectionism, and dynamicism) and show recent developments 
for some cognitive architectures. This can by no means be a complete description of the 
entire field, but should provide the reader with sufficient background and resource 
information. 
1. Developments in Cognitive Modeling 
In the 1950s, William Dember announced the cognitive revolution. Up to then, 
psychology was mostly influenced by behaviorists. However, many explanations for 
human behavior proved inadequate and the interdisciplinary collaboration among 
different sciences (engineering and, especially, computer science) did much to advance 
cognitive psychology. In 1956 Chomsky, Newell and others defined the application of the 
computer metaphor for cognitive behavior and thereby initiated the rise of cognitive 
psychology (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000). 
Matthews also describes the correlation between cognitive psychology and 
cognitive modeling. He formulates a synthesis of different approaches to cognitive 
modeling and the famous knowledge level, a level introduced by one of the leading 
artificial intelligence researchers, Alan Newell. We will describe Newell’s concept, then 
explain the different approaches, and finally put it back together to show the interfaces 
between the three main levels.  
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In 1972 Newell formulated the computational approach in the famous physical 
symbol system hypothesis (PSSH). Ten years later he introduced a new computer system 
level, namely the knowledge level, to the then-known computer levels. Newell argued 
that there exists a distinct computer system level, lying immediately above the symbolic 
level13, which is characterized by knowledge as the medium and the principle of 
rationality as the law of behavior (Newell 1982, p.99). The principle of rationality states 
that humans behave rationally, always choosing behaviors that contribute to goal 
achievements. This argument seems strange, considering how irrational people can be. 
However, Newell also made clear that the assumption of rationality is weak and that the 
knowledge level is fairly extensible, e.g. with emotions, uncertainty and the like. 
Psychologists used the different levels as an analogue to human behavior. Newell’s 
knowledge model has been used to characterize the depth of explanation that different 
cognitive approaches use (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000) 
Cognitive science was born in the 1970s. It combined psychology, philosophy, 
linguistics, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. Traditionally, cognitive science is the 
study of knowledge-based processes. Much advancement since then indicates that 
knowledge is only a part of the equation. Other factors like intelligence, emotion, and 
personality play a major role.  
2.  Symbolism Approach to Cognitive Modeling 
In 1975 Putnam, following Turing’s train of thought on Turing machines and 
Newell’s PSSH, was probably the first scientist explaining the computational theory of 
mind.  
The computational theory of mind (CTM) holds that the mind is a digital 
computer: a discrete-state device that stores symbolic representations and 
manipulates them according to syntactic rules; that thoughts are mental 
representations- more specifically, symbolic representations in a language 
of thought; and that mental processes are causal sequences driven by the 
syntactic, but not the semantic properties of the symbol (Wilson and Frank 
2001, p.1341).  
 
                                                 
13 The symbolic level is the interaction level with humans. This level encompasses variables allows 
human beings to “talk” to the computer. 
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This approach to cognitive modeling is best described as symbolic cognitive 
modeling. One of the most criticized features of this theory is its sequential nature. 
Melanie Mitchell described the weaknesses of computational theories in cognitive 
sciences as theories of structure, making claims about the information processing and 
functional structure of mental states.  
Most of these theories assume that information processing consists of 
manipulation of explicit, static symbols rather than the autonomous 
interaction of emergent, active ones. Such theories typically cannot easily 
explain what driving forces and constraints there are on how the mental 
questions can change, what trajectories they can take, their coupling with 
the body and environment, and how high-level symbols can emerge from a 
lower level substrate (Mitchell 2000, p.7). 
 
Later we will describe strengths and weaknesses of a classical symbolic cognitive 
architecture (SOAR).  
3.  Connectionist Approaches to Cognitive Modeling 
Cognitive modeling progressed by including the connectionists’ approaches that 
contrasted symbolic models with huge parallelism.  
Connectionist cognitive modeling is an approach to understanding the 
mechanism of human cognition through the use of simulated networks of 
simple, neuron-like processing units (Wilson and Frank 2001).  
 
These types of models are often used for natural cognitive tasks. A major 
criticism for this theory is that it cannot explain behavior on a level that is understandable 
for humans. So far, applications of the theory cover subconscious functions, thus the 
approach is not yet scalable towards an entire cognitive architecture with current 
technologies.  
Researchers have tried to use the strength of both approaches and build hybrid 
systems. ACT-R is a very prominent hybrid cognitive architecture and we will discuss its 
strengths and weaknesses shortly. 
4.  Dynamical Hypothesis 
One of the latest developments in cognitive modeling is the dynamical hypothesis 
(DH) for cognition. Inspired by connectionists’ models, it contrasts the symbolic 
cognitive modeling hypothesis in several ways. The most noticeable difference is the 
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assumption that cognitive agents are dynamical systems and not digital computers. The 
dynamical hypothesis applies differential equations to understanding cognitive functions. 
The approach considers the innate interaction between the embodiment of the mind and 
the situatedness of human cognition. Port states that:  
The dynamical approach to cognition is also closely related to ideas about 
the embodiment of mind and the environmental situatedness of human 
cognition, since it emphasizes commonalities between behavior in neural 
and cognitive processes on one hand with physiological and 
environmental events on the other. The most important commonality is the 
dimension of time shared by all of these domains. This permits real-time 
coupling between domains, where the dynamic of one system influences 
the timing of another, (Port, 2001, p.1). 
 
There is an overlap between the connectionist and dynamical hypothesis 
approach. However, van Gelder, a former DH advocate,14 explains the differences:  
Connectionist networks are generally dynamical systems, and much of the 
best dynamical research is connectionist in form. However, the way many 
connectionists structure and interpret their systems is dominated by 
broadly computational preconceptions. Conversely, many dynamic models 
of cognition are not connectionist networks. Connectionism is best seen as 
straddling a more fundamental opposition between dynamical and 
classical cognitive science (Wilson and Frank 2001, p.245). 
 
It is evident that certain reduced human performance could be modeled with 
differential equations. It is also obvious that situational awareness (environmental 
situatedness) has to influence the simulated human performance (Endsley 2000). 
However, it appears to be very difficult to scale a model implementing DH to a holistic 
model of human performance. It also appears very doubtful that individual behavior can 
be modeled realistically. This approach would certainly lead into the difficulties combat 
modelers discovered using Lanchester equations. The coefficients used in these equations 
are very critical and it appears impossible to validate them. Expressing individual 
differences as coefficients in an equation15 appears to be impossible to validate too. 
However, the notion of time, which DH uses, is certainly important when modeling 
human performance. Humans tend to have decreased performances over time on task, 
                                                 
14 Email correspondence with Prof. Van Gelder 
15 RHPM certainly has to parameterize individual differences. Additionally different goals and 
behaviors can be used to express individualistic personalities. 
 31 
especially if circumstances (e.g. sleep deprivation) require a lot of compensatory 
resources (Styles 1997).  

































Figure 5.   Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science 
 
Figure 5 shows a translation of Newell’s knowledge level model. The biology 
level contains a physical, neuronal representation of cognitive processing. The symbol 
processing level is divided into two layers: 
1) Algorithm, for the formal specification of programs for symbol 
manipulation.  
2) Functional architecture, allowing real time processing operations 
supporting symbol manipulation. 
The knowledge level contains goals, intentions and personal meaning, supporting 
adaptation to external environments. Using this picture, one can explain the different 
modeling approaches based on the level they try to explain. The connectionist approach 
(e.g. PDP ++), as well as the dynamical approach, interface the biology level with the 
symbol processing level (O'Reilly and Munakata 2000). The classical symbolic model 
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approach remains on the symbol processing level (e.g. SOAR). If cognitive models 
include a strategy concept, they also use the interface towards the knowledge level.  
Our approach potentially links the biology level to the knowledge level. In 
psychology this approach is studied in the field of evolutionary psychology (EP). It 
basically claims that there are genetically evolved brain circuits dealing with certain 
problems by creating adaptive behavior. Thus it contrasts the assumptions of the 
symbolicism approach. Buss claims that : 
First, mainstream cognitive psychologists tend to assume that cognitive 
architecture is general purpose and content free. This means that the 
information processing devices that are responsible for food selection are 
assumed to be the same as those for mate and habitat 
selection….Evolutionary psychologists make precisely the opposite 
assumption – that the mind is likely to consist of a large number of 
specialized mechanisms, each tailored to solving a different adaptive 
problem (Buss 1999, p.375). 
 
EP emphasizes human cognitive architecture as a product of evolution, drawing 
on two theories in its attempt to understand the mind: Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection and Turing’s theory of computation. Darwin’s theory asserts that 
psychological mechanisms are adaptations. Turing’s theory of computation stresses the 
treatment of psychological mechanisms as information processors, and minds as 
computers. EP proponents claim that the physical symbol system hypothesis is an 
incorrect depiction of the human mind because it encapsulates the mind as a universal 
machine. EP works under the assumption that the human mind represents only the Turing 
machine’s finite-state control system. This suggests that the human mind is not like an 
entire personal computer, but rather, similar to a computer’s processor. This processor 
has a small set of instructions and a fixed set of hard-wired operations (suggesting an 
interesting approach to modeling reactive behavior). A processor also possesses memory 
storage, enabling it to perform operations according to an instruction set. A comparison 
of long-term human memory to a hard-wired set of operations, and working memory to a 
registry set, is obvious and engaging. Our research explores EP findings that support the 
proposition that specialized cognitive functions are the result of evolution (Cosmides and 
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Tooby 1998; Crawford and Krebs 1998; Buss 1999; Evans and Zarate 1999; Badcock 
2000; Cartwright 2000). 
If we take this theory for granted, we should be able to identify cognitive 
functions that can be modeled as evolvable systems. These systems adapt to their 
environment and could be characterized as complex adaptive systems. Our approach to 
cognitive modeling tries to synthesize parts of the three described cognitive theories 
(symbolism, connectionism, dynamicism), using all three levels of Newell’s knowledge 
level, leveraging findings of EP, within a complex adaptive system. 
6. State-of-the-Art Cognitive Modeling 
This section briefly describes the current state of the art in cognitive modeling by 
looking at modeling human and organizational behavior. After a summary of the National 
Research Council (NRC) findings in 1998, we will show the development of cognitive 
architectures from 1998. The report provides a far more detailed description (Pew and 
Mavor 1998). The NRC authors used the following taxonomy to characterize the best-
known cognitive architectures:  
· What was the original Purpose? 
· Which sub-models have been implemented? 
§ Sensing and Perception 
§ Working/Short Term Memory 
§ Long-term Memory 
§ Motor 
· What type of knowledge representation is used? 
§ Declarative 
§ Procedural 
· Which higher-level cognitive functions are modeled? 
§ Learning 
§ Situation assessment (overt and inferred) 
§ Planning 
§ Decision making 
· What type of output does it provide? 
· Is it multitasking capable? 
§ Serial/Parallel 
§ Resource representation 
§ Goal/Task Management 
· Can it model multiple humans? 




· What type of support environment is needed? 
· Have there been validation efforts? 
 
This taxonomy left out some important questions like: 
· Can the cognitive architecture model individual behavior based on a 
personality-trait model (e.g. five factor model)? 
· Does it model individual reduced performance caused by internal or 
external stressors/moderators? 
· How does the model behave when it encounters previously unknown 
situations? 
None of the architectures Pew evaluated has achieved a state where the answer to 
these questions would be positive. The panel addressed general weaknesses and 
shortcomings of these models/architectures, and then recommended short, intermediate 
and long-term research goals. The following statement shows an overall evaluation of 
models currently used in military applications: Thus it is fair to say that, in terms of 
models in active use, the introduction of human behavior is in its infancy(Pew and Mavor 
1998, p.4).  
Many models cannot adapt to mild deviations from the conditions under which 
they were created. Often they produce unrealistic behavior and simplistic responses  to 
these conditions. As pointed out earlier, even the best models assume ideal human 
behavior, strictly following doctrine and not taking human limitations and variation 
performance into account. Hence current models lack the scope of realism that is required 
for modeling human behavior. Human behavior modeling should include the realistic 
modeling of observable individual behaviors. Realism should be increased by adding 
noise (moderator variables such as emotion or workload) to the simulation. This leads to 
the issue of reduced human performance, a major modeling problem that the described 
architectures have not yet addressed successfully. 
Human behavior representation (HBR) should be doctrinal (where applicable), 
realistic, creative and/or adaptive. This implies that non-rigid or non-brittle behavior 
needs to be introduced with a new cognitive architecture. One of the SOAR developers 
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stated that unanticipated situations were the most difficult feature to put into the 
computer program. The panel came to the following conclusion: 
The development of a truly adaptive model that would solve the general 
problem has not been actively pursued (Pew and Mavor 1998, p.44). 
  
Analyzing the general shortcomings of current cognitive models, the connection 
between theory and actual implementation becomes obvious. A mechanistic view 
(theory) on human behavior can only produce mechanistic behavior. We claim that a 
multi-agent system with robust behavior can handle unanticipated situations and hence 
would contribute to solving the general problem. New models of human behavior should 
include judgmental errors, individual differences, time pressure effects, degradation of 
cognitive function such as fatigue effects and (in our case) vigilance decrement, and 
adaptive planning based on learning. The simulated entities should have local situational 
awareness in the sense that they can interpret the state of the surrounding environment 
and compare it to their own goals and desires. However trivial or complex the model 
might be, the purpose is to make explicit:  
· The information provided to the human behavior representation from the 
external world model.  
· The processing (if any) that goes on inside the reduced human 
performance model;16 and  
· the output generated by the model. 
7. Recent Advances in Human Behavior Modeling 
This section describes the development in human behavior modeling since the 
panel’s report. 
a. The Agent-based Modeling and Behavior Representation 
(AMBR) Project 
 U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) took the panel’s 
recommendations and funded a new research program: AMBR Model Comparison 
Project. The goals for this project follow the roadmap, provided by the NRC report: 
· To advance the state of the art in cognitive modeling  
                                                 
16 This clearly requires symbols that we can interpret.  
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· To develop mission-relevant human behavior representation  
· To publish tasks, models and available data to support developers 
· To compare performances of different cognitive architectures 
Four different teams (Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) with 
Distributed Cognition (DCOG), Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) with ACT-R, CHI 
Systems with Cognitive Networks (COGNET/iGEN), and Soar Technology with EPIC-
Soar) developed or improved their architectures to fit an air-traffic-controller scenario. 
The scenario was simplistic, but required multi-tasking capability (Gluck and Pew 2001). 
A simulated air traffic controller had to manage the transition of several aircraft from one 
traffic sector to another. A fifth participant (BBN technology) mediated between AFRL 
and the teams. BBN generated different scenarios, collected human data and provided the 
statistical analysis for the model comparisons. The results showed some similarities 
between human data and the models’ behavior (Gluck and Pew 2001). However, 
considering that only eight ACT-R, two Epic-Soar, two COGNET/IGEN and two DCOG 
controllers were simulated, it is doubtful that the results account for the true variability. It 
appears that the significance of the experiment suffered from these low numbers of 
experimental runs.  
Interestingly enough, AFRL stated that the participating modeling 
architectures were challenged and improved as a direct result of their participation in this 
project, which we consider to be an indication of success in advancing the state-of-the-
art. (Gluck and Pew 2001) This clearly supports the NRC report’s assumption (“HBR in 
its infancy”) since even the simple air traffic controller scenario helped improve the 
architectures.  
(1) Distributed Cognition (D-COG) : Next we will describe the 
new cognitive architecture D-COG and other participating cognitive architectures’ 
improvements. D-COG is a new architecture introduced by AFRL. It is a hybrid approach 
between symbolic and connectionist approach. Their approach uses ideas of cognitive 
systems engineering and computational neuroscience. The resulting architecture is 
expected to provide more robust behavior. The architecture is AMBR domain-specific 
and consists of four modules: 
 37 
· A cognitive module that sets goals and prioritizes tasks 
· A procedural memory module that contains aircraft status information and 
knowledge on how to accomplish specific tasks such as transferring an 
aircraft or accepting an aircraft 
· A visual sampling module that controls eye movements and provides for 
perceptual recognition, and 
· A motor module through which the model operates the workstation 
module (Eggleston, Young et al. 2001, p.7). 
 
D-COG compared well against the other architectures, although 
the authors indicated a problem with repeatability of results. In any case, it is evident that 
new cognitive architectures stand a chance against “legacy” cognitive architectures 
indicating that their exploration is a worthwhile research topic.  
(2) States, Operators and Rules (SOAR) : The panel’s short-term 
research goals suggest that hybrid cognitive architectures could improve and advance the 
state of the art. Participating in the AMBR project, SOAR Technology improved SOAR’s 
perception module by combining it with Executive Process-Interactive Control (EPIC). 
The hybrid architecture is now called EPIC-SOAR. Another improvement resulted in an 
architectural change of SOAR’s memory system. The changed architecture incorporates 
Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT-R)’s base-level activation and base-level learning 
concepts.  
The general idea is that when an element in working memory is created, it 
is assigned an initial level of activation; a base-level of activation. The 
activation of a newly created memory immediately begins to decay 
logarithmically with time. When the activation falls below a threshold, the 
memory element is forgotten. Forgetting is implemented by removing a 
decayed memory element from working memory. When an element is 
used, its activation receives a small boost, but the activation immediately 
begins to decay, albeit from the newly boosted level (Chong 2001, p.36). 
 
Thus, the EPIC-SOAR memory system now more closely matches 
the human memory system. Another very interesting approach to improving SOAR is an 
ongoing research effort to use its architecture in single-shooter games. It has been used as 
a  computer-generated  opponent  in  the  game  of Quake (Laird 2000). This has certainly 
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been a very important step forward by combining advances in computer gaming and 
artificial intelligence. SOAR appears to be the most often used cognitive architecture in 
military application. 
SOAR needs many rules to simulate human behavior: e.g. a fixed-
wing aircraft FWA-SOAR uses more than 7000 rules and still needs operator invention to 
realistically model human behavior (Pew and Mavor 1998). This is certainly a 
disadvantage of the system. Although it has a learning mechanism incorporated 
(chunking) it does not claim to generate evolving behavior. Thus, it cannot learn 
completely new rules without supervision. One of our goals is using evolutionary 
algorithms to create emergent behavior that has not been thought of by analysts but is still 
feasible.  
(3) Cognition as a Network of Tasks (COGNET) : CHI Systems 
participated with the Computer Generated Forces CGF-COGNET variant of COGNET. 
CGF-COGNET incorporates several human behavior modeling improvements. A major 
improvement is CGF-COGNET’s capability to model effects of workload on human 
behaviors. During the conducted experiments, CGF-COGNET realistically showed better 
performance than COGNET when the simulated air traffic controller had more support 
during a scenario. CGF-COGNET differs from COGNET by extending the information 
processing mechanism and better capturing the time and accuracy of a process. It also 
incorporated a meta-cognitive component introducing cognitive proprioception 
(situational awareness) and metacognitive controls (manage interruptions and resource 
conflicts). (Zachary 2001)  COGNET has already been used for simulating adversaries in 
submarine war fighting. It can be characterized as a classical symbolic cognitive 
architecture with all the pitfalls described earlier. 
 
(4) Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT-R) : Carnegie Mellon 
University also participated with the ACT-R architecture. Some improvements of the 
architectures were introduced during the AMBR experiment. Since ACT-R’s fidelity was 
clearly below those of significant tasks such as air traffic control, it added effects of time 
pressure and high information demands to its architecture. It now has the capability to 
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model task interruptions and workload effects (Lebiere, Anderson et al. 2001). One of the 
strengths of the model is its goal-oriented structure. This type of structure lends itself to 
modeling individual differences by prioritizing goals differently. However, it has not yet 
incorporated a personality model to capture personal differences. 
(5) AMBR Achievements : AMBR’s fourth goal (comparing 
cognitive architectures) proved to be very difficult. The experimental design was lacking 
clear measures of performance and a sound design strategy. It did not address adaptability 
or flexibility, which we believe is a very important feature of cognitive architectures. It 
also did not address modeling individual performances needed to show the variety of 
human behavior. Obviously the developers had problems getting the experimental data on 
time and the calibration process was short. However, it was certainly worthwhile to see 
how these architectures improved and how their strength and weaknesses were 
discovered. This offered the opportunity to characterize cognitive architectures in relation 
to an application. Ultimately, designers could decide which model makes most sense for 
an application given its particular goals. One can easily imagine that we could use a 
cognitive toolbox that provides the best tools for every application. However, this would 
not only require interoperability but also interchangeability between architectures. With 
respect to the propriety issues it is doubtful that current architectures really “want” or are 
able to achieve this goal.  
AMBR was finished in May 2003. Round 3 and 4 have brought 
improvement to participating architectures. However, Pew concluded that: 
And indeed, one of the features most often missing in the models that have 
been procured to date is a reasonable range of responses to a given 
situation. Attention to individual differences has the potential to contribute 
to improvements in the range of behaviors that models can provide. 
Procurements can require individual differences as a means to obtain a 







b.  Use of Complexity Theory in Cognitive Science 
We now describe research already utilizing complexity theory on the scale 
of cognitive functions. Before we start our discussion we need to define cognitive 
functions. The NRC Report on Modeling Organizational and Human Behavior identified 
five high level cognitive functions (Pew and Mavor 1998): 
· Learning 
· Decision Making 
· Situation Awareness 
· Planning 
· Multitasking 
Guy Boy gave a very concise definition for cognitive functions: 
A cognitive function is simply a human cognitive process that has a role in 
a limited context using a set of resources. By definition, a cognitive 
function enables its user to transform a (prescribed) task into an activity 
(effective task). For instance, identifying situations, coordinating actions, 
making decisions and planning are high-level cognitive functions. (Dr. 
Guy Boy Director of EURISCO, the European Institute of Cognitive 
Sciences and Engineering, 1997) 
He identifies different levels for cognitive functions. Higher level 
cognitive functions include decision-making. Current insights into decision-making led to 
a new focus of research towards naturalistic decision making (NDM). One of the 
important lessons NDM generated was the fact that experts use most of their energy in 
assessing a situation, not in deciding what to do (Klein 1999). It has become obvious that 
most experts use intuitive decisions that the rationality principle cannot explain. Clearly, 
the rationality assumption is a cornerstone in Newell’s PSSH (Newell 1982). Instinctive 
or intuitive decision making shows that sometimes it pays to have hard-wired or reflexive 
behavior. One example is that of a fireman squad leader who went into a burning building 
with his men. He felt that something was wrong and retreated from the building. Seconds 
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later, the building collapsed. Intense investigation helped to explain what happened: The 
squad leader was very experienced with fires of this type. However, he couldn’t explain 
the extreme heat in the building given the distance from the fire. In other words, his 
expectations were not met. The heat was the result of a fire in the basement that hadn’t 
been detected at that point (Klein 1999). We hypothesize that his experience led to the 
development of a specialized cognitive function: a fire-threat detection mechanism. This 
would explain why he didn’t have to think – but just react. 
John Sokolowski conducted research on how to implement the 
Recognition Primed Decision Model by Gary Klein. He compares different approaches 
and concludes: 
A composite agent uses multi-agent system simulation technology to 
implement various cognitive processes of a single entity or agent. It is this 
author’s contention that a composite agent’s decision-making method 
closely matches that described by the RPD model. This close match is 
expected to produce a better implementation of the RPD model 
(Sokolowski 2002). 
 
Sokolowski’s hypothesis directly supports CASH. The composite agent 
technology has been developed utilizing CAS theory. 
Another example for the modeling of a low level cognitive function comes 
from the Santa Fe Institute: Melanie Mitchell, Douglas Hofstadter and James Marshall 
have been working on modeling the subconscious cognitive function of drawing 
analogies. Melanie Mitchell claims that a complex adaptive system is capable of making 
analogies which is a key feature to human intelligence and creativity (Mitchell 2000). 
The original computer program “Copycat” was expanded by James Marshall and it is 
now called “Metacat”. “Metacat” operates in a micro domain, drawing analogies from 
sequences of letters. One example might be 
abc  Þ  abd 
jkl Þ   ? 
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“Metacat” then tries to find a creative answer to the question mark. The 
sequences jkm or jkd would certainly be possible answers. The “Metacat” approach is 
sometimes belittled because it appears to be domain restricted. However, the researchers 
claim that they have discovered concepts that will help them to evolve software that can 
act creatively (Marshall 1999).  
This clearly supports our hypothesis. Analogy-making, modeled as a CAS, 
is certainly a part of decision-making; decision making is a high level cognitive function 
that is integral to any cognitive architecture. We claim that a combination of CAS still 
represents a CAS. Thus, the complex adaptive system hypothesis (CASH) seems to be 
the natural conclusion of the claims shown so far. 
C.  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we explained the general shortcomings of cognitive models. It is 
only recently that researchers have tried to capture more realistic human performance by 
considering workload for air-traffic controllers. The strength of the three approaches 
(symbolicism, connectionism and dynamicism) should be exploited in a synergistic 
effort. We have described cognitive architectures and their current developments to show 
that, despite their ongoing improvements, they are not able to model individual reduced 
performance. We also argued by showing D-COG’s success that new architectures 
performances can compare favourably to legacy cognitive architectures.  
Melanie Mitchell of the Santa Fe Institute, pointed out that cognitive phenomena 
would be understood by rapprochement between “computational talk” and “dynamics 
talk”. She is convinced that the use of complex adaptive systems will create a better 
understanding of human behavior (Mitchell 1998).   
We want to enhance her assumptions by modeling a known human phenomenon 
called vigilance decrement. The next chapter explains this phenomenon and discusses 
current research in this area. 
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III.  REDUCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses human performance and its complexity. Although the 
research focuses on reduced human performance, enhanced performance is an integral 
part of performance. Thus, our framework and the cognitive model have to take 
performance variability into consideration.  
There are numerous definitions for human performance. This research uses a 
definition that stems from performance psychology: 
Human beings are born to perform. In a broader sense, we perform every 
time we engage in a goal-directed activity (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000, 
p.1). 
Earlier this research pointed out that most cognitive models assumed ideal 
behavior. Real human performance, however, suffers from breakdowns and failures. 
Human errors play a major role in accidents such as car or airplane crashes. Performance 
effectiveness depends on several factors which are described in the next section. 
B. PERFORMANCE FACTORS AND MEASURES 
1. Human Performance Formula 
Human performance is influenced by external factors (i.e. stress factors like heat 
or noise), by internal factors (i.e., motivation, skills) and certainly by task variables (i.e., 







Figure 6.   Human Performance Formula (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000) 
 
Figure 6 shows a formula used in performance psychology identifying the 
contributing factors for performance variability. Matthews used the work of Blumberg on 
the theory of factors influencing work performance.  
The first is capacity (C), which refers here to all the basic characteristics 
that promote good performance, such as intelligence, learned skills and 
physical fitness. …The second is willingness (W) referring to motivational 
and attitudinal factors, which may allow the person to use their capacities 
to full advantage, or alternatively hinder them in fulfilling their potential. 
The third factor, opportunity (O), refers to the physical and social 
environment provided by the organization: workers need the right tools 
and social support to give their best. Performance reflects the interaction 
of these three factors, so the determinants of work performance can be 
expressed as follows: Performance = f(OxCxW) (Matthews, Davies et al. 
2000, p.14). 
 
In the context of this research the definition of capacity is enhanced by including 
attentional resources and its variability over time. This formula will be transferred to 
demonstrate the non-linearity of vigilance performance and the impact of behavior 
moderators or stressors.  
One of the major challenges to validate human behavior modeling is that there are 
numerous measures of performance and that this is a widely unexplored field of human 
factors. Some of the measures are quantitative and measurable (overt). However, 
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probably the more “interesting” ones are the qualitative measures of human performance 
(covert). The next sections describe both types and gives examples. 
2. Quantitative Measures 
Quantitative measures are overt measures of human performance. Some of these 
are easily measured like reaction time,17 error rate, throughput, accuracy, short term 
memory capacity, long term memory recall. More advanced measures include mental 
arithmetic and physiological measures such as alertness, heart rate, pupil diameter width, 
or measures established with an electroencephalogram (EEG). Parasuraman reports 
different vigilance experiments that used event-related potential (ERP) activity and EEG 
beta waves to determine the state of arousal during vigilance tasks (Parasuraman 1998). 
These measures are normally taken before and after an experiment to establish a baseline.  
However, there are also some normative data used for computerized 
neuropsychological assessment (i.e. closed head injury evaluation) in the medical 
community. One example is metric data taken from U.S. Navy divers: 
The Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) was 
identified as a potentially useful screening instrument for assessing the 
cognitive abilities of divers. Normative data from 113 United States Navy 
divers were collected and are presented. The instrument is computer based 
and provides millisecond timing while automatically scoring and 
summarizing. It is purported to afford the level of sensitivity necessary for 
detecting cognitive problems that can result from diving, as well as central 
nervous system decompression sickness and oxygen toxicity. The 
instrument provides a good screening tool for suspected cognitive 
problems, and using it along with the other medical assessment tools is 
encouraged (Lowe and Reeves 2002, p.1). 
 
Unfortunately it is not easy (sometimes for obvious reasons) to extract these data 
and utilize it for research in cognitive modeling. In the optimal case, a cognitive model 
could be configured with this screening instrument. The cognitive model could then be 
tested with a scenario that it hasn’t been exposed to.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Reaction time is not an “undisputable” measure of performance because there is evidence that 
humans voluntarily influence reaction times as part of a performance strategy called Accuracy-Speed-
Tradeoff. 
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3. Qualitative Measures 
Qualitative measures encompass performance strategies like speed-accuracy 
tradeoff in serial tasks or attentional selectivity in dual task situations or “beta shift” in 
signal detection theory. More complex measures try to measure the cognitive reasoning 
ability, personnel workload assessment and alike. These measure are not easily extracted 
from humans, which is one reason why performance psychology is called the science of 
the unobservable (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000). However, advancement in cognitive 
modeling will also require the validation of covert behavior. 
C. AROUSAL, STRESS AND PERFORMANCE 
This section describes the correlation between arousal, stress and resulting 
performance. We define the arousal level as a physiological level that correlates with the 
stress imposed on (external stressors) or within (internal stressors) a person.  
Examples for external stressors, sometimes called external behavior moderators18 
include: sleep deprivation, sleep disturbances, physical exercise, heat, cold, 
decompression, compression, acceleration and deceleration, weightlessness, vibration, 
noise, poor visibility, radiation, drugs and poisons (Poulton 1970). Examples for internal 
stressors are : task stress, emotions (i.e., fear or anxiety), obsessiveness.  
                                                 
18 Pew et al. describe stressors as behavior moderators. However, research shows that not every 














Figure 7.   A Representation of Stress (From: Wickens 1992, Fig. 10.1 p.414) 
Figure 7 illustrates the different effects of external stressors in terms of human 
performance. Some stressors have a direct influence on the process. Noise, for example, 
influences the quality of the perceived information, especially in auditory tasks. Vibration 
can impact the quality of the response. The perceived level of stress is often expressed as 
a phenomenological experience. Stressors don’t always degrade performance (Wickens 
1992), instead they can lead to enhanced performance which is well explained with 
arousal theory, covered in the next section.  
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1. Arousal Theories 











Figure 8.   Yerkes Dobson Law (From: Wickens 1992, Fig. 10.2) 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the Yerkes-Dobson law, which is also described as an 
inverted U-function. It basically states that there is an individual level of arousal which is 
optimal for task performance. The optimal level is different for different people and for 
some persons it also differs over time. Arousal that is below or above that threshold leads 
to degraded (respectively non-optimal) performance. It can easily be seen that causes for 
the change in performance can not be easily deduced from these (non-linear) curves, 
since the directions19 of arousal change needs to considered.  
b. Dynamic Stress Model 
There is still no unified theory that could enable prediction of the 
stressors’ effects on performance. A different approach to Yerkes and Dobson is the 
dynamic stress model by Hancock. This section briefly describes his theory on how 
humans adapt to stress.  
                                                 





































































Figure 9.   Human Adaptability to Stress (From: Hancock and Warm 1989) 
 
Figure 9 is strongly supports the underlying hypothesis of this research. It 
shows the different zones of resource capacity for psychological and physiological 
adaptability as a function of stress.  
Hypostress (underload) and hyperstress (overload) comprise areas of 
dynamic instability. Starting in the middle, one can explore the effects of stress and a 
change of performance according to the zones. The normative zone describes a region 
(for most healthy human beings) where the stress input does not cause a compensatory 
action to maintain the performance level. The comfort zone is unique for every 
individual. It is a region where first compensatory actions potentially take place. Once the 
stress reaches into the psychological zone of maximal adaptability it certainly impacts the 
capacity as well as the willingness factor (i.e., cold has a strong influence on motivation 
(Palinkas 2000)). Beyond the psychological zone is the physiological zone of 
adaptability, which is regulated by body functions such as increase of body temperature. 
Being in this zone does not only impact performance but also potentially impacts one’s 
health.20 This model thus describes the change from a stable state to failure modes and to 
                                                 
20 A rather infamous example for this zone is the heat stroke. Especially in connection with medication 
heat stroke can be a cause for death for athletes during spring training for baseball. 
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a breakdown. Unfortunately, this cannot be used as predictive model, because similar to 
the inverted U shape of the Yerkes-Dobson law, it can only be established after the fact 
(Hancock and Warm 1989).  
A cognitive model should generate these areas accordingly to show the 
shifts in performance. This research assumes that reduced human performance is like a 
complex adaptive system, which seems to be an ideal fit to the theory of adaptability 
zones. 
D. VIGILANCE PERFORMANCE  
1. Background to Studies of Vigilance Performance 
Vigilance research started in the early 1930s and was established by Mackworth’s 
work on naval recruits. Mackworth was tasked to research the question why so many 
enemy submarines that were on the radar screen of radar operators still remained 
undetected. He studied the phenomenon of the vigilance decrement in laboratory settings.  
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Figure 10.   Mackworth’s Clock Experiment and Results 
 
Figure 10 (from Mackworth 1950) shows the results of the Mackworth clock test. 
It was used to establish the increase in misses and the increase in reaction time. Subjects 
watched a clock’s watch hand for two hours. Whenever the watch hand jumped two 
instead of one second the subjects had to report it. Within the first 30 minutes the 
decrement in hit rate was most pronounced. After that the decrement leveled of and 
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stayed at an almost constant level (Mackworth 1950).Closely related to the phenomenon 
of vigilance is the theory of signal detection:  
Signal detection theory has had a large impact on experimental 
psychology, and its concepts are highly applicable to many problems of 
human factors as well. Its benefits can be divided into two general 
categories: (1) It provides the ability to compare sensitivity and therefore 
the quality of performance between conditions or between operators that 
may differ in response bias. (2) By partitioning performance and therefore 
performance change into bias and sensitivity components, it provides a 
diagnostic tool that recommends different corrective actions depending on 
whether a deterioration of performance results from a loss of sensitivity or 
a shift in response bias. (Wickens 1992, p.38) 
 
This research utilizes the ease of implementation of the signal detection theory to 
generate signals and noise and to measure the resulting performance parameters. Hence it 
is necessary to briefly explain the main points of the theory. 
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Figure 11.   Signal Detection Theory; (From: Davies and Parasuraman 1982) 
 
Figure 11 shows two hypothetical probability density distributions. The left one is 
the noise distribution. The right one is the cumulative noise+signal distribution. Incoming 
information can stem from both distributions, however, only the noise+signal distribution 
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contains a signal (like a blips on a radar screen opposed to the white noise on the screen). 
The decision criterion (beta) is a decision making threshold. If a piece of an information 
is perceived to the left of the line, it is perceived as noise, to the other side as a signal. 
The detectability (sensitivity) of a piece of information is measured between the 
amplitudes of both distributions. A decrease in sensitivity closes the gap between the 
distributions and the probability of errors increase. The errors can be differentiated into 
commission and omission errors. 
 Signal Noise 
Yes response Hit False Alarm (commission error) 
No response Miss (omission error) Correct rejection 
Table 1.   The Four Outcomes of Signal Detection Theory (Wickens 1992) 
 
Table 1 shows the four different outcomes between the information presented and 
the response. Some experimenters, like Mackworth, only reported the hit rate or the miss 
rate. However neither the false alarm rate nor the decision criterion can be deduced from 
that. Both rates (hit, false alarm) are important measures in the psychological 
understanding of a person’s response. These rates are also used to determi ne the decision 
criterion (criterion (beta) and sensitivity (d’)).  
There are different strategies for signal detection: I.e. a person’s decision criterion 
could be to the right, thus this person would only report a signal if it’s beyond their 
doubt. The false alarm rate would basically become non existent. However, this also 
increases the number of misses. If the opposite strategy is used, basically every piece of 
information is called a signal. This will create an almost perfect hit rate, but it will also 
create a high false alarm rate21. It is obvious that different personalities have a major 
impact on the decision criterion, which is subject to changes over time (Warm 1984; 
Methot and Huitema 1998). 
2.  Vigilance Performance Factors 
Vigilance is a subset of human performance. Thus, we expect that the formula for 
human performance holds true for vigilance performance. Research in this field clearly 
established factors that impact vigilance performance. After we explain some of the 
                                                 
21 False alarms are not a good way to get superior’s attention. 
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factors, we will relate them back to the formula and show their non-linear interaction. We 
































Figure 12.   Vigilance Factors 
 
Figure 12 summarizes the findings of several researchers (Davies and Tune 1970; 
Davies and Parasuraman 1982; Warm 1984; Matthews, Davies et al. 2000). It shows the 
main factors that influence vigilance performance. It also shows a sample of the different 
measures of performance (MOP). There are three main factors that impact vigilance 
performance: Task factor, environmental factor and subjective factor. These factors are 
determined by their identified variables (i.e. the environmental factor is determined by 
the stress level). The next sections explain the variables, indicating their impact on 
vigilance performance 
a.  Task Factor 
Experimental vigilance tasks are often performed in laboratories. Thus this 
factor can be easily controlled by the experimenter. Task duration, for example, can vary 
between only a few minutes to many hours. Parasuraman and Davies suggested a 
taxonomy that discriminates vigilance tasks into successive or simultaneous tasks 22.  
                                                 
22 Successive tasks are absolute judgment tasks in which observers must maintain a standard in 
working memory to compare incoming information against it. Simultaneous tasks are comparative 
judgment task, in which the information contains all the features needed to discriminate it. 
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Successive tasks are more demanding since they use the working memory intensely (See, 
Howe et al. 1995).  
Vigilance decrement can be minimized either by sufficient rest pauses or 
feedback (called knowledge of results (KR)). Research showed that even false KR can 
have a positive effect on vigilance performance (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000).  
Signal salience and probability impact vigilance performance (Sawin and 
Scerbo 1995). Signal salience (intensity, duration) impacts sensitivity (detectability). 
Signal probability has an effect on the decision (response) criterion.  
…low overall levels of detection efficiency are attributable to observers 
adopting extremely conservative response criteria that are appropriate to 
the low signal probabilities they experience in the majority of sustained 

















Figure 13.   Relationship between Task Variables and Human Performance Factors 
 
Figure 13 graphically relates vigilance research findings to the factors that 
influence human performance in general. KR or incentives (like receiving money for the 
experiment) have an impact on a person’s willingness to perform well. KR is also an 
environmental setting. The opportunity factor describes the environment in general. In 
vigilance research, this environment can be equated to the method of a vigilance 
experiment. I.e., signal salience has an impact on the opportunity factor as well as the 
capacity factor. Task duration and the use of rest pauses impact the capacity factor. 
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b. Environmental Factor 
The environmental factor in vigilance research is not equivalent to the 
opportunity factor of the human performance formula. It captures the level of stress 
caused by the environment onto the subjects. Some of these variables are again controlled 
by the researcher. Sleep deprivation impacts human performance in general. It has a 
degrading effect (Belenky 1994) that can, in certain circumstances, be counteracted with 












Figure 14.   Relationship between Environmental Variables and Human Performance 
Factors 
 
Figure 14 shows that the environmental factors impact all three 
performance factors. For example, heat has been used as an external stressor for vigilance 
tasks. Mackworth showed in one of his experiments, that signal detection increased as 
temperature was increased from 70 to 79 degrees Fahrenheit. At temperatures above 88 
degrees Fahrenheit vigilance performance degraded (Mackworth 1950). Matthews 
concluded from several studies that there is a curvilinear relationship, very similar to the 
Yerkes-Dobson law, between heat and vigilance (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000).  
Palinkas showed that cold had an impact on motivation before the body 
temperature decreased (Palinkas 2000). Looking back to Figure 9, we claim that once the 
stress level has exceeded the maximum zone of psychological adaptability, the 
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motivation is going to be impacted. Experiments with vibration showed that the capacity 
factor is impacted by this stress type (see Figure 7).  
Another example for the influence on capacity is loss of sensory acuity. A 
loss of visual acuity occurs when temperature exceeds 122 degrees Fahrenheit 
(Matthews, Davies et al. 2000). 
c. Subjective Factor 
The subjective factor includes personality, response biases and motivation. 
Different researchers showed the variance of human performance between individuals. 
Examples for this type of research can be found in (Eysenck and Eysenck 1985; 
Matthews, Davies et al. 1990; Koelega 1992; Matthews and Holley 1993; Sawin and 
Scerbo 1995; Methot and Huitema 1998; Matthews, Davies et al. 2000; Gusev and 
Schapkin 2001).  
There are many personality theories23 that try to categorize the difference 
in individuals. It is beyond the scope of this research to go into detail of personality 
research. However, there seems to be an agreement in personality theory that the 
dimension extroversion and introversion is one of the dimensions characterizing 
individuals (Matthews 1997; Gusev and Schapkin 2001; Nêcka and Szymura 2001; 
Schapkin and Gusev 2001).  
                                                 
23 (Boeree, G. (1999) describes about 30 different personality theories. 
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Tasks / Performance Extroverts Introverts 
Dual-task performance ++ -- 
Memory task involving high response competition ++ -- 
Short-term memory tasks ++ -- 
Retrieval from memory ++ -- 
Processing resources ++ -- 
Sensory reactivity ++ -- 
Resistance to distraction ++ -- 
Detection rate in vigilance tasks -- ++ 
Perceptual sensitivity -- ++ 
Difficult problem solving -- ++ 
Long term memory  -- ++ 
Table 2.   Differences (sample) in Performance Based on Personality Trait 
Extroversion 
 
Table 2 describes some of the main differences between extroverts and 
introverts adapted from (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000, p.267ff.). “++” indicates that the 
trait is superior. For example extroverts outperform introverts in dual task performance 
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1985). (Matthews, Davies et al. 1990 ) documented individual 
difference in resource availability, which is going to have an impact on our simulation 
system. Research in vigilance also established the superiority of introverts in terms of 
detection rate and perceptual sensitivity (Koelega 1992). (Gusev and Schapkin 2001; 
Schapkin and Gusev 2001) conducted the latest research in terms of individual 














Figure 15.   Relationship between Subjective Variables and Human Performance 
Factors 
 
Figure 15 shows that personality influences both the capacity factor and 
the willingness factor. As documented in Table 2, extroverts tend to have more 
processing resources. (Sawin and Scerbo 1995) showed that boredom-prone subjects 
have a more distinct vigilance decrement. This correlates with the fact that extraverts do 
not perform as well as introverts. Extroverts presumably are more prone to boredom than 
introverts (Eysenck and Eysenck 1985).  
d. Vigilance Performance Formula 
We have described how the different factor variables (task, environment, 
subject) impact performance factors (opportunity, capacity, willingness). From that we 














This equation shows that opportunity is a function of the task (specifically 
the method of the task experiment). Capacity and willingness depend on subject, task, 
and environment. Since these different factors represent dimensions, a different way of 










































This equation shows that vigilance performance is a non-linear function of 
the mentioned factors. From prior description of the impact of these factors, it is evident 
that vigilance performance is dynamic and adaptive. Hence we found support for the 
hypothesis that vigilance is a complex adaptive system. The next section describes some 
of the main theories explaining vigilance performance or more specifically in some cases 
the vigilance decrement. 
3. Vigilance Theories 
Several theories of vigilance tried to explain either the low overall level of 
vigilance or the vigilance decrement or both. Our research could potentially be utilized 
not only to approxima te empirical human vigilance performance data but also to create 
feedback to the developed theories. This is what McKelvey called the “model-centric 










1. The theories, model, and phenomena 
are viewed as independent entities.
2. Science is bifurcated into two 
independent but not unrelated truth-
testing activities:
(a) experimental adequacy 
(b) ontological adequacy
 
Figure 16.   Semantic Conception Model Centric View on Vigilance Adapted from 
(McKelvey 2000) 
 
Figure 16 shows the feedback between model to the different theories as well as 
the feedback from the real phenomenon (Vigilance) back to the model. One of the 
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assumptions of our research is that the model centric view accomplished with a model 
composed of a multi-agent system is the “third way of doing science” as expressed by 
researchers like (Axelrod 1997; McKelvey 2000). Thus we will explain these theories 
with respect to their impacts on the modeling approach. Therefore, it is imperative that 
RHPM has an open flexible architecture, that potentially allows us to include these 
theories even in hybrid forms (i.e. expectancy theory + arousal theory+ resource theory). 
a. Inhibition and Habituation 
Mackworth regarded the vigilance decrement as analogous to the 
extinction of a conditioned response when that response is no longer 
reinforced. The decline in detection rate was therefore attributed to the 
accumulation of inhibition, a fatigue like construct, which eventually 
results in a failure to produce the detection response, usually a key-press, 
when a signal is present (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000, p.117). 
 
A conclusion from his theory is that increased signal probability would 
lead to a decreased detection rate, because the inhibition process would lead to a faster 
accumulation of fatigue. Experiments showed that this conclusion doesn’t hold.  
Detection decrements were found to be inversely related to signal 
probability levels across groups. High signal probabilities generated 
consistent within-group and within-subject performance, whereas low 
probabilities generated both lower performance and larger within-subject 
variance (Methot and Huitema 1998, p.1).  
 
Habituation theory proposed that due to the habituation of neural 
responses to non-target events, the observer becomes progressively less able to 
discriminate targets from non-targets, resulting in a sensitivity (d’) decrement (Matthews, 
Davies et al. 2000). This neural response can be measured with the help of an EEG 
recording the cortical evoked potential like the N100. Parasuraman showed that the rate 
of habituation in the N100 response was not effected by signal probability (Parasuraman 
1998).   
Inhibition or habituation theory is mainly concerned with the vigilance 
decrement. There is evidence, that these theories do not explain the entire phenomenon. 
McKelvey’s view on theories explains why one should not discount the entire theory: 
A theory is intended to provide a generalized description of a 
phenomenon, say, a firm’s behavior. But no theory ever includes so many 
terms and statements that it could effectively accomplish this. A theory: 
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1. does not attempt to describe all aspects of the phenomena in its 
intended scope; rather it abstracts certain parameters from the phenomena 
and attempts to describe the phenomena in terms of just these abstracted 
parameters”; 
2. assumes that the phenomena behave according to the selected 
parameters included in the theory; and 
3. is typically specified in terms of its several parameters with the 
full knowledge that no empirical study or experiment could successfully 
and completely control all the complexities that might affect the 
designated parameters—theories are not specified in terms of what might 
be experimentally successful (McKelvey 2000,p.15). 
 
The conclusion from these theories for our model are: 
· The model should provide an opportunity to manipulate the parameters of 
the response selection and execution like the response bias beta 
· The model should provide an opportunity to impact the sensitivity 
parameter (d’). 
b. Filter Theory 
Filter theory states that sustained attention to the same information source 
is liable to intermittent interruption, because the hypothetical filter is biased towards new 
information.  
Filter Theory thus attributes the vigilance decrement to periodic failures to 
select task relevant information which become more frequent with time at 
work. Filter theory predicts that vigilance tasks in which signals are 
present only for a brief period will yield a more pronounced decrement 
than tasks in which signals are present for longer periods … Filter theory 
also predicts that the decrement in self-paced vigilance tasks, where 
observers work at their own pace, should be less marked than in tasks 
where observers work at a rate that is externally exposed (Matthews, 
Davies et al. 2000, p.119).  
 
Some experiments support the theory and its conclusions. However, there 
is also evidence against the latter conclusion. Observers tend to increase their own 
response rate paralleled with a decrease in detection rate. This implies that observers use 
the speed-accuracy tradeoff as their performance strategy (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000). 
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The conclusion from filter theory for our model is that the model needs a 
component with a filter function. This component should progressively attend more to 
new information sources than to the relevant source seeking novel stimuli  
c. Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory claims that observers keep track of past signal 
occurrences in order to predict future ones. This leads to the expectancy of signal 
occurrence. (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000).(Davies and Tune 1970; Davies and 
Parasuraman 1982) show many experiments that support this theory. However, they also 
point out some objections to the theory: 
· The knowledge of the temporal structure of a vigilance task gained during 
one session does not transfer to later sessions. Expectancy theory explains 
this by claiming that observers completely forget the temporal structure 
between experiments. 
· Expectancy theory emphasizes the importance of an early accurate 
detection level. However, a vigilance decrement occurs even if the early 
detection level was almost perfect. This doesn’t relate to the fact that the 
initial prediction of signal occurrence was accurate. (Davies and Tune 
1970, p.205) 
·  
They conclude that:  
The expectancy hypothesis has provided an ingenious way of integrating 
data from many vigilance experiments. However, in view of the many 
difficulties which it faces, certain modifications of the hypothesis, which 
would have the effect of minimizing the role of expectancy as a 
determinant of detection rate, would appear to be necessary (Davies and 
Tune 1970, p.206). 
 
Expectancy theory suggests that a model should include components that 
conduct statistical analysis of signal probability to create a signal expectancy. Clearly this 
component should account for the inaccuracy of human estimation. 
d. Resource Theory 
Figure 2 showed an adaptation of Wicken’s general multiple resource 
model. This theory claims, that there exist different resource pools in four dimensions 
(modality, code, stage, channel of visual information) (Wickens 2002). There is evidence 
that  
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..prolonged performance on detection tasks depletes the pool of resources 
as the person becomes fatigued. Vigilance tasks look undemanding, however they 
impose a high workload as measured by a workload measure called NASA-TLX. 
Fatigue studies indicate, that vigilance performance effects often relate to strategy 
rather than to loss of resource availability (Matthews, Davies et al. 2000, p.122).  
 
Matthews also concludes that there needs to be further investigation to 
research the interrelationship of motivational and workload effects on the vigilance 
decrements. 
Our simulation system is already utilizing Wicken’s resource theory. The 
derived vigilance performance formula show that willingness and capacity are main 
factors for the vigilance performance. Thus we need to model a component that takes the 
motivational status into account. 
e. Arousal Theory 
Since previous sections explained two dominating arousal theories 
(Yerkes-Dobson law, dynamic stress model), there is no further need to describe those in 
detail. Arousal theory for vigilance performance claims that the prolonged task 
performance leads to a lowering of arousal or activation. This leads to degraded vigilance 
performance (Matthews, Davies et al. 1990). Mackworth demonstrated that the use of a 
stimulant (Benzedrine) counteracts the vigilance decrement. He also showed that KR 
prevented a decline in vigilance performance (Mackworth 1950). However, there is 
experimental evidence that only the perceptual sensitivity correlates with the arousal 
level. The arousal level has no apparent impact on the response criterion (beta). 
A conclusion for the model from arousal theory is certainly that there 
needs to be an opportunity to parameterize the arousal level to manipulate the perceptual 
sensitivity.   
The next section shows that reduced human performance matches the 
typical properties of a complex adaptive system. 
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E. REDUCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE 
SYSTEM 
This section summarizes findings on reduced human performance with respect to 
the provisional working criteria of a CAS. 
1. Comparison with Provisional Working Criteria 
This section uses the provisional working criterias to discern a CAS to establish 
the main hypothesis. 
a. Autonomous Agents Acting in Parallel 
The human body consists of a network of organs that act independendly 
and parallel from each other on a physiological level. We find inspiration in the 
massively complex systems of the human body. Researchers in the field of autonomic 
computing acknowledge how complex and autonomous some of the human systems: 
Think for a moment about one such system at work in our bodies, one so 
seamlessly embedded we barely notice it: the autonomic nervous system. 
It tells your heart how fast to beat,checks your blood sugar and oxygen 
levels, and controls your pupils so the right amount of light reaches your 
eyes as you read these words. It monitors your temperature and adjusts 
your blood flow and skin functions to keep it at 98.6 F. It controls the 
digestion of your food and your reaction to stress – it can even make your 
hair stand on end if you’re sufficiently frightened….But most 
significantly, it does all this without conscious recognition or effort on 
your part.  (Horn 2001, p.6).  
 
Clearly Horn acknowledges the complexity of the autonomic nervous 
system. He shows that there are several functions often working to adjust blood sugar, 
oxygen level, pupil width, and many more. It is obvious that these functions work in 
parallel with each other steered by different mechanism (or in our Lingo: autonomous 
agents) 
Chris Wickens Multiple Resource Model is another analog that we can use 
to proof our point. There are several cognitive resource pools that seem to be independent 
at a high degree from each other. It appears that every resource pool is an autonomous 
agent providing resources to certain tasks. Research in multi tasking (simultaneous tasks 
which people work in parallel) shows that the level of performance in two different tasks 
(modality and code) can be as high as if one would only perform the tasks individually. 
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There are more examples already mentioned in this research (e.g. heart as 
a complex adaptive system, immune system as a complex adaptive system) which 
established that they consist of autonomous agents working in parallel. This leads to the 
next point. If a system consists of autonomous agents acting in parallel the control of the 
system must be highly dispersed. 
b. Highly Dispersed Control 
Again we could use the autonomic nervous system or the immune system 
as legitimate examples of decentralized controls in the human physiological system. For 
example the salivary is checking for blood sugar levels and injects insulin automatically 
when food is taken in. (Kaarlela 1997). 
Human performance is a function of willingness (volitional control), 
capacity, and opportunities. Vigilance research shows that vigilance decrement is a 
phenomenon that human can not sustain attention for long periods of time. There is 
evidence that this negative degradation can be counteracted with exterior help for a 
certain amount of time (e.g., feedback of result or treatment with benzedryne (Mackworth 
1950)). However, a performance degradation over time is inevitable even with the most 
motivated operators.  
The information stage processing model assumes that there are different 
stages of information processing. In every single stage there are distinct errors that can 
occur and even different resource pools for the stages and modalities. Stimuli in the STSS 
can be lost because we don’t attend to them in time and the “storage time” expired. Even 
after correctly processing and classifying an information, the response execution still can 
generate errors know as slips.  
c. Non-linear Interactions 
Hancock’ stress model and the Yerkes-Dobson law clearly indicate 
individual non-linear performance. Many experiments including ours clearly showed that 
external stressors like workload or time on task cause non-linear effects. Some of the 
interactions have an inversed U-shape as the outcome function. 
The human performance formula and the derived vigilance performance 
formula show the complexity and non-linearity within and between the main performance 
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factors. Two of the factors are interior factors (capacity and willingness) and there is 
evidence for the non-linear interaction between them.  
d. Adaptive System with Emergent Behavior 
Humans adapt to stress (internal or external stressors) on an individual 
basis. Hancock’s stress model combines perceived stress with available attentional 
resources. This is the link between stress and performance. He suggests that there are 
different level of adaptation or zones of adaptivity (physiological and psychological) 
which effect the available cognitive capacity (see Figure 9). By humans adapting to 
stress, human performance adapts indirectly via available attentional resources. Emergent 
behavior , like increasing error rates, occur when stress level or workload level surpass a 
certain threshold.  
Marianne Frankenhaeuser gives a good overview on degraded human 
performance in crisis situations: 
1. Attention narrowing: When our stress level rises, we develop 
tunnel vision. Important dimensions of the situation may be 
completely blocked out from conscious awareness. 
2. Perceptual Distortion: Messages tend to become distorted in the 
direction of our expectations. Such distortions occur, in particular, 
when stimuli are ambiguous, when past experiences influence 
interpretations, and when wishful fantasies color what is perceived. 
3. Mental rigidity: A related psychological phenomenon is loss of 
mental flexibility. Coping with the unexpected becomes even more 
difficult in a crisis. When people are under strong emotional 
pressure, their cognitive processes become rigid. Their ability to 
take in new information is reduced, particularly information which 
is not consistent with established beliefs. The ability to weigh 
alternative courses of action is impaired, as is the capacity to 
reevaluate conclusions. We know from the accident at Three Mile 
Islands that the operators adhered rigidly to a picture that did not 
tally with the facts. 
4. Vigilance fluctuation: It is also significant that the accident at 
Three Mile Island took place at about 4:00 a.m. It is well known 
that mental alertness is associated with the diurnal rhythm which 
characterizes most physiological processes. This rhythm adapts 
slowly to shifts in the pattern of sleeping and waking hours. 
(Frankenhaeuser 1997, p.5) 
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 Human performance seems to rely on an adaptive system delivering 
cognitive resources. Emergent behavior then becomes the level of performance. 
Vigilance decrement is an emergent behavior characterized by increases in error rates 
(omission and commission). 
e. Dynamically Changing Structure 
The brain continually strengthens and weakens myriad of connections 
between neurons as individuals learn from their encounter with the environment.  
Different organs of the autonomic nervous system change their structure or features (for 
example: pupil width, heart rate, brain blood flow).  
Posner and Steven Peterson showed how the attention system of the 
human brain functions on a neuronal activity level (Posner, 1990). Dynamically changing 
connections and changes in blood flows occur in the same areas at different stages of the 
detection process. The supporting brain regions for sustained attention dynamically 
change their structure to support this cognitive function.  
f. Changing Different Equilibria 
Human performance is all but constant over long periods of time. Athlets 
try to time and manage their work outs such as to achieve peak performance for 
important competitions. Vigilance experiments show that the initial decrement is most 
pronounced within the first 30 minutes. Nevertheless the degradation continues over 
time. Knowledge of feedback results causes non-linear jumps in performance basically 
going back to a previous alertness state. However this state doesn’t last and the 
degradation starts again with the first stimulus.  
g. Implicit or Explicit Model for the Future 
It is very obvious that planning and decision making of humans are based 
on explicit models of the future. Expectancy theory for vigilance performance claims that 
humans build a statistical expectation of signal occurrence. This is certainly supportive 
evidence for our hypothesis. 
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h. Strong Sense of Path Dependency 
Interviews after the conducted experiments showed that there was a broad 
variety of strategies to cope with the workload. Many mentioned that once they found the 
rhythm it was easier to conduct all the required tasks. Thus it appears to be evident that 
by evolving structures in our case even strategies and incorporating the incoming 
information a strong sense of path dependency has been established. 
The next section describes conducted experiments showing individual 
differences in personality traits, cross-cultural differences and individual vigilance task 
performances. 
F. PERSONALITY AND VIGILANCE EXPERIMENTS 
This research claims that human performance is a function of internal factors, 
external factors and task variables. Internal factors like personality have been shown to 
impact vigilance performance (Methot and Huitema 1998; Schapkin and Gusev 2001). In 
order to enhance the understanding of the theories of vigilance and it’s relation to 
personality theories and to gather complete data a series of own experiments were 
conducted. The following sections describe four different conducted experiments 
(personality test, low workload vigilance experiment, high workload vigilance 
experiment) and discusses their results. 
1. Personality Test Experiment 
There are many personality tests that one could potentially use to asses the 
differences in personality. (Boeree 1999) discusses some 30 different personality 
theories. Every theory has a battery of different tests associated with it. One of the most 
acknowledged one is the the five factor model of personality. This model is often called 
an evolution of the well-known Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and suggests a paradigm 
shift from personality types to personality traits. The model establishes five different 
dimensions of personality: 
· Openness (O) refers to the number of interests to which one is attracted 
and the depth to which those interests are pursued. High openness refers to 
a person with relatively more interests and, consequently, relatively less 
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depth within each interest, while low openness refers to a person with 
relatively few interests and relatively more depth in each of those interests. 
· Conscientiousness (C) refers to the number of goals on which one is 
focused. High C refers to a person who focuses on fewer goals and 
exhibits the self-discipline associated with such focus.  Low C refers to 
one who pursues a larger number of goals and exhibits the distractibility 
and spontaneity associated with diffuse focus. 
· Agreeableness (A) refers to the number of sources from which one takes 
one's norms for right behavior.  High A describes a person who defers to a 
great many norm sources, such as spouse, religious leader, friend, boss, or 
pop culture idol.  Low A describes one who, in the extreme, only follows 
one's inner voice.  High A persons will march to the drumbeat of many 
different drummers, while low A persons march only to their own 
drumbeat. 
· Extraversion (E) refers to the level of sensory stimulation with which one 
is comfortable.  High extraversion is characterized by a larger number of 
relationships, a larger proportion of one's time spent in enjoying them, and 
in general a comfort with loud, bustling social scenes.  Low extraversion is 
characterized by quieter social scenes, a smaller number of relationships 
and a smaller proportion of one's time spent in pursuing those 
relationships. 
· Negative Emotionality or Neuroticism (N) refers to the number and 
strength of stimuli required to elicit negative emotions in a person. More 
resilient persons are bothered by fewer stimuli in their environment, and 
the stimuli must be strong in order to bother them. More reactive persons 
are bothered by a greater variety of stimuli, and the stimuli do not have to 
be as strong in order to bother them.  (Howard and Howard 1995, p. 4ff)      
After a brief discussion with research psychologists (Shilling 2003) the NEO FFI 
test was chosen. The electronic version with the short form (60 questions) was installed 
on a standard personal computer. The test computes the raw scores and standardizes them 
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under the assumption that scores are normally distributed with a mean t-score of 50 
(Costa and McCrae 2000). The NEO FFI not only provides the t-scores of individuals in 
the five dimensions it also correlates their traits describing certain styles of behavior 
based on the trait assessment (see Appendix C for a detailed discussion and definitions)  
a. Method  
Participants: Fifty Naval Postgraduate students (mostly military officers) 
participated in the study (38 US students (5 female) and 12 foreign students from four 
different countries (Germany, Greece, Singapore, Turkey). Mean age was 34. Participants 
volunteered and received a personality report printout after conducting all experiments. 
Subjective Measures: Participants completed the NEO FFI electronic 
version before they started the vigilance experiments. 
b.  Results  
The results indicate that the tested population is in fact not a normal 
population. There is biases that might be typical for the military community: 
One Sample T-test P-O P-C P-E P-A P-N 
Mean 53.36 52.92 53.82 46.86 45.60 
stddev 9.81 10.68 8.53 11.24 9.51 
t 2.42 1.93 3.17 -1.98 -3.27 
df  49.00 49.00 49.00 49.00 49.00 
alpha 0.025 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 
Ho mean=50 Reject Fail to reject Reject 
Fail to 
reject Reject 
CI Lower 50.57 49.88 51.40 43.67 42.90 
CI Upper 56.15 55.96 56.24 50.05 48.30 
Table 3.   One Sample T-test for Personality Scores 
 
Table 3 summarizes the result of conducted two-tailed t-tests. Every 
dimension was tested against the following hypothesis at the alpha level of 0.05: 
50;    :  










There are three traits (openness (O), extroversion (E), and neuroticism 
(N)) where the null hypothesis was rejected, indicating that the means of these traits 
differ from a normal population. Thus, the sample is more prone to score high in O, high 
in E, and low in N. The latter one is certainly a desired trait in the military community 
since a low score in negative emotionality indicates a more relaxed reaction to negative 
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experiences. There was not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis for 
conscientiousness (C) and agreeableness (A). The 95% confidence intervals consequently 
(albeit barely) cover a mean of 50.  
The result indicates that simulation systems certainly have to take the 
shown bias instead of an average assumption into account. 
Although the sample of foreign students was small (12) the opportunity to 
investigate cross-cultural differences was taken. The results show statistical significance 
for the trait of conscientiousness (p-value = 0.03). 
 





















Figure 17.   Cross-Cultural Differences between US and Foreign Students 
 
Figure 17 indicates that there are differences in two traits: Openness (O) 
and concscientiousness (C). While C could be established with statistical significance (p-
value 0.03) the difference in O is not as pronounced. The interaction between traits now 




The purpose of this research was not to evaluate cross-cultural differences. 
Drawing conclusions from the results is possible but they should be carefully evaluated 
considering the small sample and the diversity of the participating countries and 
definitely backed up with follow on research24.  
A general result is that the US sample shows a higher level in 
conscientiousness and a lower level in openness. Thus the behavior is more goal-driven, 
rule conform and group oriented. Foreign students are more critical and innovative. 
However, they do not tend to rule-conform behavior and not always towards goal 
oriented behavior. This population also seems to focus more on their own needs than on 
group needs. 
Another important conclusion can be drawn from this experiment. The 
experiment showed that the military community has strong biases if compared with a 
normal population. There is also evidence cross-cultural differences exist and that they 
might impact the behavior or behavioral patterns. This research will explore whether or 
not cross-cultural difference actually impacts vigilance performance. Overall the 
experimental result of a biased military population should be taken into consideration for 
cognitive models especially in military simulation systems.  
2. Low Workload Vigilance Experiment 
One of the driving ideas of the vigilance experiments was to establish the 
vigilance decrement while evaluating the correlation of this decrement with personality 
traits. Most of the collected data was used to calibrate the RHPM. Some set was used for 
validation purposes. There were four different treatments: 
· Low workload treatment 
· High workload treatment 
· Going from high to low back to high workload 
· Going from low to high back to low workload. 
Participants conducted the first two treatments and than either one of the last two 
treatments. Every experiment lasted 30 minutes which should be sufficient to establish 
                                                 
24 The Naval Postgraduate School certainly has a prime opportunity with over 250 foreign student 
officers and also officers from all US services. 
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the vigilance decrement. Participants conducted each of their experiments at the same day 
time to confine or block any time-related effects. The experiments were conducted with 
the SynWin-Simulator from Activity Research Inc. This simulator is very flexible and 
collects the raw data for further evaluation.  
a.  Method 
Participants: 44 participants conducted the low workload conditions. All 
participants were students (42 officers, 2 civilians) of the Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California from different countries (US 33, Germany 4, Greece 3, Turkey 2, 
Singapore 2) and different branches of the respective Armed Forces. They ranged in age 
from 26 to 47 years with a mean of 34.0 years. All participants had normal or corrected 
to-normal-vision and normal hearing. 
The next figure shows the setup of this experiment: 
 
Figure 18.   Low Workload Set Up 
 
Procedure: Participants had two mutual-exclusive monitoring tasks. No 
feedback of result was provided during the experiment. Participants were asked not to 
wear their wrist watches. The visual monitoring task is on the lower left side. Participants 
 74 
watched the fuel gauge and mouse-clicked on it when the needle went into the red zone. 
Lapses were defined as either clicking too early or letting the needle touch the bottom. 25 
The alert button belonged to the auditory vigilance task. A sound was 
played periodically every 3 seconds (Miller)26. The noise sound was 1000 hz and 0.15 
sec in duration. The signal sound was 1025 hz and 0.15 sec in duration.  The participant’s 
task was to click the ALERT button following the signal sound, before the next sound 
occured. The probability of the signal sound was 0.1. Measured results (a snapshot was 
taken every 10 minutes) contain number of hits and misses, number of false alarms and 
correct rejections, reaction times for hits and false alarms.   


























Figure 19.   Reaction Time in Low Workload Condition 
 
The mean reaction time changed with time periods. After an initial 
improvement which could be subject to being used to the task the reaction times 
increased. This result supports the assumption that a vigilance task is a high workload 
task. More interestingly it’s variation increased over time (sigma first 10 min = 0.199, 
                                                 
25 For details on parameter setting (i.e. movement rate) please see Appendix D 
26 Pre- experiments showed that signal salience could be a potential problem. The difference between 
a 1000hz and 2000hz signal was clearly to salient and different sounds were generated for the experiment. 
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sigma last 10 min = 0.271). This shows that some subjects were reacting slower at the 
end of the experiment.  
False Alarms: False Alarms didn’t show statistical significance in terms of 























The number of misses remains steady for the first 20 minutes (assuming 
unequal means yields a p-value = 0.667) In the last period there is a significant increase 
in misses (p-value 0.03 periods 1 and 2 compared to 3). Hence a performance degradation 
in terms of misses is pronounced. 
c.  Cross Cultural Differences  
Results don’t show statistical significant differences between US and FS 
students. However, there is a difference for the development of false alarms. The foreign 
student sample actually decreased the false alarm rate significantly (comparison between 
false alarm rate (0-10 min versus 20 to 30 minutes) with a p value 0.04. 
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Figure 20.   Cross Cultural Difference Low Workload 
 
Figure 20 shows that foreign students improved their performance over 
time whereas the US students performance remained constant. 
d. Influence of Personality Traits 
There exist statistically significant correlations between agreeableness (A) 
and the number of misses in the first two time phases. The significance is also 
pronounced in a linear regression using A as a predictor. However, it only accounts for 
10-15% of the variance in the data. Extraversion and openness each had one significant 
correlation with reaction time phase 3 / false alarm phase 1 . Their impact is measurable 
but not significant enough to establish them as driving forces. 
e. Summary 
This experiment clearly established a vigilance decrement in terms of miss 
rate and reaction time. The false alarm rate did not change significantly. An analysis of 
variance showed  some evidence for the influence of the personality traits agreeableness, 
extroversion, and openness. However, their impact only accounts for a small portion of 
the variance. An evaluation of the different interactions between the personality traits is 
beyond the scope of this research. However, initial results showed that the small sample 
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sizes (subjects are categorized in four splitter groups) don’t usually allow conclusions 
with statistical significance. 
3. High Workload Experiment 
a. Method 
Participants: 43 participants conducted the high workload conditions. All 
participants were students (41 officers, 2 civilians) of the Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California from different countries (US 32, Germany 4, Greece 3, Turkey 2, 
Singapore 2) and different branches of the respective Armed Forces. They ranged in age 
from 26 to 47 years with a mean of 34.0 years. All participants had normal or corrected 
to-normal-vision and normal hearing. The next figure shows the set up of this 
experiment: 
 
Figure 21.   High Workload Condition 
 
Procedure: The visual and auditory monitoring tasks remained the same. 
The high workload condition included two more displays. The upper left window is a 
Sternberg memory task. At the beginning of the experiment four letters were displayed. 
During the experiment probe letters were randomly displayed (trial duration 8 seconds) 
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and participants had to decide whether or not the letter was in the test sample.  Feedback 
for correct, false or missing answers was given with the help of a point display in the 
middle of the screen and an auditory signal for mistakes.. The upper right corner shows a 
simple cognitive task, computing digits. Participants could use the = or – buttons to 
display the sum of the math task. Feedback for correct and mistaken answers were given 
via the point display and an auditory signal. Participants were encouraged to score high 
without ignoring (compromising) the monitoring tasks. 
b. Results 
The effect of additional task complexity and imposing higher workload 
showed clear effects on all three MOEs. The reaction time was slightly higher in every 
single time phase, the differences between the means was statistically significant (highest 
p-value 0.003). The development over the course of the experiment mirrors the low 






















Figure 22.   Comparison Reaction Times Low vs. High Workload 
 
The false alarm rate started at a rate of 3.81 false alarms / 10 minutes and 
remained almost constant for the experiment. The miss rate showed an interesting 
phenomenon. It started higher than in the low workload condition but then it basically 
followed the same development. 
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Figure 23.   Comparison Misses Low vs. High 
 
This result helped to gain insight into applying arousal theory to the 
vigilance decrement. If one would expect a steady decrease this result would be 
counterintuitive. Just by looking at the experimental results it appears to be obvious that 
initially subjects had problem with the workload and therefore missed critical signal. 
After that they adapted to the new condition and improved their performance drastically. 
There seems to be a phase transition from a transient period to an adapted phase. 
However, at the end the performance level decreased again. Table 4 shows that it is very 
unlikely that these differences are coincidental. 
Ttest Misses P-Value
Miss 1 to 2 0.000002
Miss 2 to 3 0.034810
Miss 1 to 3 0.006108
Miss 1 high to 1 low 0.000002
Miss 2 high to 2 low 0.778712
Miss 3 high to 3 low 0.783757  
Table 4.   P Values for Comparison of Misses 
 
The first four p-values show that the differences between the means are 
significant. For example the comparison of means between high workload miss rate in the 
first 10 minutes to the second 10 minutes is almost 0 (0.000002). The same result holds 
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true for comparing the low and high workload condition’s results in the first 10 minutes. 
It also shows that the miss rate between high and low workload in the last 20 minutes can 
not be distinguished. Arousal theory can deliver one possible explanation for this 
behavior: Subjects started the high workload condition highly aroused and adapted their 
strategy over time. This decreased their arousal level to an almost optimal performance 
comparable to the low workload condition. However, time on task increased the arousal 
level again such that an increase in miss rate occurred.  
c. Cross Cultural Differences 
There are no statistically distinct differences comparing US to FS students. 
However, it appears that again there is a difference in false alarm rate development. 






















Figure 24.   Comparison False Alarms US versus FS 
 
It seems obvious that the performance of foreign students in terms of false 
alarm rate improved whereas the US sample showed a more or less constant rate over 30 
minutes. There is no statistically significant evidence to support this statement. However, 
it appears that the false alarm rate and its change over time could potentially be a cross-




d. Influence of Personality Traits 
The generated correlation matrix did not indicate significant correlations 
between the MOEs and the personality traits.  
e. Summary 
The results clearly show the impact of a higher workload on the overall 
performance. The higher workload especially impacted the reaction time and initially the 
miss rate. Cross cultural differences are not significant but together with the low 
workload condition there is an indication that there are differences in terms of false alarm 
rate changes. The next chapter describes the results of varying conditions during the 
experiment.  
4. Changing Condition Experiment 
a. Method 
Participants: 24 participants (low-high-low) and 20 participants (high–
low-high) conducted the mixed treatment.  
Procedure: These experiments changed conditions every 9 minutes within 
the experiment. Everybody had conducted the two previous experiments and were not 
give any special instructions. 
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b. Results 


















Figure 25.   Comparison Lapses in mixed conditions 
 
Figure 25 shows how sharply conditions influenced the amount of lapses 
(fuel gauge errors). The graph displays two curves. The high-low-high curve has a v-
shape indicating that the error rate corresponds negatively (decreased) to the low 
workload conditions. The reverse is true for the low-high-low workload treatment. Here it 
is obvious that the shift to the high workload conditions had a positive effect on the error 
rate (increasing).  
LHL 
p-val 1vs 2 pval 1 vs 3 p val 2 vs 3 
0.022 0.165 0.037 
Table 5.   P Values for Low High Low Workload 
 
Table 5 lists p-values for the comparison of means between the first 10 
minutes and the second 10 minutes, the first with the third, and the second with the third 
session. The difference in means is significant between workload conditions (p-values 
0.02 and 0.037). 
A comparison for the reaction times also indicates the pronounced “V”-
shape. 
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Figure 26.   Reaction Time Comparison HLH to LHL 
 
Figure 26 shows that the change of working condition did have an impact 
on the reaction time. Especially in the HLH condition the differences between low and 
high are significant. Some of the results are also surprising and it is not easy to explain 
them with the given theories. 
















Figure 27.   False Alarm Mixed Conditions 
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The result for the HLH treatment is unexpected. The difference between 
the first high phase and the second high phase is significant. The false alarm rate 
improves significantly over time which is a surprise by itself. Even more surprising is 
that it improved despite increasing the workload. Looking at a performance comparison 
with the low and high condition shows that the false alarm rate improved within the 
sequence of experiments. There seems to be a perceptual learning effect impacting the 
results and a better adaptation to the high workload condition. This result certainly 
emphasizes the hypothesis that reduced human performance is a complex adaptive 
system.  
c. Influence of Personality Traits 
The results of the mixed runs are similar to the pure condition runs in 
terms of correlation with personality traits. In the LHL treatment there is again evidence 
that agreeableness (A) correlates with the number of misses in the first 20 minutes. A 
possible explanation for this correlation could be that subjects with a high score in A are 
more motivated in a boring vigilance task. Thus they attend better to signals and don’t 
miss them as often as subjects who score lower in A. This could be an potentially 
interesting result and further investigation is suggested. 
d. Summary 
The mixed treatments’ results show the impact of differing working 
conditions on vigilance performance. For example there are distinct differences in 
reaction times. The error rates were generally lower which indicates that subject learned 
to better distinguish signal from noises. Even subjects that could not clearly hear 
differences in the first two experiments improved their performance. This learning effect 
needs to be taken into consideration when harmonizing the model.  
One surprising result was the outcome of the false alarm rate in the high 
low high condition. Despite an increase in workload subjects further decreased their false 




This experiment helped to understand the complexity of human performance. 
Some of the benefits of the experiment is seeing the theories in practice and also 
experiencing limitations of the theories. For example, there is no clear explanation why 
the false alarm rate improved over time despite increasing workload. If the theories do 
not explain the entire phenomenon maybe the model can be used to reproduce the results 
to help in understanding the phenomenon. The data for the low and high workload 
conditions will be used to calibrate the model.  
G. FINDINGS 
This research intended as one main point to show convincing evidence that 
reduced human performance is a complex adaptive system. After defining and explaining 
CAS in Chapter II, this chapter started by defining human performance. Then it defined 
vigilance performance, explained the main theories and showed examples of vigilance 
performance. The comparison between the features of reduced human performance and 
working criteria of a CAS showed overwhelming evidence, that human performance is a 
CAS.  
The main measure of effectiveness (MOE) that this research will be using are: 
· Mean reaction time (time it takes for a generated stimulus to lead to a 
reaction) 
· False alarm rate (number of commission errors in 10 minutes intervals) 





MISSES FALSE ALARMS  
Low High Low High Low High 
10 min 0.81 1.05 1.69 5.77 3.81 3.63 
20 min 0.78 0.96 1.45 1.53 3.21 3.67 
30 min 0.83 0.98 3.62 3.05 2.43 3.40 
Table 6.   Measure of Performance Human Experiment 
 
Table 6 shows a summary of the results achieved via the vigilance experiments. 
These results will be used to calibrate the model.  
The next chapter describes the design of the Reduced Human Performance Model 
(RHPM) and will apply the same working criteria to investigate whether or not RHPM is 
a CAS by itself. 
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IV. DESIGN OF THE REDUCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
MODEL 
This chapter looks at early design consideration and software engineering and 
moves on to model design and validation strategy, describing a holistic view of cognitive 
frameworks and modules used in computational models of vigilance. By using the 
hypothesis that reduced human performance can be modeled as a complex adaptive 
system this model is a unique approach to capture human performance. Currently there 
no known computational models of vigilance (Parasuraman, 2003). Although this 
research focuses on building a computational model of vigilance, the bigger picture of 
embedding this model into a cognitive framework is essential. This research suggests that 
a future cognitive architecture should consist of interoperable sub-components.  
A. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING ASPECTS 
Major design decisions such as the use of a discrete event-driven simulation 
system and the formal description method for RHPM are explained below.  
1. Discrete Event Simulation 
Discrete event simulation27 proposes an event-driven method:  
Discrete event simulation concerns the modeling of a system as it evolves 
over time by a representation in which the state variables change 
instantaneously at separate points in time. (In more mathematical terms, 
we might say that the system can change at only a countable number of 
points in time.) These points are the ones at which an event occurs, where 
an event is defined as an instantaneous occurrence that may change the 
state of the system (Law and Kelton 1991, p.7). 
 
Appendix A contains a primer on discrete event simulation methodology and their 
formal description event graphs. Many simulation systems are time-step driven: with 
every step, the entities of the simulation update their state variables and act accordingly. 
This method uses computating resources rather inefficiently, since the update rate of 
entities often depends on the rate of animation. There is also evidence that the length of a 
time step influences a simulation’s outcome (Warhola 1997).  
A less formal argument for the use of discrete event simulation versus the use of 
time step simulation would be that people do not usually interrupt an action in a periodic 
                                                 
27 This method also allows mimicking a time-step simulation by inducing events at fixed intervals. 
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fixed interval. Rather, it appears to be natural that they react continually to changes in 
their environment, which favors an event-driven approach. 
Discrete event simulation has been used intensely in queuing and manufacturing 
problems. We assume that the information-stage processing model is a kind of queuing 
system (i.e. the STSS stores stimuli before the model processes them).  
Based on the comparative efficiency of discrete event simulation and our 
assumption that information processing is a kind of queuing system, the primary major 
design decision for RHPM is the use of an event-driven method. This decision guides the 
entire design.  
 
2. Loosely Coupled Components  
Investigation of loosely coupled components (LCC) is a research project of the 
operations research department of the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Gordon Bradley described the reasoning behind the project in 1995: 
The problems faced by planners will be less predictable than in the past, so 
the systems must be more flexible to address situations the designers 
cannot anticipate. The systems must have an open architecture that allows 
additional capabilities to be added without disruption. Legacy systems for 
planning and execution are too static, monolithic, and inflexible to meet 
these requirements. Current efforts to integrate legacy planning tools are 
an improvement, but, even when these efforts are brought to fruition, the 
results will not be sufficiently interoperable, platform independent, or 
extensible to meet the challenges of military decision making. As 
demanding as the individual requirements are, advanced systems for 
planning and execution must incorporate all these capabilities in an 
integrated system (Bradley, 1998, p.30). 
 
LCC is a project that should assist modelers in rapidly prototyping and utilizing 
components as building blocks; fittingly, the latest research paper describes these types of 
components as LEGOs (listener event graph objects). “The name is also a metaphor for 
how complex models can be built by rapidly linking simpler component sub-models” 
(Buss and Sanchez 2002, p.732). Since 1995, many projects have successfully used this 
design strategy in the domain of military simulation. See (Arntzen 1998; Bohmann 1999; 
Le 1999; Schrepf 1999). 
 89 
LCC’s design philosophy is based on the “observer” design pattern of the “gang 
of four” (Gamma, Helm et al. 1995). The pattern is applicable: 
· when changing one object requires changing others, and you don’t 
know how many objects need to be changed; 
· when an object should be able to notify other objects without 
making assumptions about who these objects are. In other words, 
you don’t want these objects tightly coupled. 
 
LCC uses even weaker criteria on the coupling mechanism and therefore calls it 
the “listener pattern.” For example, the observer pattern uses interfaces for attaching and 
detaching observer objects. LCC uses no coupling between the components, though 
initially it used mediators. This research employs software routers embedded in the 
listener pattern, in a manner analogous to networking 














Figure 28.   Message Routing between Agents 
 
Figure 28 illustrates why the structure is called loosely coupled. Agent A could be 
any agent in a simulation system that provides a message (A) as output. The agent sends 
this message out and even if nobody listened to it, Agent A would still continue its work. 
It is independent of acknowledgement of its message, which is a feature for the observer 
pattern. In this example, the Router “listens” to Agent A’s messages. It can use several 
information modes (unicast is a one-to-one connection; multicast is a one-to-many 
connection; broadcast is a one-to-all connection). The router can also filter the content of 
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the information and transport the entire message (A) to Agent B and a reduced message 
(A-) to Agent C. Unidirectional arrows indicate the listener pattern. The arrow tip points 
to the listener; the end of it is connected to the sender of information. The message object 
can be formatted using typical agent-communication protocols (i.e. using Knowledge 
Queering Modeling language (KQML) (Flores-Mendez 1999)). Bidirectional arrows 
show that the entities communicate two ways, acting either as receivers or senders. 
The listener pattern seems to be very apt as a design choice for a next-generation 
cognitive architecture. Some advantages include: 
· An architecture based on the listener pattern is dynamically extendable. Its 
structure can be changed during run-time, which is essential for CAS 
modeling. 
· Components can be exchanged at any time (event run-time) without 
creating a new system. 
· It facilitates re-use of software. 
· This pattern lends itself to a plug-and-play approach, similar to 
exchanging hardware components via USB. 
Considering these important advantages, a major design decision for this research 
is the use of the listener pattern for most components of the simulation system. After 
discussing the background for two major design decisions, the next aspect for designing a 
cognitive architecture is a validation strategy, which should be developed before the first 
line of code is written.  
B. DESIGN AND VALIDATION STRATEGY 
It is essential to start the creation of a cognitive framework by focusing on 
validation. The NRC panel (Pew et al, 1998, p.3) recommended that future research 
efforts on modeling human behavior should focus on the following areas: 
1. Collecting and disseminating human performance data 
2. Developing accreditation procedures for models of human behavior 
3. Supporting sustained model development in focused areas 
4. Supporting theory development and basic research in relevant areas 
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This research uses a validation strategy called harmonization and focuses on 
vigilance performance. The next sections show how this relates to complex adaptive 
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Figure 29.   Fitting a Model to a Real System (adapted from) (McKelvey, 2000) 
 
Figure 29 shows how to fit a computational model to a social system; this 
research fits the reduced-human-performance model (RHPM) to human vigilance 
performance. The analysis and comparison of the model’s and the system’s output can 
lead either to a good fit (unlikely in the early stages) or to a change in structures, rules 
and parameters.28 Thus this research harnesses complexity29 by fitting a complex 
adaptive system to a range of experime nts.  
Once model and system output are sufficiently similar, the model can potentially 
be used as a surrogate of the system (recall the artificial immune system for in silico 
experiments), generate predictions, or explain previously unexplained phenomena.  
                                                 
28 Parameter fitting is only one level of adjusting the model. Thus this research doesn’t attempt curve 
fitting. After evaluating the literature on vigilance, it is highly unlikely that one can fit any combination of 
different vigilance tasks’ outcomes with a curve-fitting model of all important measures of performance 
(i.e. hit rate, false-alarm rate, and reaction time). Curve fitting would work for a very simple experiment 
like Mackworth’s clock. 
29 (Axelrod, R., Cohen, M., 1999) explained how one can influence CAS and 
avoid common mistakes. 
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This kind of procedure, harmonization of computational models, is an acceptable 






































Figure 30.   Harmonization of a Computational Model adapted (From: Carley 1996,  
Fig 3. p.20) 
 
Kathleen Carley30 explains that a multi-step process should guide the validation 
of a computational model. Figure 30 shows the concept of this multi-step process. The 
calibration part is used to fit parameters of the model such that its outcome matches real 
data. The next step is to predict data and compare the prediction with real data. The 
verification process would currently be called validation.31 She claims that a model can 
achieve four levels of validation: 
· Pattern validation (predicted pattern matches real patterns) 
· Point validation (predicted points match real points) 
                                                 
30 Carley was a co-author on the National Research Council for modeling human and organizational 
behavior (Pew et al., 1998) 
31 Verification checks whether a model does the right thing. Validation checks whether it is the right 
model. 
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· Distributional validation (predicted distributions match real distributions) 
· Value validation (predicted values match real values) 
Value validation is the aim of this research; a major difficulty stems, however, 
from the linear assumptions of Carley’s harmonization. We have discussed why vigilance 
performance is non-linear, and of course a linear model cannot capture this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the process is useful in calibrating our model with data and conducting test 
runs against previously unknown data.  
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK 
This section describes the functionality of the main modules and components for a 
next-generation cognitive framework. Subtitles reflect (Pew and Mavor 1998)’s 
suggested list of items for inclusion into architectural descriptions.  
1. Original Purpose 
This research intends to create a new cognitive framework with the potential to 
allow the use of different modules and sub-modules to model specific cognitive 
functions. The information-stage processing model is a rough blueprint for this 
framework. A proof-of-concept implementation is used to demonstrate the usefulness of 
complex adaptive systems for modeling robust and adaptive human behavior. Vigilance 
modeling is the focus of a first design phase.  
I have long thought that computational methods should be applied to 
vigilance but there have been none. Neural networks or other 
computational models have not been developed, so if you succeed that will 
be a great accomplishment (Parasuraman 2003). 
 
2. Submodels 
A functional description of the modules needed to calibrate the model follows. 
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Figure 31.   Calibrating the Reduced Human Performance Model 
 
 Figure 31 depicts the modules used to calibrate the model. A human-
experiment database feeds the Generator32 module. The Generator recreates scenarios 
for several experiments (e.g., the Mackworth clock test). The scenario represents the input 
for RHPM. The human-experimental results represent the input for the Calibrator 
module. The scenario’s ground truth (e.g. a generated observation is a signal or a noise) 
represents one input for the Comparator module. The other input comes from RHPM 
behavior (e.g. identifying an observation or dropping an observation). The comparator 
then provides input for the calibrator, which can adjust models’ parameters, rules, and 
structure-fitting RHPM to human vigilance performance. 
b. RHPM Modules 
Figure 3 shows the main modules of RHPM (for convenience, this figure 
is shown again below). The modules are numbered the sub-sections that describe their 
functionality. The major components, which also show this research’s main contributions 
in terms of modeling, are blue. 
                                                 
32 We use cursive lettering for software constructs such as agents or objects. Underlined cursive 
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Figure 32.   Numbered RHPM Modules 
 
(1) Symbolic Constructor Agents: Symbolic constructor agents 
(SCAs) encode impressions (input into the system). SCAs represent the perception aspect 
of this framework. They have been used in a number of projects at the MOVES Institute: 
see (Hiles et al, 2002) for more details. This model uses two different input modalities, 
auditory and visual. For every modality, there exists a specialized agent whose 
performance decreases with time on task to mimic the loss of sensitivity often seen in 
vigilance tasks. The agent relays the observation to the short-term sensory store.  
(2) Short-Term Sensory Store: Chris Wickens describes the 
functionality of the ShortTermSensoryStore (STSS) in context with the information-stage 
model: 
Each sensory system, or modality, appears to be equipped with a central 
mechanism that prolongs a representation of the physical stimulus for a 
short period of time after the stimulus has physically terminated. When 
attention is diverted elsewhere the STSS permits environmental 
information to be preserved temporarily and dealt with later. Three general 
properties are characteristic of STSS: (1) It is preattentive; that is no 
conscious attention is required to prolong the image during the natural 
“time constant” of the store. (2) It is relatively veridical, preserving most 




This research uses Wickens’ description as the functional 
requirements for the STSS. Next we describe the transformation of his multiple-resource 
model (MRM) into a mathematical model. 
(3) CapacityManager: The CapacityManager is a model for 
attentional resources, using the MRM to simulate attentional resources. This model part is 
















Figure 33.   Transformation of Multiple Resource Model (MRM) 
 
Figure 33 shows a transformation of the MRM. The highest-level 
agent for providing attentional resources is the MetaResourceAgent. The next level 
(MetaProcessingAgent and MetaSelectionAgent) represents the distinct pools of 
information processing and response selection and execution. On the processing side, an 
intermediate level represents the processing code, differentiating between verbal and 
spatial resource pools (SpatialAgent, VerbalAgent). The next level depicts the interface 
between elementary action and resource models. On the processing side, the modality 
dimension (auditory, visual) is introduced. There are four resource agents: PSV 
(ProcessingSpatialVisualAgent), PSA (ProcessingSpatialAuditoryAgent), PVV 
(ProcessingVerbalVisualAgen), and PVA (ProcessingVerbalAuditoryAgent.) These 
                                                 
33 According to a personal email, Dr.  Wickens doesn’t know of a computational model of the MRM 
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provide attentional resources, characterized by code and modality, to elementary 
actions.34 On the selection side are two agents (ManualAgent for manual responses, 
VerbalAgent for verbal. Figure 33 shows the analog, indicating the activation level in the 
brain, that this research attempts to capture.  
This research faced a major design problem by deciding on how to 
implement the multiple resource model. Obviously it must allow for parallel actions and 
the resulting resource computation should influence the human performance non linearly. 
There should be an inherent capability to start with an easy model and then enhace it’s 
degree of complexity. Computation should be “easy and fast” to allow good performance 
characteristic. Time on task should influence the resource depletion increasing the 
demand the longer a task takes. Another important consideration is how well the 
implementation can be adjusted to fit into vigilance theories. 
Consumer load (task?)
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Figure 34.   Main Analog for RHPM 
 
Figure 34.visualizes the main analog used for the design and 
implementation of RHPM. The decrease in performance looks very similar to the power 
decrease in an electrical circuit with a thermal resistor. When the resistance increase over 
time, the power decreases. This research develops this analog towards cognitive 
resources distributed via electrical circuits.  Potentiometers and thermal resistances in 
                                                 
34 WorkingAgents conduct elementary actions such as storing, retrieving, or evaluating stimuli.  
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parallel and seriell circuts mimic the distribution of resources. The electrical analog has 
advantages in terms of computational ease and clearly using parallel circuits introduces 
non-linear effects. For example electrical power decreases with the inverse of a resistor’s 
squared value. The potential introduction of new elements like capacitors and coils fulfill 
one of the design requirements to start with an easier model with the potential to increase 
complexity.  
The electrical analog can also address some vigilance theories 
easily. Habituation, for example, is a process that occurs when neurons grow acclimated 
to arousal and simply don’t react anymore. The analog to this process in electrical terms  
would be a thermal resistance increasing over time. The flow needs to increase in order to 
achieve the initial performance level. Similarly, the idea that over time a task demands 
more resources to maintain acceptable performance can be modeled by using thermal 
resistors for tasks that increase their temperature (or resistance) over time. The next 
































Figure 35.   Multiple Resource Model as Electrical Circuit 
 
Figure 35 shows the relationship and functionality between the 
different resource levels. The MetaResourceAgent provides energy for all resource 
agents. Whenever this agent is influenced (e.g., by stressors) the performance of the 
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model degrades. ResourceAgents are reactive, and modeled as potentiometers, allowing 
them to vary their resistance to achieve a desired goal flow. The resource levels are 
shown as serial elements. Agents on the same level are modeled as parallel elements. 
This structure allows for a clear separation of resources (e.g. between the 
ProcessingSpatialAgent PSA and ProcessingVerbalAgent PVA) and also supports agents 
using the same resource pool (e.g., ProcessingSpatialAuditoryAgent PSAA and 
ProcessingSpatialVisualAgent PSVA both use PSA as supplier). The relationship can be 
described in a rigid mathematical model (shown later). Appendix A provides a formal 
description for all agents of the CapacityManager. 
(4) Cognitive Module: The cognitive module captures the 
functionality of the perception and memory parts of the information-stage processing 










































Figure 36.   Cognitive Module 
 
The cognitive module comprises seven composite agents. Each 
agent has a distinct task (or elementary action) to fulfill, granted the resources to do so. 
These agents compete for resources and their performance depends on their state. Three 
mechanisms can degrade their performance: 
· Stimuli can be dropped because the agent’s buffer is full 
· Stimuli can fade, because they were not attended to in time 
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· Task time depends on resource flow; changes in flow also change the time 
the task is finished. 
Every agent is composed of a WorkingAgent (WA) and a 
FlowRegulatorAgent (FRA). The FRA is a reactive agent (much like resource agents) 
that checks the flow periodically, trying to maintain or return to a desired goal flow. It 
can change its resistance and thereby influence the entire resource-distribution system. 
The WorkingMemoryStore is a rudimentary implementation: 
Vigilance tasks require at most a comparison between a standard and a stimulus in 
working memory; thus this research doesn’t try to use a sophisticated model of working 
memory. (Miyake and Shah 1999) show an excellent summary on how different 
architectures implement working memory. One of the main features is an executive 
control module best described as the homunculus for the working memory. Since our 
hypothesis claims that there is decentralized control, this would not be a likely 
implementation idea for a possible expansion. Figure 35 also shows how the cognitive 
module is embedded in the model. The UpdateAgent checks the STSS for new stimuli and 
relays these stimuli to the PerceptAgent. PerceptAgent determines code and modality of 
the stimuli, transforms the stimulus into a percept, and informs TaskAllocatorAgent and 
ComparisonAgent. TaskAllocatorAgent informs the CapacityManager module regarding 
the code and modality of the task at hand. All resource agents that support either the code 
or modality start regulating their flow. ComparisonAgent compares the stimulus either to 
a standard in working memory (if the vigilance task uses a standard to compare the 
stimulus with [simultaneous discrimination]) or forwards the percept to TransmitAgent or 
SearchAgent (if percept is known). SearchAgent is a hook-up for further expansion of the 
model. This agent normally would try to find the percept and what to do with it from long 
term memory. In this model, it randomly classifies whether the percept is known and 
informs TransmitAgent and StorageAgent. StorageAgent stores the percept into 
WorkingMemoryStore, and TransmitAgent relays the classified (i.e. known) percept to the 
ResponseSelectionAgent. The next figure shows the described relationships as an 

























Figure 37.   Data Flow in the Cognitive Module 
 
The cognitive module is also embedded with the electrical-circuit 
analog. TaskAllocatorAgent represents the connection between this circuit level and the 
next higher level. The other working agents work in parallel, indicating that they have to 























































































Figure 38.   Cognitive Module as Electrical Circuit 
 
Figure 38 shows how agents are modeled in an electrical circuit. 
The composite agent shown in the figure is the UpdateAgent. When this agent is idle, its 
resistance is not in the circuit, and its switch is open. As soon as the agent starts a task, 
the switch closes and resistance becomes active. The resistor is thermal, indicating 
increasing resistance over time. This figure shows how multi-tasking is actually modeled: 
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The UpdateAgent (UA), SearchAgent (SA), ComparisonAgent (CA), StorageAgent 
(StA), and the TaskAllocatorAgent (TAA) are busy, indicated by their closed switch. 
Again, the mathematical model behind the scenes is rigid and can easily be implemented. 
The computation is actually implemented in the next module—the Ampere module. 
(5) Ampere Module: Ampere is like an instrument for every agent 
to read their flow and to write changes in the resistance values of resource agents and 
flow regulator agents. Ampere is a passive object and produces no behavior by itselfSince 
agents can only have local knowledge, every WorkingAgent, ResourceAgent and 
FlowRegulatorAgent receives only local information from Ampere (i.e., your current flow 
is 6.123 amp).  
It is used to compute flows when the following events occur: 
· Initial flow event : Computes initial flows for all agents 
· A working agent starts or ends a task and thereby changes its resistance. 
· A FlowRegulatorAgent asks for it’s current flow (periodically, with a 
parameterized update rate) 
· A FlowRegulatorAgent changes its potentiometer value to achieve it’s 
desired flow. 
· After a change in the system it informs every working agent about their 
specific flow changes, thereby extending or shortening tasks.  
Every resource level is the voltage source for the next lower level. 
To compute the different flows in different parts of all electrical circuits, the computation 
starts with the total resistance in every lower-level circuit. The rules for totaling 
resistance across several resistors are straightforward. The next figure explains the 
























Figure 39.   Computational Rules for Electrical Circuits 
 
Figure 39 illustrates the ease of computation in electrical circuits 
that have resistors as the only elements. The upper part shows that resistors that work 
serially are simply added together and treated like a single resistor. In the parallel case 
(lower picture), computation is slightly more difficult, but the rule is similar. The inverse 






Equation: Computation for Parallel Resistors 
Transforming this equation leads to the formula inside the 
resistance on the right side of Figure 30. Computing the current (flow) goes back to 
Ohm’s law: 
;* IRV =  
Equation : Ohm’s Law 
 
Voltage is the product of current and resistance. In a serial circuit, 
current is constant but voltage at each element adds up to the total voltage. In a parallel 













































Equation: Computational Formulas for Parallel and Serial Circuits 
 
Applying these formulas to the cognitive module circuit leads to 
the following computations: 
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Equation : Total Resistance Computation for the Cognitive Module 
The total resistance for the cognitive module is the sum of the 
parallel circuit’s resistance and TaskAllocatorAgent’s two resistors, where one is 
controlled by its FlowRegulatorAgent. The parallel resistance is computed by summing 
up the inverse totals of each composite agent’s resistance. A working agent’s resistance is 
0 when idle. After starting work, its resistance increases over time by adding resistance 
increments (constant c). Again, the composite agent’s potentiometer’s value is controlled 
by its FlowRegulatorAgent.  
Having established the lower-level circuit’s resistance, we can treat 
it as a single resistance for the next level. The computation bubbles up to the 
MainResourceAgent, which provides the main voltage. The flow (current) computation 
then goes top down, computing the current for every resource and working agent using 
described equations. The MainResourceAgent has a connection (loosely coupled) to the 
EgoModule, which we describe next. 
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(6) Individual States and Traits (IST) Module: This module is a 
pre-planned component where emotions and external and internal stressors can effect 
RHPM performance. Since these areas are still terra incognita, RHPM uses a few 






















Figure 40.   Individual States and Traits (IST) Module 
 
Figure 40 shows all agents that can potentially be used in this 
module. DistractionAgent and FocusAgent determine how much of MetaAgent’s energy 
really goes into the system for vigilance tasks.  
As mentioned, most people have an bias for new information. Thus 
in our model, the influence of DistractionAgent compared to that of FocusAgent 
increases over time, taking resources from MetaAgent.  
MetaAgent also offers an opportunity for modeling feedback of 
result. Since this feedback almost cancels the vigilance decrement, DistractAgent’s 
influence goes back to its initial influence value and the time process starts again. This 
agent also provides interesting enhancements of the model by introducing non-constant 
energy levels (i.e. varying with the time of day). 
StressAgent can be used to model individual sensitivity to arousal. 
It uses an update rate and an perceived stress increment. By changing the StressAgent 
parameters it is possible to simulate a faster impact of stress on the model’s performance. 
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ExpectancyAgent sets up expectations by computing statistics such 
as perceived signal probability and rate, and influences the update rate of the 
UpdateAgent and the decision criterion of ResponseSelectionAgent. 
(7) Response Selection: This agent uses a simple mechanism to 
determine whether it detected a signal, comparing the nominal value of the percept to a 
criterion. If the value is below threshold, the percept is classified as noise; if above 
threshold, as a signal. The criterion can be influenced by the EgoModule, which accounts 
for one major assumption of signal detection theory.35 This component can easily be 
expanded to include more complex responses and should be subject to future work. 
(8) Response Execution: The Response Execution produces 
RHPM’s output. It has an inbuilt mechanism for producing slips. A slip is an omission 
error—in our case knowing the right thing to say (yes or no), but saying either the 
opposite or nothing. 
3. Knowledge Representation 
This model uses a limited type of data that can be classified as signals or noise. 
This type of knowledge can easily be represented as objects with different values on 
attributes. However, there are substantially new ways of representing knowledge 
(available at our research institute [tickets and connectors] (Hiles, J. et al, 2002)) that 
could potentially be utilized by expanding the model. 
4. Higher-level Cognitive Function 
This cognitive architecture models vigilance as a higher-level cognitive function; 
thus it is part of signal detection and decision-making. The architecture can easily be 
extended to include different cognitive functions. This actually captures the gist of what 
evolutionary psychologists claim. If we have several circuits (different cognitive 
functions), we can conceive of modeling each one as a complex adaptive system and then 
adding them onto a framework. We expand on this visionary statement in the future work 
section. 
                                                 
35 Decision criterion beta increases over time with low signal probability. 
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5. Output 
RHPM’s current output differs between vigilance tasks. Sometimes it is a vocal 
statement of identifying an observation (“yes” or “no”). Sometimes it is a manual 
response, like pushing a button.  
6. Multitasking 
RHPM is multi-tasking capable, allowing for parallel and serial working. It uses 
cognitive buffers (queues) at various places to enable prioritization and interruption with 
rescheduling of tasks. CapacityManager manages the attentional resources; thus the 
model is limited by available resource.  
7. Multiple Human Modeling 
RHPM models an individual involved in a vigilance task. Its lightweight 
architectures permits use in a scenario involving multiple persons. This research could 
potentially interface to an air-defense simulation system (Calffee, 2003) modeling all or 
some individuals of the air defense crew. 
8. Implementation 
The model, formally described in Appendix A, is an event-driven simulation. 
Professor Arnie Buss has developed a useful library (SIMKIT) that supports modeling 
and programming discrete-event simulations. Since SIMKIT is written in Java, we 
choose to implement the model in that language; however, any implementation language 
that can handle discrete event simulation (DES) could implement the underlying 
mathematical model. 
9. Support Environment 
RHPM runs on PCs and workstations that have a Java Virtual machine. In order 
to run it, the Simkit.jar file is needed.36 Java Version SDK 1.4 or higher is recommended. 
10. Validation 
RHPM was designed with a validation strategy called harmonizing, which has 
been described earlier. The results chapter of this dissertation describes details of the 
validation process. 
                                                 
36 Simkit can be downloaded at http://diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/Simkit/ 
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This section explained major design decisions and features. RHPM uses discrete 
event simulation, documents its design with event graphs and uses the Listener pattern for 
most simulation components. Appendix A, B, and C provide a more detailed view on 
design specifics by describing the underlying mathematical model. RHPM’s architecture 
is very transparent. It enables exchange of components, intense re-use of software, easy 
extensibility. The next section describes RHPM in terms of a multi agent system without 
going into design details that have just been described. 
D.  RHPM AND FERBER’S FORMULA 
Jacques Ferber describes the major elements of a multi agent system. He 
explained the design of MAS as a set of factors, now called the Ferber Formula for MAS: 
MAS = (E,O,A,R,Op,L) (Ferber 1999) 
This section briefly described the elements of his formula in the context of 
RHPM’s design. 
1. Environment E 
Environments can be multidimensional (e.g. 2D or 3D). RHPM uses a one 
dimensional environment meaning that agents and objects don’t move. The agents and 
objects are situated in an electrical circuit that represents cognitive resource flows. 
Details follow in the next section.  
2. Objects O 
There are several objects like a ScenarioGenerator or Comparator that are 
wrapped around the model. Inside the model there is the Ampere object which we 
described earlier. Other objects include resistors and potentiometer which are operated on 
(values change) by agents. Objects in MAS can be typically used by the agents.  
3. Agents A 




ResourceAgents regulate their potentiometer if there is a task in the system that 
fits their profile. FlowRegulatorAgents try to maintain a desired flow for a specific 
 109 
working agent. WorkingAgents process tasks. The time to finish a task is determined by 
the flow it receives. Changes in flow lead to changes in the task end time. 
The IST module contains several kinds of agents such as a: 
· Distraction Agent, FocusAgent 
· ExpectancyAgent  
· MetaResourceAgent 
The DistractionAgent competes for resources with the FocusAgent. Over time the 
influence of the DistractionAgent increases. The Expectancy Agent is a cognitive agent 
in the sense that it keeps a history of perceived signals and noise and builds its own 
statistical model. The MetaResourceAgent provides the energy to RHPM. It divides its 
resources to the competing Distraction and FocusAgent. 
4. Relations R 
Some agents cooperate explicitly (Expectancy Agent informs UpdateAgent) or 
implicitly (WorkingAgent FlowRegulatorAgent, ResourceAgent). Every action of an 
agent influences the local perspective of every other agent. 
5. Operations Op 
Typical operations of agents is reading from or writing to Ampere. (i.e. 
FlowRegulatorAgents and ResourceAgents change values of their potentiometers. 
Working Agents start or end a task causing resistors and switches to change state. 
6. Laws L 
Potentiometer can only be changed to a certain min (or max) value. Their value 
can never be negative. Potentially the value could go to infinity simulating a burn-out in 
the sense of the word. 
RHPM fulfills the characteristics that Ferber described as typical for a MAS. The 
next section addresses the question whether or not RHPM is a CAS by itself. 
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E. REDUCED HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODEL AS A COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
This section compares the design of RHPM to the provisional working criteria of 
a CAS and investigates whether the model features potentially allow the model to be a 
CAS. 
1. Comparison with Provisional Working Criteria 
a. Autonomous Agents Acting in Parallel 
The underlying electrical circuit model for the capacity manager shows 
that agents work in parallel to each other. RHPM uses several different autonomous 
reactive agents that base their next action on their goal and their local perspective. 
Working agents use buffers do establish independence from each other. However, if one 
agent runs dry, agents that follow in a sequential order will also run dry.  A better 
example for autonomous agnets are the flow regulator agents that decide based on a 
comparison between desired flow and current flow whether or not to change their 
resistance. These agents clearly act in parallel to other flow regulator agents, working 
agents, and resource agents.  
b. Highly Dispersed Control 
Every agent bases its decision on a local perspective. There are agents that 
provide information to other agents (e.g. the Expectancy Agent informs the UpdateAgent 
on a perceived signal occurrence probability.)  
Even the Ampere module has no central control in terms of behavior. It is 
used as a read repository for specific individual flows, thereby assuring that agents only 
have a local perspective. It is also used as a write repository for changes in resistance that 
change every single flow. 
c. Non-linear Interactions 
There are several design features that allow non-linear interaction. Agents 
working in an electrical circuit with parallel elements is a non-linear model feature. The 
computational formulas for the flows in the system are non-linear functions of resistor 
values. Switching in a network also causes non-linearity in the system.  
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d. Adaptive System with Emergent Behavior 
There is two levels of adaptions intended to be used within the model. The 
lower level adapts to the current workload by providing resource flow to specific working 
agents. Changes in workload or the resource drainage over time lead to changes in the 
system. The design allows for emergent behavior such as errors or even a total 
breakdown by blocking incoming stimuli or dropping conscious percepts. 
The higher level is the use of a genetic algorithm to fit the model to 
different human performance measures. 
e. Dynamically Changing Structure 
Agents frequently change their connections depending on their state. For 
example if an agent has just ended a task, it uses a recovery time before it becomes a part 
of the circuit again (closes the switch). Resource agent provide for task that match their 
perception code and modality. As soon as there is no demand for them they don’t 
compete for resources and don’t take measures to change their flow. 
A limitation for every computational model of a CAS is the lack of 
capability to generate entirely new interactions and new behavior. This is still an open 
research question which the MOVES Institute is addressing in a project called IAGO 
(Principal Investigator Research Professor John Hiles).  
The design decision to use listener pattern for the connections between 
components could potentially limit this feature. RHPM allows to dynamically connect 
and disconnect entities during run time with specified method calls. It does not allow 
connectivity between unspecified methods. Further research would be needed to address 
this problem. However the decision to use the listener pattern is feasible considering that 
this remains an open research problem.  
f. Changing Different Equilibria 
RHPM state variables change permanently during run time. They never 
truly settle down which shows that this feature can be established. However, since RHPM 
is a computational model there are phases where the model is in an equilibrium. For 
example in the pre-instantiation phase the model doesn’t do anything. If no stimulus were 
generated, the system would go into a state of equilibria permanently. Thus RHPM 
fulfills this feature only during runtime with stimulus generation. 
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g. Implicit or Explicit Model for the Future 
Expectancy theory claims that humans build their own statistical models 
for signal probability and occurrence. RHPM uses an ExpectancyAgent that listens to 
decisions and builds an internal statistical model. This statistical model is a perceived 
depiction of reality because it doesn’t account for errors (omission or commission errors) 
as long as there is no knowledge of result feedback in the model.  
h. Strong Sense of Path Dependency 
Thus feature is certainly related to the question of dynamically changing 
structures with new behavior and interactions. RHPM supports this feature only with 
previous specified structures. Thus the number of evolving structures is finite and 
depends on the number of methods and connections that can be established. Further 
research is needed to improve RHPMs capability to allow the strong sense of path 
dependency.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained major design decisions and showed a blueprint of RHPM. 
It described modules in detail and then evaluated the question whether or not RHPM 
itself is a CAS and not a machine. The model’s main features follow the provisional 
working criteria for CAS. There is limitations to the model in terms of generating entirely 
new structures and behavior that is not based on the combination of pre-existing 
behaviors and structures. However, as pointed out, this is still an open research question. 
After a breakthrough certain design decision (like the use of listener pattern) should be 
reconsidered.  
The model’s validation is the benchmark for success. The next chapter describes 
RHPM’s configuration, experimental design and the results. This chapter adresses the 
remaining main point of this research showing whether or not RHPM is strongly 
connected to experimental results and whether it can generate surprises. 
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V. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
This next chapter describes the setup for calibrating RHPM. As described earlier 
this research followed the validation strategy for computational models suggested by M. 
Carley, called harmonization. It then describes the test runs for previously unknown 
scenarios after the model’s structure and parameters were calibrated. The following 
section describes how RHPM can be utilized to test theory of vigilance thus establishing 
the system as a surrogate for testing purposes. The summary points out the main 
experimental results and shows limits of the analysis.  
A. HARMONIZING RHPM 
RHPM uses many parameters such as signal probability, signal salience that need 
to be fixed before experiments actually start37. Other parameters distinctly influence the 
outcome of experimental runs. Initially this research focussed on parameters that clearly 
influence the measures of effectivness (MOEs). In the initial calibration step, the 
uncalibrated computational model was run with the high workload condition from the 
conducted human experiment. The first calibration process we applied to achieve 
reasonable (that is close to the mean of measured reaction times) reaction times included 
the parameter Main_Voltage and Conversion_Factor. Main_Voltage determines the 
initial energy level of the system, whereas the Conversion_factor determines how much 
time a task takes given a fixed amount of energy. The initial approach to calibrate these 
parameters was a “brute force” approach, randomly generating different parameter 
combinations and measuring a score. 
The scoring algorithm is well known in statistics as the sum of squared error. The 
differences between computational scores and human experimental scores were squared 
(also called Euclidian distances) and added up. 
                                                 
37 These parameters were used as constants for the harmonizing runs. However, they can and should 
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This equation shows how to compute the resulting score. After every 10 minutes 
within the experiment statistics are collected and compared to the human data (see Table 
6). Thus the dimension of time is enforced on the performance of RHPM. This approach 
generated a very close approximation for the reaction times (error less than 0.0001) 
within a hundred runs.  
The next step within the calibration process added the low workload condition. 
The result was again produced by randomly mixing parameter set ups. However, this 
time the scores of both conditions were combined to calibrate the reaction times not to a 
specific experimental condition. This time the approach was not as successful and the 
closest score was not satisfying (meaning that the sum of squared error was too high). 
Clearly the calibration process now needed to address the structure of the model to better 
fit the computational outcomes. Obviously a change in experimental conditions from a 
high to a workload should have an impact on the model. Clearly the stress level for the 
high workload condition is higher, consequently we adjusted the StressAgent such that it 
reacted to a difference in workload conditions. The perceived stress level reduced in the 
low workload condition. Another important difference between low and high workload is 
the arousal level. RHPM captures the arousal level as an energy level provided by the 
Meta_Resource_Agent. With this structural changes we were able to produce human like 
reaction times in two different conditions with the same parameter set up. 
Calibrating the next MOEs was more challenging since they were to be influenced 
by the same parameters. The most important parameters include the decision criterion, 
the criterion shift based on expectancy and the sensitivity decrement over time.  
This research used a simple genetic algorithm (Goldberg 1989) to optimize the 
parameter set up. The algorithm used to adapt RHPM will also be used for the application 
runs to assure comparative measurements.  
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A population of 200 different parameter set ups was generated. Each set up was 
run with the high and low workload condition. The resulting score was computed with 
the fitness function (sum of squared errors). After identifying the best score, this score 
was used as a benchmark for the creation of a new population. While the population size 
did not equal 200, set up’s were drawn from the original population. The drawing 
followed Goldberg’s idea of a wheel. However, we used the min score as nominator and 
the current score as denominator. If a uniform random number was below that ratio the 
parameter set up progressed into the mating pool. Thus the higher its score the less likely 
it was going to be in the mating pool. Then we applied the crossover and mutation to the 
new population and started the process all over. The goal was to calibrate the model such 
that it would have a resulting score lower than 50.0. This score is the sum of squares error 
computed from 18 different measure points (every MOE was collected at 10,20 and 30 
minutes in two different conditions.) Thus the goal was not to have a perfect fit of 
individual performance curves but to have a sufficiently close result for all 18 
measurement points. After 78 generations the fitness value was below the selected 
threshold. The resulting parameters were then fixed for the validation runs which are 
described next.  
B. VALIDATION RUNS 
This section shows the result of runs made with previously unseen situations and 
fixed parameters. The computational results were used as predictions and compared to 
the true human results.  
After utilizing the first two experimental conditions to calibrate the model the 
next major step was to run the model without changing it’s structure from the outside and 
using the achieved parameter. However, in order to adjust for the learning effect the 
variance for the signals and noise were slightly decreased depicting the ability of subject 
to better distinguish signals. The data collected in the high low high and low high low 
conditions were used for validation purposes. This section will visualize the results 
showing how close the model actually comes to true human performance. 
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1. Validation Run Low High Low  
The model was run with 24 repetitions (comparable to 24 subjects during the 
experiment). Every single run result was treated like a subject’s result. The MOEs were 
computed and statistical analysis were conducted. The individual results were used for 
paired T-tests to see whether there are significant differences in means and variances. 

























Reaction Time RPHM Reaction Time Human  
Figure 41.   Comparison Reaction Times Human vs. RHPM LHL 
 
Figure 41 shows how closely the mean of reaction times and the behavior of 
RHPM and subjects were correlated. This correlation could also be seen comparing the 
false alarm rates.  
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FalseAlarm RHPM FalseAlarm Human
p-value= 0.23
 
Figure 42.   False Alarm Comparison RHPM Human LHL 
 
Figure 42 shows the resemblance of the data produced by RHPM and human 
subjects. The difference in means was not significant between and within treatment. 
However, there is a down ward trend that can be shown with linear and non linear 
regression on both curves with similar results. 
The last MOE to validate was the miss rate. 
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Misses  RHPM Misses Human
significant p-value = 0.004
 
Figure 43.   Comparison Misses RHPm Human LHL 
 
Figure 43 shows almost identical behavior in the first 20 minutes. Then the 
experimental data suggests a decrease in miss rate (statistically significant) whereas 
RHPM increased its miss rate. This is possibly a perceptual learning effect that is even 
more pronounced in the other mixed treatment condition. There seems to be an 
improvement of performance in humans probably due to perceptual learning which the 
known theories do not cover and consequently RHPM does not fully capture this 
phenomenon. This question needs to be addressed by future research. The next section 
shows the results for the high low high workload condition. 
2. Validation Run High Low High 
RHPM produced data with 20 repetitions in order to compare it with the results of 
the human experiment. 
Again RHPM results in reaction times were very similar to the experimental data. 
 119 

























Reaction Time RPHM Reaction Time Human  
Figure 44.   Comparison RHPM to Human HLH 
 
Both curves show a very similar reaction to the decrease of workload in the 
second phase of the experiment. Reaction times increase slightly and then go back to the 
high workload level. Again there are no significant differences between the means at 
different times. 













Misses  RHPM Misses Human
significant p value = 0.03
 
Figure 45.   Comparison Misses RHPM Human HLH 
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The behavior of the miss rate is very similar. However, there is a difference in 
means in the first 10 minutes (p-value 0.03). After that the two performance curves are 
indistinguishable. The difference between human subjects and RHPM is a slightly lower 
initial failure rate that then approaches human error rates. This result is very interesting as 
it shows a possible effect caused by the way the experiment was conducted. Subjects 
didn’t have a warm up period as it is done in other experiments. Hence there seems to be 
a cold start effect that could presumably occur with every skilled function. Even in the 
high workload condition this “initial bias” could be established. The effect occurs for 
misses which really require an active act of saying yes or clicking the Alert button. Hence 
the subjects seemed to be pre-occupied with the other task such that they didn’t attend to 
the auditory task sufficiently. The reviewed literature did not cover this type of effect.  
One possible explanation is that there exists a phase transition. Vigilance theory does not 
cover a transient phase; consequently RHPM is not covering this phase either.  
The next result indicates that RHPM doesn’t improve as fast as human subjects in 
terms of misses. 



















FalseAlarm RHPM FalseAlarm Human
significant p-value 0.003
 
Figure 46.   Comparison False Alarm RHPM Human HLH 
 
The experimental result of an improving false alarm rate despite an increase in 
workload was reproduced by the model. Although it showed an improvement there is a 
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statistical difference between the means at the end of the run (p-value 0.003). The 
difference could be explained with an perceptual learning effect which correlates to a 
sensitivity increment. One possible explanation for the effect is that there is an order 
effect caused by the sequence of experiments. Every subject had conducted two previous 
experiments (low and high or high and low). It looks like the perceptual learning 
generated an automation effect for the distinction of signal and noise and thus even the 
high workload had no impact on a close to optimal performa nce. 
3.  Application Runs 
This section shows the model’s graphical user interface and then describes 
additional application runs showing that RHPM is neither brittle nor mechanistic. It also 




Figure 47.   Start View for RHPM 
 
Figure 47 shows the start view for RHPM. There are numerous parameters that 
can be set before a simulation runs starts (Setup Simulation).  
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Figure 48.   Setup View of RHPM 
 
Figure 48 shows the setup view. For example the top parameter “ Time to check 
for stress level” determines how often the Stress Agent updates it’s perceived stress. 
a. Variability of RHPM 
This section shows some experimental results indicating that RHPM could 
potentially be used as a surprise generating simulation entity. The main goal of the 
calibration and validation process is to match the mean of the MOEs. However, the 
standard deviation as a measure of how wide data is dispersed is another important factor 
for every model. If the model stays close to its mean, then it’s actions become 
predictable. In a simulation system where RHPM would “replace” human operators it 
would be important to produce unpredictable and human like results. The user should not 
be able to see a difference between a computer operator or a human.38 
                                                 
38 In the ideal case a reduced Turing test (only for a specific cognitive operation here vigilance) could 
show the value of having a close approximation to human performance in a simulation system. 
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Figure 49.   False Alarms in the High Workload Condition Generated by RHPM 
 
Figure 49 shows that RHPM is a stochastic model. The curves are 
individual (random) outcomes that would converge to the mean MOEs. RHPM produces 
outcomes with almost no false alarms (yellow triangle) or with an unusually high number 
in the last 10 minutes (red diamond).  
 The next table provides a more analytical approach comparing the 














Table 7.   Comparison of the Standard Deviation in the LHL Condition 
 
Table 7 shows a comparison of the MOEs’ standard deviations of RHPM 
and human subjects in the LHL condition. Human data is more dispersed, however the 
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differences especially in misses are small. Together with the good approximation to the 
mean MOEs RHPM is certainly neither mechanistic nor brittle. The random number 
generation allows repeatability of runs but it also allows pseudo-randomness making it 
very difficult to precisely predict the next outcome. The model’s variability can easily be 
increased e.g. by changing deterministic task times to stochastic task times. 
b. Individual States and Traits (IST) Module 
The IST Module contains several agents (StressAgent, DistractionAgent, 
and MetaResourceAgent) that influence the distribution of RHPM.s resources.  
The StressAgent updates the perceived stress level periodically with a 
parameter called STRESS_UPDATE. The perceived stress increases over time with a 
parameter called STRESS_DELTA. In a normal run the StressAgent’s influence 
increases over time reducing available resources for the MetaResourceAgent. The loss of 
resources is a function of the described parameters. The outcome with the default values 
typically39 looks like the next print out result: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 600.0 
Number of Fades 4 
Number of false Alarms 3 
Number of hits  14 
Number of Misses  2 
Number of correct rejection  181 
reaction time =   0.98562 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 1199.9 
Number of Fades 0 
Number of false Alarms  5 
Number of hits  16 
Number of Misses  2 
Number of correct rejection  177 
reaction time =   0.94344 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 1799.8 
Number of Fades 0 
Number of false Alarms  1 
Number of hits  14 
Number of Misses  0 
                                                 
39 The model is stochastic. In this context “Typically” means that the MOEs in multiple runs would 
converge to a mean value.  
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Number of correct rejection  185 
reaction time =   1.00219 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
 
This print out shows the main MOEs (False Alarm, Misses, Reaction 
Time) and their compliments (hits, correct rejections) at different time intervals (namely 
after 600 seconds, 1200 seconds and 1800 seconds). Fades are stimuli that were not 
processed within their expiration time (for auditory signals 2-8 seconds).  
The StressAgent offers two ways to induce stress to RHPM. Increasing the 
update rate of the stress agent is an analog to humans that reach their stress threshold 
faster than a more relaxed subject. Increasing the stress increment indicates a higher 
impact of stress on individuals. Changing theses parameters leads to interesting 
outcomes. When STRESS_DELTA is set to 0.08 (instead of 0.002) the outcome shows a 
very interesting phenomenon:  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 600.0 
Number of Fades 5 
Number of false Alarms  3 
Number of hits  14 
Number of Misses  2 
Number of correct rejection  181 
reaction time =   1.19086 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 1199.9 
Number of Fades 83 
Number of false Alarms  2 
Number of hits  11 
Number of Misses  8 
Number of correct rejection  197 
reaction time =   6.46071 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Stats Collecting @ 1799.8 
Number of Fades 200 
Number of false Alarms  0 
Number of hits  0 
Number of Misses  14 
Number of correct rejection  186 




Initially RHPM reacts by slowing down the information process from just 
below one second to several seconds. In the first time interval RHPM started out slower 
than normal but still within “normal” range in terms of false alarms, misses and reaction 
time. However, in the second time interval with the stress level increasing, the reaction 
times increased steeply and RHPM had a significant number of unprocessed information 
(83 fades). The last time period shows a complete breakdown. RHPM did not process any 
information (all stimuli faded in the STSS).  
This looks very much like an interesting analog to the human phenomenon 
of tunnel vision. Increased stress level can lead to narrowing down attention to a point 
where important dimensions of the situations are completely blocked out of the conscious 
awareness. RHPM produces a similar outcome with an increased stress update rate and a 
default value for the stress increment.  
4. Summary 
RHPM showed its contribution by closely matching human performance 
degradation within four different experiments.  
Reaction Time Misses False Alarms MOE vs. 
treatment 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30 
Low X X X X X X X X X 
High X X X ///// X X X X X 
Low-High-Low X X X X X ////// X X X 
High-Low-High X X X ////// X X X X ////// 
Table 8.   Comparison of MOE Fitness 
 
Table 8 shows where during the validation runs between human and 
computational results there was not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis that the 
compared data had an equal mean indicated by (X). Statistically significant differences 
occurring are indicated by (/////). Two of these differences occur at the initial time phase 
for a high workload. As pointed out earlier, this indicates that there is a transient phase 
that neither the theory nor the model captures.  
The differences between RHPM and experimental data are minor considering that 
there were 36 measurements (4 experiments * 9 MOEs) and only four differed from each 
other. There seems to be a perceptual learning effect for human subjects which enables 
them to distinguish noise and signals more easily after a certain number of experiments or 
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exposure to number of signals. This could be modeled by changing the values of signal 
and noise parameters (mean and variance) over time. Thus the sensitivity (or the ability to 
distinguish signals) would increase with gaining perceptual experience over time. The 
sensitivity decrement would still occur however it would start at a different point. This is 
certainly a topic for further research and ongoing discussion with vigilance researchers. 
Another interesting finding is the start up effect in the high workload condition. It 
took subjects a while to re-adjust to four different tasks. Normally subjects get a warm up 
period before the experiment, however, in this case there was no warm up phase at all. 
This very closely resonates with operational monitoring tasks, a radar screen operator 
starts immediately working and might be prone to more errors initially before adapting to 
the task again. RHPM can be used to show that by adjusting parameters the differences in 
performance are minimized and thus help gaining insights into the explanation of the 
phenomenon. The difference could be modeled by giving less resources to the 
Focus_Agent initially or by introducing a task difficulty factor that would require more 
resources to process the task at hand. However, it would be questionable to just change 
some parameters without backing it up with the theoretical implications. Hence a change 
to the structure of model would only make sense if human experiments validate the 
hypothesis. RHPM generated three notable hypotheses in terms of vigilance theory 
improvement: 
· Humans need initial time to adjust to a vigilance task. This influence 
seems to correlate with the difficulty of a task or the overall workload, 
since this effect was very pronounced with high workload.  
· There are two forces influencing the sensitivity: One is the known 
decrementing force over time. However, there could be an incrementing 
force correlating with the number of perceived signals. The influence of 
the latter one indicates a perceptual learning effect that gains more 
importance (compared to the decrement factor) over time. 
· The sensitivity decrement as well as the shift of response bias have limits. 
It appears likely that the rate of change towards these limits decreases 
which would be a possible explanation for the leveling off effect. 
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C. VALIDATION ISSUES 
This section describes the assessment activities to validate RHPM as a 
computational model of vigilance. Validation is always a best effort process when there is 
no mathematical way to proof the correctness of a model. However, as described earlier 
there are ongoing efforts especially in the domain of cognitive modeling to improve the 
validation process. However, there are also some resources that describe how to validate 
simulations (Law and Kelton 1991; Knepell and Arangno 1993). The major assessment 
activities applied to RHPM are: 
· Conceptual model validation 
· Software verification 
· Operational validation 
· Data validation 
The next sections describe how these activities were applied to RHPM. 
1. Conceptual Model Validation 
Conceptual validation attempts to establish the reliability of the model 
design and the integrity of its development, facilitated by completeness of 
documentation and augmented by expertise and training of the CA 
analysts. Consideration is given to development history, level of detail, 
level of fidelity, inputs, outputs/measure of effectiveness (MOEs), 
ranges/specification, and premises of design”(Knepell and Arangno 1993, 
p. 3-I) 
Knepell also points out that a “new generation of simulation languages present a 
breakthrough in the field. These languages support graphical model development using 
iconic displays. These includes Schruben’s SIGMA” (Knepell and Arangno 1993, p.3-I) 
This research uses Schruben’s work on event graphs for a thorough 
documentation of RHPM’s design. The psychological models human information stage 
processing model and the multiple resource model) have been transformed in an event 
graph based model. Thus, RHPM has a transparent design. A validation strategy was in 
place before the first line of code was written. The intended use of the model was very 
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clear from the beginning: Design a computational model of vigilance that is embedded in 
a new cognitive framework composed of multi-agent systems.  
The main design ideas were discussed with leading researchers in the field 
(Wickens 2002; Parasuraman 2003) and their input influenced the design choices. Even 
implementation details like “Should the Short Term Sensory Store be modeled as a first 
in first out (FIFO) queue or a (last in last out) LIFO queue?” were discussed with experts 
to assure closeness between theories and implementation. 
The next section explains how the conceptual model was translated into software 
and how this software was verified. 
2. Software Verification 
Software verification includes completeness and compatibility of 
functions and concepts within the model, development integrity and 
thoroughness of documentation, as well as maintainability, level of 
fidelity, ease of use , overall runtime, implementation of design elements 
and system components (Knepell and Arangno 1993, p.3-I). 
 
RHPM has several main components and sub-components that are implemented 
in JAVA. Every component can be tested independently from each other by running its 
main method. Thus we tested every component against its design objective. The 
algorithm were tested with print out statements to assure correctness of computation. A 
graphical user interface enables animation of scenarios and change of input parameter. 
This eases the use of the model and gives visual information about the processes.  
Run times for the calibration process can be very long (48 hrs for 1000 runs with 
30 repetitions), obviously depending on the number of runs and repetitions. A single run 
without repetition takes less than five seconds. This is quite acceptable considering that 
30 minutes of real time are simulated.  
We also conducted trace analysis to evaluate when objects were passed between 
objects to assure that the processes worked properly. The additional JAVA package, 
designed by Prof. Buss, called Simkit, allows single step processing with a print to the 
screen event list. The properties of all statistical objects can also be “dumped” to the 
screen. Thus we have been able to verify every single step through the model.  
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The next section shows an exerpt of the event list generated by the model during 
instantiation (setting their attributes to predetermined values and scheduling first actions 
of the objects and agents 
Time: 0.000     Current Event: Run      [31] 
 ** Event List --  ** 
0.000   GenerateSound   Signal or Noise are generated 
0.000   StartFull                 Fuel gauge starts 
0.000   CheckFuel            Initially subject checks the fuel gauge 
0.000   StartLetterDisplay  Sternberg memory task gets displayed 
0.000   TimeStress             Time ticker for the performance starts. 
0.050   DisplayMathTask  Math task is displayed 
0.226   Update  {flow regulator agent 2}  This flow regulator agent will check  
      its flow 
1.108   Update  { ResourceAgent code spatial modality meta  stage   
 processing providing false} This resource agent will check its flow 
…… 
 ** End  of Event List --  ** 
Together with the property changes of the objects and the event list it is possible 
to verify even simultaneously occuring simulation steps. Thus it was fairly 
straightforward to verify the correct implementation of the designed event graphs. 
3. Operational Validation 
Operational validation is based on a rigorously-defined operational test 
plan, and provides documentation for all procedures and results; the plan 
incorporates excursions as deemed necessary, and in general is designed to 
1) baseline the model, 2) stress the model, and 3) establish parametric 
comparisons with previous testing efforts as well as with known or 
accepted results (Knepell and Arangno 1993, p.3-2). 
 
This type of validation includes inspection tests, demonstration tests and 
analytical tests. RHPM application runs showed known pitfalls of different theories. One 
example is that an increase in signal probability leads to a decrease of failure rates. Signal 
detection theory does not depict that. However, there are ways to improve the fit of the 
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computational model, for example by allowing signal and noise distribution to change 
over time. These changes might possible generate insights with vigilance researchers. 
The calibration process was in itself a test because it changes structure and 
parameter of the model until the model fitted the different MOEs reasonably well. If the 
model could not have been configured to fit the experimental outcome, then questions 
about it’s functional validity would arise immediately. 
4. Data Validation 
Data validation includes an analysis of data derivation, trustworthiness of 
data origin, consistency throughout the model and code, and output, as 
well as analysis of the representation of the constants and variable 
definitions, units of measure and ranges (Knepell and Arangno 1993, p. 3-
2). 
 
Data validation is certainly an overt validation strategy because one only tries to 
match human data. Again Carley’s harmonization process has supported this type of 
validation by assuring a configured model that could then be used in experiments. The 
calibrated model produced results that we compared to human data in a thorough data 
analysis. Since we had all experimental results the data is trustworthy.  
Units of measure and ranges for our capacity manager are certainly questionable 
as we have not tried to tie our parameters to research data on the electrical flow inside the 
brain. This is also true for some of the constants that we used to represent the resistors or 
potentiometers. However, this research has not claimed that our brain looks like an 
electrical circuit but that cognitive resources modeled as electrical circuits can help to 




The validation run results of RHPM match our expectations. The model showed 
reliable behavior during “normal” simulation runs. It closely approximates individual 
human data and shows a reasonable range of behaviors. It also generated insights into 
applying theories to the phenomenon (e.g. the importance of the detectability of a signal). 
RHPM could be validated against two previously unseen scenarios. RHPM can also 
demonstrate the pitfalls of certain theories. For example: it is well known, that an 
increase in signal probability leads to an improvement of the miss and false alarm rate. 
Signal detection theory does not address this phenomenon. Consequently, RHPM 
increases the miss rate instead of decreasing it. However, by looking at the design of the 
model and how different modules work with each other, there are possible solutions on 
how to improve the model performance. These improvements could potentially reflect 
improvements in the theories.  
The multiple resource model’s implementation influences the reaction time in a 
normal case. As soon as the main energy level decreases, the error rates increase to a 
point where the model does not process any signals. This should be facilitated for 
example, by introducing more stressors to the model than time on task or change of 
workload. 
Some experimental results also indicated the need to introduce perceptual learning 
(better distinguishing signals) into the model. These mechanisms are not well 
documented in vigilance research and it requires further research to introduce perceptual 
learning to a computational model of vigilance. 
One possible limitation of the proof of concept implementation is the question of 
how well it would fit scenarios from a different experimental set up. The time effort to 
program new scenarios is low and due to the open architecture it can be connected very 
fast. However, some task characteristics (i.e., signal salience) should be adjusted before 
RHPM should be used. 
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RHPM can certainly generate surprises by simply missing signals or giving false 
alarms too often. The surprise factor can be increased by changing certain parameters. 
One example is the probability of a slip. The response selection agent passes the decision 
(e.g. SayYes) to the ResponseExecution agent. The response execution than depends on 
how busy this agent is. It can conduct a omission error by having the information fade 
away or simply by a slip saying “No” instead of a “Yes” with a given probability. This 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This chapter summarizes the main findings and conclusions. It then describes 
further research questions that stem out of this research. 
A. CONTRIBUTION 
This research suggested a new cognitive model that simulates individual reduced 
human performance. The human experiment shows evidence that personality traits 
(especially extroversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness) do in fact influence 
vigilance performance. However, personality traits’ multiple regression models only 
accounted for approximately a third of the variance in the data.  
This research also shows evidence for distinct cross-cultural differences in 
personality and vigilance performance. Further research is needed to integrate this cross- 
cultural differences into cognitive modeling. It is very obvious that the average 
assumption for behavior of performance degradation is neither true for a single 
population nor for cross-cultural populations. The pitfalls of mirror imaging (thinking and 
here even modeling that others should think and act like ourselves) loom behind 
simulation systems that do not take these differences into consideration. 
Using a discrete event simulation together with the event graph design opens a 
cognitive architecture to design discussions with the domain experts (in our case human 
factor specialists and psychologists).40  
Further contributions contain evidence that a paradigm shift in human behavior 
modeling taking vagary into account is suggestive. The proposed framework for the next-
generation cognitive architecture has shown advantages in terms of robustness and 
adaptivity. The open and flexible architecture shows a possible path of cooperation 
between modelers. The implemented parts of the cognitive framework show their 
contribution by modeling the challenging problem of vigilance decrement.  
                                                 
40 This claim is very similar to what the meta language Unified Modeling Language (UML) tries to 
achieve. However, it appears that UML is not necessarily the right description tool for discrete event 
simulations. 
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RHPM has been validated with quantitative and qualitative analysis. It closely 
approximates individual human performance and shows a reasonable range for it’s 
behaviors. The model has limitations and potential improvements were mentioned. These 
improvements should occur in cooperation with vigilance researchers.  
This research suggests a research direction to improve signal detection theory. 
The model’s behavior and the theories predicted behavior are coherent. However, a 
difference in outcomes between human experiments and RHPM lead to the assumption, 
that there are perceptual learning effects in signal detection affecting the sensitivity. 
RHPM can fit the data better with a sensitivity increase based on the number of signals. If 
the number of signals reaches a certain threshold signal detection seems to become easier. 
The next step should be human vigilance experiments that try to find out whether or not 
there is a relation between number of signals and a sensitivity increment.  
Two further achievements deserve mentioning: 
1)  RHPM seems to be the first computational vigilance model composed of 
multi agent systems.  
2) The implementation of Wickens multiple resource model also seems to be 
a first try for a computational model on multiple cognitive resources. 
Thus this research contributes to the modeling of human behavior as well as to 
cognitive psychology especially to vigilance research. It is difficult to compare it’s 
behavior with current cognitive architecture since it has not the same level of 
sophistication. However, it has shown its potential by modeling an important 
phenomenon that hasn’t been modeled by others. It also showed that a multi agent system 
based on complex adaptive system’s theory can be used to produce desired results that 
are within human range of performance.  
B. SCALABILITY 
The question how a model scales is certainly an important question. Our 
architecture is lightweight in terms of storage space (less than 200 Kb) and it performs 
rather fast. However, this question could only be answered if the architecture were 
integrated into a simulation system that allows for vigilance decrement. One potential 
example is Calfee’s simulation system that takes reduced performance of air defense 
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operators into account.(Calfee 2003) The source code is available yet uncommented at 
the current time. A close cooperation with Calfee would certainly enhance the validity of 
both models and could show evidence for the scalability. 
However a big advantage of the loosely coupled approach is the possibility to 
taylor-make task oriented computer generated forces. If one only needed the function of 
either detecting or missing a radar signal there is no need for an architecture that can do 
more than that. Thus the sufficiency criterion for modeled functions is a big advantage of 
this open model. 
Another legitimate criticism is the unanswered question whether the entire 
approach would scale to a complete cognitive architecture. However, there is no current 
cognitive architecture that claims that it can model all human behavior with a single 
architecture. The new approach with complex adaptive systems is certainly promising 
and will be described next. 
C. COGNITIVE MODELLING WITH COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
This research started with the hypothesis that human performance can be modeled 
with a complex adaptive system (complex adaptive system hypothesis CASH). Cognitive 
modeling with complex adaptive system is a new approach that has yet to show its value. 
This research contributes to its valid claim of being a new promising avenue by 
successfully modeling the phenomenon of vigilance decrement. It is possible to harness a 
complex adaptive system in a way that it can produce desired emergent behavior in our 
case the realistic occurence of a vigilance decrement. The inherent capability of CAS to 
learn and to adapt to an ever changing environment seems to be an ideal fit to human 
performance modeling. However, the implementation of these ideas is not easy and some 
of the mechanism can only be modeled rudimentarily.  
Findings in evolutionary psychology indicate that certain cognitive functions are 
“hard-wired” functions that have evolved. In order to be a truly successful approach, a 
close cooperation with researchers of both fields (evolutionary psychology, modeling and 
simulation) is needed.  
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D. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
A perceived weakness of cognitive models is their tendency to rely on a stimulus-
response sequence. In reality humans are constantly processing information within the 
context of current plans and intentions (McCauley 2003). RHPM provides a capability to 
include this higher dimension into the model. However since this research focused on 
vigilance performance there is a need for further research to include this dimension fully 
into the model. There are research efforts at NPS (for example IAGO - MOVES Institute) 
that should integrate this research to enhance cognitive modeling into this higher 
dimension. 
Several improvements of RHPM have been mentioned. It is obvious that RHPM 
is not the solution to all questions a vigilance researchers might have. However the model 
shows that a combination of signal detection theory, resource theory and expectancy 
theory delivers promising avenues for the computational modeling of vigilance. 
Distinct cross-cultural differences imply a need for research on how to integrate 
different personalities and culture into cognitive modeling. RHPM can be adjusted (i.e. 
with the help of a genetic algorithm) to mimic a given performance. There is also 
evidence that the combination of certain personality traits influence vigilance 
performance (for example: extroversion and conscientiousness). Combined with cross 
cultural differences this is certainly an interesting research direction for vigilance 
researchers. 
There are many potential applications for a model that reliably simulates reduced 
human performance. Some examples for applications are: 
· Airport security screener 
· Radar screen operator 
· Sonar screen operator 
· Intelligence analysts listening to interrogation tapes (often more than 200 
hours overall). 
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· Simulation of hostage situations where the vigilance decrement of 
terrorists is an intended goal for the negotiator 
More generally applications where auditory, visual or cognitive monitoring is 
essential lend themselves to be using a simulation system that can capture the attentional 
limitation of human capacities. 
RHPM can also help to gain more insights into the phenomenon of vigilance 
decrement and more generally into human performa nce degradation. It appears to be a 
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APPENDIX A: PRIMER ON DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION 
 
This primer gives the interested reader a brief background into the basics of 
discrete event simulation, their formal description, and an interesting way to implement 
modules as loosely coupled components.  
This method uses resources only when events occur; it does not waste the time 
between events. Figure 49 depicts the approach and its main components. 
1. Set simulation clock =0.0
2. Initialize system state and 
statistical counters
3. Initialize event list
Initialization
0. Invoke initialization
1. Invoke timing routine
2. Invoke event routine i (repeat 1)
Executive 
Class
1. Determine next event I
2. Advance simulation clock
Timing routine
1. Update system state
2. Update statistical counters
3. Generate future events and add to event list
















Figure 50.   Control Flow for Next-Event, Time -Advance Approach; (After: Law and 
Kelton 1991, p.12 Fig. 1.3) 
 
Figure 50 shows the flow of control during a discrete event simulation. The 
executive class starts the simulation by initializing the system state, event list, and 
simulation clock, and invokes the timing routine that tracks the event list and simulation 
clock. When an event routine is invoked (i.e., StartTask is an event where working agents 
process a percept conducting a specified task.) it immediately updates the system state 
and statistical counters, and generates future events (i.e., a StartTask event always 
schedules an EndTask event). The decision node checks whether the simulation should be 
terminated (e.g., because it should only run for a specified or number of events). If not, it 
goes back to the executive class, asking for the next event. The timing routine determines 
the next event I and relays it to the executive class, and the process starts all over.  
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Discrete-event-simulation design can best be visualized by means of event graphs, 
which are described in the next section. 
A.  EVENT GRAPHS 
There are several ways of visualizing discrete event simulation: process networks, 
stochastic Petri nets, stochastic state machines, and event graphs (Schruben 1992). This 
research makes intensive use of event graphs. An example provided by Lee Schruben is 
shown in the figure below.  
A B(j)





Figure 51.   Event Graph of an Object (Schruben 1995, p.472) 
 
Schruben describes the graph as follows: 
 
1.  Edges: After each occurrence of event A, if condition (i) is then 
true, event B will be scheduled to occur after a delay oft. Potential 
time ties are broken with event B receiving an execution priority, 
p. 
 
2. Vertices: Whenever event B occurs, the state variable(s) in the set 
of event parameter(s) j will be assigned the values of the 
expression(s) k computed when B was scheduled. The state of the 
system will then change from S to fB(S). The edge conditions for 
all edges exiting B will then be tested and those found true will 
have their destination events scheduled. Also, to make certain 
modeling tasks easier, events are allowed to cancel one another an 
event cancellation edge is represented in an event graph as with a 
dashed arrow. Vertices can schedule or cancel further instances of 
themselves. 
All of the elements of the event graph can be statements or expressions; 
for instance, event execution priorities, p, can be real-valued expressions 




Schruben41 favored event graphs as a means of developing an alternative event-
oriented representation of a discrete simulation system. He defined them thus: 
The event graph presented here can be used to develop alternative event 
oriented representations of a system. Several candidate model structures 
can be considered for possible implementation as discrete-event 
simulations using an event scheduling approach. Event graph analysis can 
aid in identifying state variables, in determining what events must be 
initially scheduled, anticipating possible logic errors due to simultaneous 
events, and in eliminating unnecessary event routines prior to coding a 
simulation (Schruben 1983, p.957).  
 
Research projects at Naval Postgraduate School have used event graphs 
extensively. The NPS’s expert on discrete event simulation system, Arnie Buss, describes 
event graphs and their advantages in two ways: 
Event graphs are a way of graphically representing discrete-event 
simulation models. Also known as “simulation graphs,” they have a 
minimalist design, with a single type of node and two types of edges with 
up to three options. Despite this simplicity, event graphs are extremely 
powerful. The event graph is the only graphical paradigm that directly 
models the event list logic. There are no limitations to the ability of event 
graphs to create a simulation model for any circumstance. Their 
simplicity, together with their extensibility, make them an ideal tool for 
rapid construction and prototyping of simulation models (Buss 1996,p.1).  
 
An event graph is a graph (in the formal mathematical sense of being a set 
of vertices and edges) that captures the event logic of a given model. In an 
event graph, the vertices represent the state transition function, while the 
edges capture the scheduling relationships between events (Buss and 
Sanchez 2002, p.1).  
 
These definitions identify several important features: 
1. Event graphs visually describe the logic of a model. 
2. They are simple and extensible. 
3. They are ideal for rapid prototyping. 
4. They help identify important state variables 
5. Event graphs help anticipate problems with distributed (simultaneous) 
events. 
                                                 
41 Lee Schruben conducted parts of his work while he held a National Research Council Naval 
Postgraduate School research associateship in 1992 (Yucesan, E, 1992). 
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6. They help streamline a model by eliminating unnecessary event routines. 
There is evidence that event graphs are equivalent to stochastic Petri nets 
(Schruben and Yucesan 1994). Petri nets have a reachability problem42 which is 
decidable. This can be expensive. “In the worst case, the time and memory 
(computational complexity) needed to analyze a Petri net grows exponentially with the 
size of a net” (Ralston, Reilly et al. 2000). However, since a Petri net can be analyzed, by 
induction so also can an event graph. The following references explain the features of 
Petri nets and event graphs in more detail: (Schruben 1992; Schruben and Yucesan 1994; 
Balbo, Desel et al. 2000).  
In cognitive modeling, event graphs have other interesting advantages:  
· Event graphs are easy to read and there is no need to go into 
implementation details to explain how the model works. They provide a 
transparent look into the model, avoiding black boxes.  
· Since event graphs are extensible, it is easy to create new relationships or 
simulation entities (e.g. introducing emotions into a cognitive 
architecture), thus allowing flexibility in the mathematical model.  
 
Example: Short Term Sensory Store 
At first the parameters of an entity (object, agent) are defined; these parameters 
can be changed or varied. They represent the buttons used to calibrate a model.  
1. Parameters: 
capacity; storage  where 











The important parameters for STSS are: 
· the time when a stimulus fades away (a positive real number),  
· and its storage capacity (positive integer).  
The index j belongs to a set B (which is the set of all agents or objects that use a 
capacitated queue). Next the system’s state variables in this entity are defined: 
 
                                                 
42 Reachability can be analyzed by asking whether a Petri net that starts with an initial marking (or set-
up) can reach  desired final makeup (or final state). 
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2. State Variables 
queue  FIFOin elements of num.    where BjQ j ÎÁÎ  
 
STSS only contains a state variable for its queue. Q has a positive integer value. 
Next the statistical variables are declared. 
 
3. Statistic Variables 
nsobservatio (picked) erased ofnumber  
nsobservatio dropped ofnumber   









“Fades” are observations in which the time for storage expired. “Drops” describes 
observations that couldn’t enter the system due to limited capacity. “Erases” counts the 
number of stimuli that made it into the system as percepts. Finally, the event graph shows 
the logic of STSS inner workings.  
 
































Figure 52.   Event Graph for Short Term Sensory Store 
 
 
5. Event Graph Description: 
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STSS receives a Task object from the SymbolicConstructorAgent (perception 
event) and checks whether the capacity of its store is sufficient. If so, it stores the 
observation; if not, it drops it. A time ticker is instantiated on this specific task. If it 
expires, the observation fades away (fade event). The Pick event interrupts (dashed line) 
the Fade event, given a Task in the queue. It then erases this task from the queue and 
relays it to the UpdateAgent (UA). 
This brief example shows how a system’s components can be described in a rigid 
way. Its design is transparent and facilitates discussion. For the interested reader, 
Appendix A describes all entities of the simulation system as event graphs that can be 
taken as a surrogate of the simulation system.  
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APPENDIX B: EVENT GRAPH FORMULATIONS 
 
This appendix shows the blueprint for RHPM’s main entities: 
 








Task which is an object containing state variables like taskTime 
 
Statistic Variables 

















The SymbolicConstructorAgent serves as input channel to the model. It creates an 





capacity; storage  where 











Literature review shows that visual information can be stored for approx. 1 
second, auditory information time ranges from 2 to 8 seconds. It is unclear how much 
unconscious information can be stored into the STSS. We assume it has a limited 
capacity similar to working memory (7±2) 
 
State Variables 
queue  FIFOin elements of num.    where BjQ j ÎÁÎ  
Statistic Variables 
nsobservatio (picked) erased ofnumber  
nsobservatio dropped ofnumber   








Fades are observations where the time for storage expired. Drops describes 



































STSS receives a Task object from the SCA (Perception event) and checks whether 
or not the capacity of its store is sufficient. If there is enough capacity it stores the 
observation. If not it drops the observation. A time ticker is instantiated on this specific 
task. If it expires the observation fades away (Fade event) The Pick event interrupts the 
Fade event, given there is a Task in the queue. It then erases this task from the queue and 




Every agent in the cognitive module is a kind of working agent with slight 
differences. Thus we describe the common events first and then only describe events that 
are changed or entirely specific to this type of agent 
 
Parameters: 
capacity; storage  where 
ime;recovery t   where 



















flow of function as ask timeleftover t   where 
flowcurrent    where  F
)recoveringnot ,1recovering(0agent  of statusrecovery     where R
busy)idle,1(0agent  of status    where  S




















agent  workingof task finished ofnumber    W;k   where
percepts dropped ofnumber ;








Fades are observations where the time for storage expired. Drop describes 
percepts that couldn’t enter the system due to limited capacity. Jobs keeps track of the 


































































· Run event (coming from the main class) initializes agent status into idle 
and not recovering. 
· InitFlow: Agent receives its initial flow from AMPERE and uses it as goal 
flow. 
· TaskArrival: Agent receives information (percept) 
· StartTask: Agent begins to works with the information and signals a 
“ChangeRes” event to AMPERE. 
· EndTask: Agent has finished task, processes it to router, and signals a 
“ChangeRes” event to AMPERE. It then schedules a Recover event or a 
StartTask event, depending whether or not there are further percepts in its 
queue.  
· Recover: After the appropriate time the agent has recovered and can start a 
new task, given there is a task in queue. 
· ChangeFlow comes from AMPERE: Agent’s flow has changed, if agent is 
not idle and not recovering, it reschedules the EndTask event. 









Like WorkingAgent additionally: 
















































































The TaskArrival event comes from the PerceptAgent (PA). Another event that 
adds on to the WorkingAgent events is the ChangeRecover time. This event enables the 
agent to have different recover times TUA depending on the perceived signal probability 





















































































The PerceptAgent receives information from the update agent and recognizes and 









Like WorkingAgent, additionally  






















































































ComparisonAgent receives its tasks from the PerceptAgent. It has two additional 
events compared to WorkingAgent: Found and NotFound set the value for the Boolean 
variable flag. The StartTask event also schedules a Search event within the 
WorkingMemoryStore. We assume that the search time is included into the 
ComparisonAgent. If the task resides in the WorkingMemoryStore the TransmitAgent 


















































































TaskAllocatorAgent gets a task from the PerceptAgent. When it finishes its task it 




















































































The TransmitAgent can get its input either from the ComparisonAgent or the 




















































































SearchAgent is the agent looking into long term memory whether or not an object 
is a known object. Right now it is called by the ComparisonAgent. However it would be 
an obvious extension to have the SCA relay information towards long term memory via 
the SearchAgent immediately. Since we have not implemented long term memory it just 



















































































StorageAgent receives a task from the SearchAgent. It then stores this new 






capacity; storage  where 













queue  FIFOin elements of num.    where BjQ j ÎÁÎ  
 
Statistic Variables 
nsobservatio (picked) erased ofnumber  
nsobservatio dropped ofnumber   















































WorkingMemoryStore gets input either from the SearchAgent (storing 
information), from the ComparisonAgent (looking for information), or from the 
StressAgent reducing its storage capacity. The SearchInformation event returns 
information (found/not found) to the ComparisonAgent. It also stores the current task at 






;expectancy on based increase criterion decision  +ÂÎcd Like WorkingAgent 
 
State Variables 












































































ResponseSelection is a kind of WorkingAgent. The difference is an additional 
event ChangeCriterion. This event comes from the ExpectancyAgent. It changes the 
decision bias according to a perceived signal probability. It informs the ExpectancyAgent 











NO ofnumber  ;
 YESofnumber  ;





































ResponseExecution is an object that takes the input from ResponseSelection. It 
lends itself to introduce slips into the model. A slip is defined as saying the opposite from 
what has been decided. The probability of a slip is a parameter that can either be set 






flow; goal aroundy sensitivit  where
flow; goal  where













































RegulatorFlowAgents are instantiated by the main class. They update their 
knowledge of flow periodically. The UpdateEvent asks Ampere for the current flow. 
Ampere creates a ChangeFlow event for the demanding agent (identified by myID). If the 






flow; goal aroundy sensitivit  where
flow; goal  where
















jobs suppliedcurrently  ofnumber  ;SupJob
flowcurrent  ;
ÁÎ





































ResourceAgent is informed either by the TaskAllocatorAgent or the 
TransmitAgent. ResourceAgent only controls its flow, if there are tasks that fit its code or 
modality. As soon as all of this tasks are finished the ResourceAgent does not update 






;factor  conversion  wherec









ter value;potentiome  where
;  valueresistance  thermal where 










































*0 = main class







Ampere schedules a priority event (indicated by the thick arrow) to initialize the 
flow of all agents. WorkingAgents (WA) change their resistance when a task starts or 
ends. Once a resistance is invoked it increases over time. FlowRegulatorAgents (FRA) 
change their resistance based on a decision. Whenever a ChangeRes event occurs all 
WorkingAgents are informed about the change. If a specific FlowRegulatorAgent asks for 
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APPENDIX C: DETAILED RESULTS OF NEO FFI PERSONALITY 
TEST 
 
This appendix shows in detail all the results of the personality experiment. The 
interested reader is advised to be aware of: 
· The sample of foreign students (12) is small and from four very different 
countries (Germany, Greece, Turkey, Singapore) compared to the sample 
of US students (38).  
· The distinction between high and low is based on the assumption that a 
score of >= 50 is high and <50 is low. A more thorough investigation with 
more subjects should certainly distinguish between average (from 45 to 
55), high >65, 35 > low< 45, very high >65, very low <35) 
· This is only a quick analysis not utilizing sophisticated data mining 
technologies. It should serve as a starting point for follow-on research. 
 
This research has not intended to show cross cultural differences. However, the 
interaction of certain personality traits indicates evidence for some major differences 
between the two populations and could potentially generated initial research questions. 
All definitions are taken from the NEO FFI manual. 
A. STYLE OF DEFENSE 
The style of defense is defined by the interaction between the factors neuroticism 
(N) and openness (O). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Maladaptive 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and low in 
openness (N+, O-). 
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Maladaptive individuals tend to use primitive and ineffective defenses such as 
repression, denial, and reaction formation. They prefer not to think about disturbing 
ideas, and they may refuse to acknowledge possible dangers (such as serious illnesses). 
They lack insight into the distressing affects they experience, and because they cannot 
verbalize their feelings they may be considered as alexithymic. 
 
2. Hypersensitive 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and high in 
openness (N+, O+). 
Hypersensitive individuals seem undefended. They are alert to danger and vividly 
imagine possible misfortunes. They may be prone to nightmares. Because they think in 
unusual and creative ways, they may sometimes be troubled by odd and eccentric ideas. 
 
3. Hyposensitive 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and low in 
openness (N-, O-). 
Hyposensitive individuals rarely experience strong negative affect, and when they 
do, they downplay its importance. They do not dwell on threats or losses, turning instead 
to concrete action to solve the problem or simply to distract themselves. They put their 
faith in higher powers 
4. Adaptive 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and high in 
openness (N-, O+). 
Adaptive individuals are keenly aware of conflict, stress, and threat, but use these 
situations to stimulate creative adaptations. They grapple intellectually with their own 


















The data indicates that the sample of foreign students is significantly more prone 
to being hypersensitive than hyposensitive. US students are more prone to being 
hyposensitive. Both populations include a good proportion of adaptive individuals. There 
is no significant proportion of maladaptive individuals in both samples. In terms of 
conducting warfare it is certainly desirable to have a population that is biased toward 
being adaptive or hyposensitive. 
 
B. STYLE OF ANGER CONTROL 
The style of defense is defined by the interaction between the factors neuroticism 
(N) and agreeableness (A). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Temperamental 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and low in 
agreeableness (N+, A-). 
Temperamental people are easily angered and tend to express anger directly. They 
may fly into a rage over a minor irritant, and they can seethe with anger for long periods 
of time. They are deeply involved in themselves and take offense readily, and they often 
 168 
overlook the affects of anger on others. They may be prone to physical aggression or 
verbal abuse  
2. Timid 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and high in 
agreeableness (N+, A+). 
Timid people are heavily conflicted over anger. On the one hand, their feelings 
are readily hurt and they often feel victimized. On the other, they are reluctant to express 




Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and high in 
agreeableness (N-, A+). 
Easy-going people are slow to anger and reluctant to express it when it arises. 
They know when they have been insulted and may raise objections, but they would prefer 
to forget and forgive. They understand that there are two sides to every issue and try to 
work a common ground in resolving disputes 
4. Cold-Blooded 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and low in 
agreeableness (N-, A-). 
Cold-blooded people “don’t get mad, they get even.” These people often take 
offense, but they are not overpowered by feelings of anger. Instead they keep accounts 
and express their animosity at a time and in a way that suits them. They may seek 
revenge in criminal assaults, or more commonly manipulative office politics or 







Anger US FS NPS 
Students 
US% FS% NPS 
Students% 
Cold-Blooded 14 4 18 36.84 33.33 36.00 
Easy-Going 14 2 16 36.84 16.67 32.00 
Temperamental 5 5 10 13.16 41.67 20.00 
Timid 5 1 6 13.16 8.33 12.00 

















Most US students are either easy-going or cold-blooded. Easy-going is certainly 
the desirable style of anger control in any organization. The sample of foreign student has 
a tendency of either being cold-blooded or temperamental. The latter is certainly 
undesirable in any organization. Timid individuals are a strong minority with about 12% 
in both samples. Their overall performance is certainly impacted by the amount of anger 





C. STYLE OF WELL-BEING 
The style of well-being is defined by the interaction between the factors 
neuroticism (N) and extraversion (E). The different categories are defined as: 
 
1. Gloomy Pessimist 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and low in 
extraversion (N+, E-). 
These people face a dark and dreary life. There is little that cheers them and much 
that causes anguish and distress. Especially under stressful circumstances they may 
succumb to periods of clinical depression and even when they function normally, they 
often find life hard and joyless. 
2. Overly Emotional 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and high in 
extraversion (N+, E+). 
These people experience both positive and negative emotions fully and may 
swing rapidly from one mood to another. Their interpersonal interactions may be 
tumultuous because they are so easily carried away by their feelings. They may show 
features of the Histrionic Personality Disorder, but they may also feel that their lives are 
full of excitement. 
3. Upbeat Optimist 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and high in 
extraversion (N-, E+). 
These people are usually cheerful because they are not unduly troubled by 
problems, and they have a keen appreciation for life’s pleasures. When faced with 
frustration or disappointment, they may become angry or sad, but they quickly put their 
feelings behind them. They prefer to concentrate on the future, which they view with 
eager anticipation. They enjoy life. 
4. Low-keyed 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and low in 
extraversion (N-, E-). 
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Neither good news or bad news has much effect of these people; they maintain a 
stoic indifference to events that would frighten or delight others. Their interpersonal 
relationship may suffer because other people might find them to be “cold fish”. Their 
emotional experience of life is bland. 
 
WellBeing US FS NPS 
Students 




3 2 5 7.89 16.67 10.00 
Low-
keyed 
7 0 7 18.42 0.00 14.00 
Overly 
Emotional 
7 4 11 18.42 33.33 22.00 
Upbeat 
Optimist 
21 6 27 55.26 50.00 54.00 
























The majority of both populations tend to be upbeat optimists. The sample of 
foreign student tends to score high in neuroticism which causes the significant proportion 
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of gloomy pessimists and overly emotional people. The trend of US students towards 
extraversion can be seen by the proportion of optimists and overly emotional people. 
However, there are also low-keyed people that are quit the opposite scoring low in E and 
in N. Low-keyed people have some characteristics that could be facilitated in a variety of 
specialty assignments (i.e. analysts).  
D. STYLE OF IMPULSE CONTROL 
The style of impulse control is defined by the interaction between the factors 
neuroticism (N) and conscientiousness (C). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Undercontrolled 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and low in 
conscientiousness (N+, C-). 
These individuals are often at the mercy of their own impulses. They find it 
difficult and distressing to resist any urge or desire, and they lack the self control to hold 
their urges in check. As a result they may act in ways that they know are not in their long-
term best interests. They maybe particularly susceptible to substance abuse and other 
health risk behavior 
2. Overcontrolled 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in neuroticism and high in 
conscientiousness (N+, C+). 
These individuals combine distress-proneness with a strong need to control their 
behavior. They have perfectionists’ strivings and will not allow themselves to fail even in 
the smallest detail. Because their goals are often unrealistic and unattainable, they are 
prone to guilt and self-recrimination. They maybe susceptible to obsessive and 
compulsive behavior. 
3. Directed 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and high in 
conscientiousness (N-, C+). 
These individuals have a clear sense of their goals and the ability to work toward 
them even under unfavorable conditions. They take setbacks and frustrations in stride, 




Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in neuroticism and low in 
conscientiousness (N-, C-). 
These individuals see little need to exert rigorous control over their behavior. 
They tend to take the easy way, and they are philosophical about disappointments. They 
may need extra assistance in motivating themselves to follow appropriate medical advice 
or to undertake any effortful endeavor. 
 
Impulse US FS NPS 
Students 
US% FS% NPS 
Students% 
Directed 23 3 26 60.53 25.00 52.00 
Overcontrolled 8 2 10 21.05 16.67 20.00 
Relaxed 5 3 8 13.16 25.00 16.00 
Undercontrolled 2 4 6 5.26 33.33 12.00 

















The foreign student sample represents an almost normal population distributed 
evenly over the four categories. However, there is a very distinct difference towards the 
US student sample. Clearly their behavior is governed by a generally high score in 
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conscientiousness. They certainly tend to be directed or over controlled. In terms of 
desirable style the directed person has certainly many advantages especially in military 
organizations. 
E. STYLE OF INTERESTS 
The style interest is defined by the interaction between the factors extraversion 
(E) and openness (O). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Mainstream Consumers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in extraversion and low in 
openness (E+, O-). 
Their interests reflect the popular favorites: Parties, sports, shopping, blockbuster 
movies – events where they can enjoy themselves with others. They are attracted to 
businesses and jobs that let them work with others on simple projects. 
2. Creative Interactors 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and high in 
openness (E+, O+). 
Their interests revolve around the new and different and they like to share their 
discoveries with others. They enjoy public speaking and teaching and fit well into 
discussion groups. They enjoy meeting people from different backgrounds. 
3. Introspectors 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and low in 
openness (E+, O+). 
Their interests are focused on ideas and activities they can pursue alone. Reading, 
writing, or creative hobbies like painting and music appeal to them. They prefer 
occupations that provide both challenge and privacy. 
4. Homebodies 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and low in 
openness (E+, O+). 
Their interests are focused activities they can pursue alone or in a small group. 
They are unadventurous and may collect stamps or coins, watch television, or garden. 
Their vocational interests may include mechanical or domestic work. 
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Interest US FS NPS 
Students 




19 9 28 50.00 75.00 56.00 
Homebodies 5 0 5 13.16 0.00 10.00 
Introspector 5 2 7 13.16 16.67 14.00 
Mainstream 
Consumers 
9 1 10 23.68 8.33 20.00 























The overwhelming majority of the foreign student sample tends to be creative 
interactors. Although this is also very pronounced within the US student’s sample, there 
are also a significant number of mainstream consumers in the sample. Presumably 





F. STYLE OF INTERACTIONS 
The style of interactions is defined by the interaction between the factors 
extraversion (E) and agreeableness (A). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Leaders 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in extraversion and low in 
agreeableness (E+, A-). 
These people enjoy social situations as an arena in which they can shine. They 
prefer giving orders to taking them and believe they are particularly well suited to making 
decisions. They may be boastful and vain, but they also know how to get people to work 
together. 
2. Welcomers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in extraversion and high in 
agreeableness (E+, A+). 
These people sincerely enjoy the company of others. They are deeply attached to 
their old friends and reach out freely to new ones. They are good-natured and 
sympathetic, willing to lend an ear and happy to chat about their own ideas. They are 
easy to get along with and popular. 
3. The Unassuming 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and high in 
agreeableness (E-, A+). 
These people are modest and self-effacing. They often prefer to be alone, but they 
are also sympathetic and respond to others’ needs. Because they are trusting, others may 
sometimes take advantage of them. Their friends should watch out for their interests but 
still respect their privacy  
4. Competitors 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and low in 
agreeableness (E-, A-). 
These people tend to view others as potential enemies. They are wary and distant 
and keep to themselves. They prefer respect to friendship and guard their privacy 




Interaction US FS NPS 
Students 
US% FS% NPS 
Students% 
Competitors 6 1 7 15.79 8.33 14.00 
Leaders 13 8 21 34.21 66.67 42.00 
Unassuming 4 1 5 10.53 8.33 10.00 
Welcomers 15 2 17 39.47 16.67 34.00 


















Clearly the sample of foreign students has a strong tendency to leadership. The 
US student sample tends towards welcomers or leaders. There exist also a significant 
proportion of competitors, which is obviously not a style of interactions that any 
organization would prefer. 
 
G. STYLE OF ACTIVITY 
The style of interactions is defined by the interaction between the factors 
extraversion (E) and conscientiousness (C). The different categories are defined as: 
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1. Fun Lovers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in extraversion and low in 
conscientiousness (E+, C-). 
They are full of energy and vitality, but they find it hard to channel their energy in 
constructive directions. Instead they prefer to enjoy life with thrills, adventures, and 
raucous parties. They are spontaneous and impulsive, ready to drop work for the chance 
of a good time 
2. Go Getters 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in extraversion and high in 
conscientiousness (E+, C+). 
They are productive and work with a rapid tempo. They know exactly what needs 
to be done and are eager to pitch in. They might design their own self-improvement 
program and follow it with zeal. They might seem pushy if they try to impose their style 
on others. 
3. Plodders 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and high in 
conscientiousness (E+, C-). 
They are methodical workers who concentrate on the task at hand and work 
slowly and steadily until it’s completed. In leisure as in work, they have a measured pace. 
They cannot be hurried, but they can be counted upon to finish whatever tasks they are 
assigned. 
4. The Lethargic 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in extraversion and low in 
conscientiousness (E-, C-). 
They are unenthusiastic and have few plans or goals to motivate them. They tend 
to be passive and respond only to the most pressing demands. They rarely initiate 






Activity US FS NPS Students US% FS% NPS Students% 
Funlovers 6 6 12 15.79 50.00 24.00 
Go-Getters 22 4 26 57.89 33.33 52.00 
Lethargic 3 1 4 7.89 8.33 8.00 
Plodders 7 1 8 18.42 8.33 16.00 

















The majority of the US student sample is go-getters. The international students 
tend to be fun-lovers or go-getters. This indicates that the US students exhibit a more 
focused and goal directed behavior compared to the sample of foreign students and, of 
course, to a normal population. 
 
H. STYLE OF ATTITUDES 
The style of attitudes is defined by the interaction between the factors openness 




1. Free Thinkers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in openness and low in 
agreeableness (O+-, A-). 
They are critical thinkers who are swayed neither by tradition nor by 
sentimentality. They consider all views but then make their judgments about right and 
wrong, and they are willing to disregard others’ feelings in pursuing their own idea of the 
truth. 
2. Progressives 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in openness and high in 
agreeableness (O+-, A+). 
They take a thoughtful approach to social problems and are willing to try new 
solutions. They have faith in human nature and are confident that society can be 
improved through education, innovation, and cooperation. They believe in reason and 
being reasonable. 
3. Traditionalists 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in openness and high in 
agreeableness (O-, A+). 
These individuals rely on the values and beliefs of their family and heritage in 
seeking the best way for people to live. They feel that following the established rules 
without questions is the best way to ensure peace and prosperity for everyone. 
4. Resolute Believers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in openness and low in 
agreeableness (O-, A-). 
These individuals have strong and unchanging beliefs about social policies and 
personal morality. Because they view human nature with considerable skepticism, they 
support strict discipline and a get-tough approach to social problems. They expect 





Attitudes US FS NPS Students US% FS% NPS Students% 
Free Thinkers 10 9 19 26.32 75.00 38.00 
Progressives 14 2 16 36.84 16.67 32.00 
Resolute Believers 9 0 9 23.68 0.00 18.00 
Tradionalists 5 1 6 13.16 8.33 12.00 























The attitude of free and critical thinking is very pronounced with the foreign 
student sample. The US student sample tends slightly to the progressive side followed by 
free thinkers and resolute believers. There appears to be a significant cultural difference 
between US and foreign students.  
 
I. STYLE OF LEARNING  
The style of learning is defined by the interaction between the factors openness 





Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in openness and low in 
conscientiousness (O+, C-). 
They are attracted to new ideas and can develop them with imaginative 
elaborations, but they may get lost in flights of fancy. They are good in starting 
innovative projects, but they are less successful in completing them and may need help in 
staying focused. They are able to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity 
2. Good Students 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in openness and low in 
conscientiousness (O+, C-). 
Although they are not necessarily more intelligent than others, they combine a 
real love of learning with the diligence and organization to excel. They have a high 
aspiration level and are often creative in their approach to solving problems. They are 
likely to go as far academically as their gifts allow. 
3. By-The-Bookers 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in openness and high in 
conscientiousness (O-, C+). 
These individuals are diligent, methodical, and organize, and they abide by all the 
rules. But they lack imagination and prefer step-by-step instructions. They excel at rote 
learning but have difficulties with questions that have no one right answer. They have a 
need for structure and closure. 
4. Reluctant Scholars 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in openness and low in 
conscientiousness (O-, C-). 
Academic and intellectual pursuits are not their strength or preference. They need 
special incentives to start learning and to stick with it. They may need help in organizing 





Learning US FS NPS Students US% FS% NPS Students% 
By-The-Bookers 12 1 13.00 31.58 8.33 26.00 
Dreamers 7 7 14.00 18.42 58.33 28.00 
Good Students 17 4 21.00 44.74 33.33 42.00 
Reluctant Scholar 2 0 2.00 5.26 0.00 4.00 






















US students are mainly good students or by-the-bookers. A minority can be 
categorized as dreamers. This is clearly different with the foreign student sample. Here 
the main category is dreamers followed by good students. They seem to be more curious 
and imaginative than their American counterparts. 
J. STYLE OF CHARACTER 
The style of character is defined by the interaction between the factors 
agreeableness (A) and conscientiousness (C). The different categories are defined as: 
1. Well-Intentioned 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in agreeableness and low in 
conscientiousness (A+, C-). 
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They are giving, sympathetic, and genuinely concerned about others. However, 
their lack of organization and persistence means that they sometimes fail to follow 
through on their good intentions. They may be best at inspiring kindness and generosity 
in others. 
2. Effective Altruists 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in agreeableness and high 
in conscientiousness (A+, C+). 
They are individuals who work diligently for the benefit of the group. They are 
high in self-discipline and endurance, and they channel their efforts to the service of 
others. As volunteers, they are willing to take on difficult or thankless tasks and will stick 
to them until they get the job done. 
3. Self-Promoters 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score high in agreeableness and low in 
conscientiousness (A+, C-). 
They are concerned first and foremost with their own needs and interests, and 
they are effective in pursuing their own ends. They may be highly successful in business 
or politics because of their single-minded pursuit of their own interests. 
4. Undistinguished 
Individuals qualify for this category if they score low in agreeableness and low in 
conscientiousness (A-, C-). 
They are more concerned with their own comfort and pleasure than with the well 
being of others. They tend to be weak-willed and are likely to have some undesirable 



















The US student sample shows that the majority are either effective altruists or self 
promoters. The data indicates that the majority foreign student sample tend to be 
undistinguished which is certainly an undesirable feature for any organization. Clearly 
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